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ABSTRACT 
EXPLORING FRANCHISE BOARDS: A STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVE 
Denise M. Cumberland 
January 25, 2012 
The use of franchise advisory boards, typically composed of franchisees and 
franchisor representatives, is common practice in domestic and international franchise 
systems. Because effective board collaboration requires teamwork, understanding the 
stakeholder relationships on these boards is critical at the beginning of any board 
evaluation or organization development (OD) assessment. One of the goals of OD is to 
help organizations ensure groups, such as boards, function synergistically. 
Based on stakeholder and board governance literature, a four-quadrant grid for 
classifying franchise board relationships was proposed. This typology suggested that 
franchise board relationships could be classified based on which of the four normative 
governance processes were emphasized - partnership (franchisors and franchisees 
dedicated to working together), supporters club (franchisors and franchisees aligned to 
provide a united front to external audiences), political (franchisors and franchisees 
concerned with representing specific interests), or monitoring (franchisors and 
franchisees focused on compliance). Depending on which frames of governance the 
board favors, the relationships can be categorized as one of the following: antagonists, 
agents, allies or activists. 
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Qualitative research methods included two phases to provide triangulation. First, 
22 board members from multiple industries were interviewed. Second, a comparative 
case study of three franchise boards was conducted over an eight month period. Four 
research questions framed the study. The first question addressed why franchise boards 
form, a topic documented in practitioner literature, but with little empirical validation. 
Findings revealed that the motives for board formation do align with practitioner 
literature, with one exception. The second research question explored how franchisee 
and franchisor board members view the roles of the board. The data indicated that 
franchisors and franchisees agree on some of the reasons, but differ in some respects on 
the purpose of the boards. This suggests an issue that organization development efforts 
could help address. The third question investigated how boards were structured. 
Findings revealed some basic commonalities between different types of boards, be they 
franchise advisory councils, independent boards, or ad hoc groups. Importantly, 
however, variation in some key governance processes did have an impact on board 
member attitudes. The fourth research question examined what types of relationships 
exist. Findings supported the four grid typology, suggesting organization development 
practitioners have a practical tool for classifying franchise board relationships as 
antagonists, agents, allies or activists. The final chapter of this dissertation discusses this 
study's implications for franchise organizations. In addition, a series of 
recommendations are offered to help develop allied and activist stakeholder board 
relationships that foster trust and open communication exchanges. 
Keywords: Stakeholders; Franchise Boards; Organizational Development 
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Franchising is an $800+ billion, expanding industry in the United States. This 
business format has played a major role in shaping the U.S. economy over the last 50 
years. Franchise businesses make up 11 % of the U.S. private-sector economy and there 
are over 800,000 franchised businesses in the United States (International Franchising 
Association, 2007). Despite a weak lending environment, franchising continues to attract 
individuals with an entrepreneurial spirit seeking to establish and manage their own 
businesses. The International Franchising Association (IFA) projects a 2.5% growth rate 
in the overall number of franchise units in 2011. The importance to the economy is not 
just in the livelihood of the franchise business owner, but also in the more than 9 million 
jobs that are created from franchising enterprises. In the current environment, in which 
unemployment tops 9% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011), a strong franchise business 
model can assist in the U.S. economic recovery. 
The franchisee-franchisor relationship is interdependent. Each partner relies on 
and influences the other across multiple domains, including marketing, operations, 
finance, human resources, and governance (Morrison, 1998). Understanding what 
detracts and enhances that relationship has been the subject of much academic research 
(Baucus, Baucus, & Human, 1996; Cochet, Cormann, & Ehrmann, 2008; Kidwell, 
Nygaard, & Silkoset, 2007; Tikoo, 2005). One mechanism promoted to enhance the 
relationship between franchisees and franchisors is the establishment of franchise 
advisory councils, and another is the formation of independent associations. These 
councils and associations encourage participatory engagement and allow franchisee 
voices to be heard (Dandridge & Falbe, 1994). Although there is a substantial body of 
practitioner literature on franchise boards, there is a more limited pool of scholarly 
research. 
Background of the Study 
The International Franchising Association (IFA), a trade association representing 
the franchise industry, recommends that franchisors establish councils early in their life 
cycle (Wulff, 2005). The IFA reports that the majority of their franchisor members have 
established advisory councils and over 90% of the council participants are elected by 
fellow franchisees. In addition to sponsored councils that the franchisor initiates, 
independent franchise associations also exist. These independent associations are created 
by franchisees to leverage their collective strength to influence the franchisor 
(Sniegowski, 2010). These two types of entities, along with ad hoc councils formed by 
franchisees, have continued to form as franchising systems have proliferated over the last 
20 years (Barkoff & Green-Kelly, 2006). In this study I use the general term franchise 
board, except when it is necessary to indicate relevant differences between the various 
structures. 
Current understandings of why boards form and the roles these boards play are 
based largely on normative guidelines provided by franchise consultants (e.g., Evan 
Carmichael Consulting; John Powers; Ingage Consulting), franchising attorneys (Barkoff 
& Green-Kelly, 2006; Gurnick & Wharton, 2000; Karp, Norman, & Stafford, 1999; 
Spandorf & Barkoff, 2003) and trade associations (e.g., IFA; American Franchise 
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Association, Coalition of Franchisee Associations). From a scholarly standpoint, the 
field's knowledge is limited to a few studies conducted outside the United States (Cochet 
& Ehrmann, 2007; Croonen, 2008; Grunhagen, DiPetro, Stassen, & Frazer, 2008; 
McCosker, Frazer, & Pensiero, 1995) and Dandridge and Falbe's (1994) U.S. study. 
In a recent study on independent franchise associations, Lawrence and Kaufman 
(2010) argued that multiple ownership changes result in franchise associations assuming 
the role of brand stewards, whereby rank-and-file franchisees identify more closely with 
the association than with the franchisor. The qualitative inquiry by Lawrence and 
Kaufman focused solely on independent associations and franchisee perspectives. The 
current study extends these scholars' efforts by layering in franchisor viewpoints and 
broadening their study's scope to include advisory councils established by franchisors 
and ad hoc councils formed by franchisees. Whereas Lawrence and Kaufmann used 
organizational identity theory as their framework, this study presents stakeholder theory 
as a promising avenue to identify the types of relationship that may exist within these 
boards. Stakeholders are those groups or individuals who are impacted by the 
organizations decisions (Freeman, 1984). In the case of a franchise board, the 
stakeholders would include the franchisees and the corporate staff referred to as the 
franchisor. 
Statement of the Problem 
Drucker (1974) suggested that a commonality among boards is that most of them 
function poorly. In providing his recommendations for nonprofit boards, Drucker (1990) 
argued that membership on a board should not be viewed as power, but as responsibility. 
Franchise boards can influence operating decisions, channel communication to the 
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broader franchisee constituency, ignite tensions between franchisees and the franchisor, 
or collaborate on strategic opportunities to grow the brand. A good deal of time, money, 
and resources are dedicated by both franchisees and franchisors to running franchise 
boards. Taken together, Drucker's (1974, 1990) research suggests that periodic 
assessments are needed to ensure that there is not a gap between the intentions and the 
functioning of the board. 
Organizational development (OD) practitioners can offer a deeper understanding 
of boards to improve communication, enhance collaborative problem solving, and build a 
trusting environment whereby productive conflict leads to synergy versus dissension. 
But before solutions can be offered, a deeper understanding of board dynamics is needed. 
I relied on Swanson and Holton's (2009) OD philosophy that whole system change must 
first begin with a commitment to in-depth study of the group. 
When a franchise advisory board is recognized as a group that is designed to 
achieve certain objectives, periodic evaluation is needed to examine how well the group 
is functioning. Five components characterize groups: goal clarity, task structure, group 
composition, team functioning, and performance norms (Cummings & Worley, 2009). 
Each of these group behaviors influences franchise-board interactions and effectiveness. 
It is common for groups to function without clear unity around their purpose, 
roles, or decision-making rights (Parker, 2006). The first question an OD practitioner 
will ask is whether franchise board members are in alignment on the roles that the board 
plays. If franchisor board members expect the board to function as a sounding board, and 
the franchisee board members view the board's role as a decision-making body, conflict 
can occur. 
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Task structure focuses on coordination and regulation (Cummings & Worley, 
2009). Franchise advisory board tasks may vary depending on the board's mission, but 
one common theme is communication to the rest of the system. How the task of 
communication is handled and regulated can facilitate or impede the board's ability to 
function effectively. How do franchisors and franchisees agree on the messages to be 
shared with the rest of the system? Which group is accountable for sharing this 
information? OD practitioners understand that these questions can help assess the 
franchise board's effectiveness as a representative body. 
Because the composition of a franchise board is frequently established by 
elections, there is strong probability the group will vary on key dimensions. Board 
members, for example, may be multiunit operators or single-unit operators, or they may 
be second-generation franchisees or relatively new to the world of franchising. In 
addition, board members are likely to vary on demographic variables such as age, 
education, and socioeconomic status. All of these differences can impact group 
dynamics. 
How the group functions as a team is a fourth aspect of behavior that warrants 
analysis in an OD assessment. Synergistic groups are able to identify problems quickly 
and accurately and generate a larger number of quality solutions (Berry, 2010). Much of 
OD is focused on helping groups develop participation patterns that capitalize on 
capturing multiple perspectives that lead to consensus building. Franchise advisory 
boards, like all groups, can become victims of groupthink, domination by an individual 
with a personal agenda, or mired in nonessential discussions to the task at hand. 
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The fifth component of analyzing groups focuses on performance norms, which 
reflect how members believe they should behave (Cummings & Worley, 2009). One of 
the most relevant aspects of franchise board members' behavior is the implicit method 
that is used for decision-making. Franchise boards may not have explicit voting rights, 
yet over time the franchisor has come to rely on the board's nonbinding vote to decide 
whether to pursue initiatives. This implicit voting right may cease to exist if the franchise 
is sold and the new owner opts not to embrace the voting approach. OD practitioners 
must learn what performance norms exist and help the group develop alternative norms if 
necessary. 
Unfortunately, it is too easy for consultants to offer generic solutions without 
spending enough time trying to understand actual group dynamics to uncover the root of 
the problem. Too often the result turns out to be a Band-Aid when surgery is needed, or 
vice versa. OD interventions with franchise advisory boards should examine the roles, 
structure, composition, relationship, and performance norms that characterize the group. 
The impact of franchise advisory boards' actions can be far-reaching. The impact 
of the board is not just on the lives of those on the board but also carries over to other 
franchisees whose interests are represented. How franchisee and franchisor board 
members work together becomes critical to determining the effectiveness of the board. 
One of the franchisee board members interviewed for this study articulated the 
relationship issue when he commented: 
The issue with franchise boards is mistrust. We spend a lot of time and money 
going nowhere. We ultimately get somewhere, but it takes too long. We should 
grow franchisees that sit on these boards and not just let them be puppets of some 
type of anarchy scheme. We are all human, but we have to do a better job of 
building trust. We have to put more in the trust bank account every day. You 
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can't say we have trust, and then go out and say the other side is dumber than a 
box of rocks. (franchisee personal communication, February 8, 2011) 
Purpose of this Study 
Consultants and managers often practice OD to help groups improve 
performance. This study will explore the attitudes and behaviors of both franchisees and 
franchisors that serve on franchise boards. The objective of this research is to develop a 
conceptual model for understanding the stakeholder relationships that exist within these 
groups. By creating and testing a conceptual model that can be used early in the OD 
process, franchise boards will have an assessment tool to help calibrate what type of 
relationship is operating. Another aim of this study is to facilitate OD efforts that offer 
meaningful interventions to develop open and transparent franchise boards that create 
value for both the franchisor and the franchisees. 
Research Questions 
Using qualitative methods, this study explores stakeholder dynamics that operate 
within franchise advisory boards. Several research questions guide this study. 
1. Why do franchise advisory boards form? 
2. How do franchisee and franchisor board members view the roles of these 
boards? 
3. How are boards structured? 
4. What types of stakeholder relationships exist? 
The first question examines why franchise boards form and seeks to confirm or 
disconfirm the theories that are espoused by franchise consultants, franchising attorneys, 
and franchise trade associations. The second question is guided by the desire to 
understand the similarities and differences between how franchisees and franchisors view 
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the roles of these boards. OD practitioners must be cognizant that perceptions about 
board roles may vary, which impacts group relationship dynamics. Whereas Research 
Question 2 seeks to examine roles, Research Question 3 is interested in understanding 
how board structure influences the board-stakeholder relationship. Finally, Research 
Question 4 is an extension of the first three research questions and will emerge by 
examining the attitudes and behaviors of the board members. 
This chapter has introduced the topic of franchise boards, framed the research 
problem, presented the argument for why this matters, outlined the research questions, 
and defined the terms that will be used throughout the document. Chapter 2 provides a 
literature review on the franchising business model, franchisee-franchisor relationships, 
and details the rise of franchise boards. Chapter 2 also systematically examines the rise 
and development of stakeholder theory as another perspective on corporate governance. 
At the conclusion of chapter 2 a conceptual framework of the types of stakeholder 
relationships that operate within franchise boards is proposed. Chapter 3 will introduce 
and explain the research methodology used to assess the model, including the sample, 
data collection tools, and the analytic process. The findings of the study will appear in 
chapter 4 and chapter 5. Finally, chapter 6 will offer an interpretation of the findings, 
review the conceptual model, along with implications and suggestions for future research 
efforts on the topic of franchise boards. 
Limitations 
A limitation of the study is the method for selecting the franchise boards included 
as cases. Because franchise boards discuss confidential business information, these 
sessions are not open to the public. Having prior background in the industry, I relied on 
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my contacts in the industry to help introduce me to two franchisors who agreed to grant 
me access to their meetings and conference calls. With respect to my third case, I 
cultivated the relationship of one of the franchisees whom I had interviewed. So the 
sampling was purposeful and "snowball" (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002), not 
random. Another limitation is the limited number of face-to-face board meetings that can 
be observed due to budget and timing. Some boards only meet 2 to 4 times per year, 
which lengthens the time involved to gather data for a doctoral student engaged in 
research. Furthermore, these board meetings are often held in distant cities requiring 
travel expenditures and the researcher's ability to negotiate time away from work and 
other responsibilities. 
Definitions 
Throughout this dissertation, the following six terms will be used as defined 
below: franchisor, franchisee, franchise board, independent association, franchise 
advisory council, and ad hoc council. 
Franchisor: A company that allows an individual (known as the franchisee) to run a 
location of its business. The franchisor owns the overarching company, trademarks, and 
products, but grants to the franchisee a limited right to run the franchise in return for 
agreed-upon fees. Franchisor board members are employed by the franchisor. 
Franchisee: An individual in a franchising agreement is granted the right to use a 
business's trademarks, associated brands, and other proprietary knowledge to open a 
branch. In addition to paying a franchising fee to the underlying company, the franchisee 
must also pay a portion of its revenues to the franchisor. Franchisee board members may 
be elected, appointed by the franchisor, or self-elected to serve on franchise boards. 
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Franchise Board: This term is being used to represent all types of franchise groups that 
operate in a franchise system that are unified by one or more identifiable goals. 
Specifically in this study the term will represent independent associations, franchisor 
sponsored advisory councils, and ad hoc franchisee groups. 
Franchise Advisory Council: A group typically comprised of franchisees and possibly 
representatives of the franchisor that is sponsored by the franchisor. Members may be 
appointed or elected. 
Independent Association: A group almost always formed by franchisees to represent 
franchisees with or without support from the franchisor. These mayor may not be 
incorporated, but typically these groups rely on membership dues. Franchisors mayor 
may not recognize these entities. 
Ad Hoc Council: A self-selected group of franchisees that forms to address specific 





Academic interest in franchising has focused on explaining the firm's motivation 
for franchising, primarily using agency theory or a resource scarcity perspective (Elango 
& Fried, 1997; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Stanworth & Curran, 1999; Tracey & Jarvis, 
2007). These various theoretical frameworks have focused on control and autonomy as 
the rationale for franchising business forms. More recent academic interest, however, has 
tapped into the relational aspect of franchising, which offers additional understanding for 
franchisor and franchisee motivations (Watson & Johnson, 2010). Using these 
theoretical frameworks to understand why firms and individuals pursue this business 
format provides insight into how each party values and judges the relationship. 
Scholars of OD argue that the ability of groups to draw on formal power, critical 
resources, network links, and discursive legitimacy indicates a need for frameworks and 
models to assess how mindsets are established, power relationships are managed, and 
common ground among stakeholders can be forged (Marshack & Grant, 2008). 
Understanding what detracts and enhances the interdependent franchisor-franchisee 
relationship has been the subject of numerous empirical investigations (Baucus, Baucus, 
& Human, 1996; Cochet, Cormann, & Ehrmann, 2008; Kidwell, Nygaard, & Silkoset, 
2007; Tikoo, 2005). Franchisors expect, among other things, for franchisees to grow 
sales, abide by their contractual commitments, share insights from thefield, be a source 
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of new ideas, and expand their operations by building new units (Fulop & Forward, 
1997). 
Franchisees expect training, procedures, and technical expertise on a host of 
subjects, usually including marketing, operations, human resources, legal expertise, and 
distribution (Morrison, 1998). Franchisees also consider themselves entrepreneurs rather 
than employees of the franchisor; therefore, they desire some level of participation in the 
decision-making process (Dandridge & Falbe, 1994; Dant & Nasr, 1998; Fulop & 
Forward, 1997). 
Mechanisms that afford franchisees participation in the system include franchise 
associations, boards, and councils. The IF A, a trade association representing the 
franchise industry, recommends that franchisors establish some form of board early in 
their lifecycle. The IFA's first published book on the subject, titled How to Organize a 
Franchisee Advisory Council, was published in 1979 and has been revised three times 
(Wulff, 2005). The IF A reports that the majority of its franchisor members have 
established advisory councils, and over 90% of the council participants are elected by 
fellow franchisees. In addition to sponsored councils that the franchisor initiates, 
independent franchise associations also exist. These independent associations are created 
by franchisees to leverage their collective strength to influence their franchisor 
(Sniegowski,2010). 
Chapter 2 is divided into six sections. The first section describes the search 
process, including data bases searched and key words used. The second section reviews 
motivations for franchising, with subsections reviewing theories for why firms pursue 
franchising and explaining why individuals choose this business format. The third 
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section reviews the literature on franchisor-franchisee relationships. This section contains 
a subsection on conflict, examines detractors and enhancers to the relationship, and 
establishes the need for mechanisms to provide franchisees with a voice in organizational 
decisions. The fourth section covers the historical background of franchise boards, as 
well as the roles and responsibilities of these boards. The fifth section introduces 
stakeholder theory as a means for understanding the sociopolitical aspects of organization 
decision-making and proposes that this construct be used as part of an OD diagnostic 
approach to help franchise boards achieve greater collaboration. In the sixth section, I 
offer a conceptual model that provides a typology of stakeholder cultures that franchise 
boards operate within. 
Literature Search Process 
The initial database search on franchise advisory boards, franchise independent 
associations, and franchise advisory councils produced only four empirical studies from 
scholarly journals on these topics. Databases referenced included Business and 
Management Practices, Business Source Premiere, ABI Inform Database, EBSCO 
Academic Search Premiere, ERIC, ProQuest Direct, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses 
(Digital Dissertations), JSTOR, and the Social Sciences Citation Index Contact. The 
following key words were used in the initial search: franchise advisory councils, 
franchise boards, franchise associations, franchise independent associations, franchisee-
franchisor relationships and franchising. Over the past 12 months I searched these 
databases multiple times and uncovered only two additional studies. I contacted the 
author of an article (in press at the time) on the subject of franchise-independent 
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associations (Lawrence & Kaufmann, 2010). The reference list from this article indicated 
no additional empirical studies in my research area of franchise board dynamics. 
Because of this, I broadened my s-earch to include nonprofit boards. For this 
search I used the following key words: nonprofit boards, nonprofit advisory boards, 
nonprofit board roles, nonprofit stakeholders, corporate governance theories, boardroom 
processes, boardroom culture, and board effectiveness. The investigation of nonprofit 
boards focused on the perception of the roles and responsibilities of board members. 
This literature provided a basis for identifying which roles of nonprofit boards could be 
mapped onto the roles of franchise advisory boards. Understanding how the roles and 
responsibilities are defined within boards offers insight into the type of stakeholders these 
boards represent. Making the assumption that these franchise boards are designed to help 
business performance, OD can playa key role in helping franchisors manage the 
stakeholders' relationships with their boards. The purpose of this literature review then 
shifted to address a different conceptualization of interdependent relationships using 
stakeholder theory to develop a conceptual model for understanding franchisor-
franchisee board relationships. 
Motivations to Franchise 
The Singer Sewing Machine company is credited with introducing the first 
franchise system into the United States in 1851 (Luxenberg, 1986). Struggling for cash, 
Singer sold area licenses granting individuals the right to sell the company's sewing 
machines in specific geographic regions. The individuals who operated as dealers had 
exclusive rights to territories and discovered that this form of self-employment was quite 
lucrative. Sales of sewing machines increased, but the company itself continued to 
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struggle because of inadequate distribution controls (Luxenberg, 1986). Although Singer 
eventually repurchased the rights they had sold to dealers, the concept of franchising was 
born. 
Franchising in the 21st century has changed dramatically, but the concept 
continues to attract organizations and individuals. Franchising literature has heavily 
explored the driving factors behind the firm's rationale for entering into these licensing 
agreements. There is a small base of empirical literature that helps provide an 
understanding of the motivational incentives for individuals to pursue this line of self-
employment. 
Why Firms Franchise 
Agency theory 
One framework offered to explain why firms' franchise, agency theory, suggests 
that operational convenience influences this decision (Combs, Michael, & 
Castrogiovanni, 2004; Dant & Nasr, 1998). Agency theory assumes that, to secure 
protection from opportunistic behavior by employees, agents will be motivated to oversee 
the principal's financial interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Rubin (1978) argued that 
corporate employees in distant geographic locations are more likely to attend to their self-
interests versus the interests of their employer, thereby inhibiting productivity. 
Organizations pursing geographic expansion, therefore, became proponents of franchise 
operations because this left the monitoring of employees in distant geographic regions to 
the franchisee. Franchisees, it was assumed, would act as agents based on a strong 
incentive to maximize labor efficiency, thereby operating in the best interests of the 
franchisor (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). 
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If agency theory operated in pure form, the franchisor would take a hands-off 
approach and allow franchisees to operate with minimal supervision because the 
assumption of similar interests would ensure compliance with the contract. In a study of 
U.S.-based franchisees in the Middle East and Africa, however, Dant and Nasr (1998) 
found that franchisors' and franchisees' goals did not align, and this caused dissension in 
the relationships. Franchisees motivated by the need to profit took a different view of 
pricing and operations than their franchisors. Because franchisors received payment from 
royalties, they focused more on driving top-line sales (gross sales before expenses are 
taken into account), showing less concern for franchisees' bottom-line net earnings. 
Dant and Nasr's (1998) research suggested that franchisees with a vested interest 
in short-term profit were more likely to engage in opportunistic behavior such as "free-
riding" as a means to generate cash flow. Free-riding occurs when franchisees forgo 
asset upgrades or reduce the quality of the services or products offered in an effort to 
reduce out-of-pocket expenditures. Franchisors, concerned about the reputation of the 
brand, engage in control techniques to ensure franchisee compliance and reduce free-
riding behavior (Dant & Nasr, 1998; Pizanti & Lerner, 2003). 
Agency theory, therefore, evolved to suggest that franchisees must now be 
monitored to ensure that they are not engaging in deceptive practices (Dant & Nasr, 
1998). The franchisor establishes control mechanisms to provide oversight or hires 
outside agents to monitor franchisee behavior (Castrogiovanni, Combs, & Justis, 2006; 
Kidwell et al., 2007). Under these definitions of agent and principal, the legal contract 
between the franchisor and franchisee becomes the dominant element in the relationship. 
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When franchisors ramp up monitoring mechanisms they undermine the economic 
benefits associated with franchising and emphasize their dominant power in the 
relationship. Power wielded on the franchisor side may in tum create the need for 
franchisees to rebalance the equation (Combs et aI., 2004; Dant & Nasr, 1998). 
Franchisees, although in a weaker position, can still exercise power by withholding 
valuable information from the franchisor, refusing to participate in a new program, 
withholding royalties, or even taking legal action (Fulop & Forward, 1997). 
Resource dependency theory 
Another widely held perspective on why firms choose the franchise business 
format stems from resource dependency theory. Franchising offers firms that have 
limited access to capital a method for more rapid geographic expansion (Fulop & 
Forward, 1997; Oxenfeld & Kelly, 1968). Beyond capital, the franchisees can bring 
insights about local market preferences, knowledge about zoning regulations, information 
regarding the labor pool, and their own managerial skills to the enterprise. 
Theorists Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggested that all organizations are 
dependent on external groups in the environment and must obtain resources from these 
groups to survive. Initially, resource dependency theorists postulated that the franchising 
business format would be a temporary organizational structure because once a franchisor 
had sufficient capital, he or she would buy back the units from the franchisee, converting 
them to company-owned outlets (Fulop & Forward, 1997). But between 1970 and 1990, 
the percentage of franchised outlets (80%) remained the same, and today that percentage 
has crept upwards. 
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Through the resource dependency lens, the franchisor-franchisee relationship is 
no longer tethered exclusively to the contract. Power does not rest solely with the 
franchisor but shifts depending on the situation. The notion that power can shift, even in a 
vertical relationship, suggests that rather than a goal of compliance, perhaps the 
franchisors should aim to initiate processes that influence franchisee satisfaction. In a 
study of furniture dealers in a distributor relationship, Gassenheimer, Calantone, Schmitz, 
and Robicheaux (1994) found that satisfied partners are less likely to engage in power 
games or embrace a quid pro quo mentality. 
Theoretical Combinations 
Some theorists have suggested that both agency and resource dependency theories 
help explain an organization's decision to franchise (Fulop & Forward, 1997). Rather 
than an either-or scenario, these authors argue that the decision to franchise will vary and 
may depend on financial, behavioral, and situational factors. 
A recent study by Castrogiovanni et al. (2006) lends support to the idea that both 
agency and resource scarcity frameworks apply to franchising. Findings from their study 
of 102 franchisors over a 21-year period suggested that during a firm's early years, when 
geographic expansion was a core objective, resource scarcity provided the explanation for 
franchising. After approximately 10 years, however, firms achieved sizeable scale and 
shifted toward corporate ownership. The level of franchising picked up again on average 
when the firm reached the 21-year mark. The return to franchising in a firm's later years 
was not driven by resource scarcity needs, but by the high cost of monitoring. This trend 
lent credence to agency theory as the viable rationale for franchising, and Castrogiovanni 
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et al. concluded that the dominant frames for why firms franchise, agency theory and 
resource dependency theory, shift over time. 
In summary, although the theoretical debate is likely to continue over why firms 
franchise, prospective franchisees may find it beneficial to attempt to understand firms' 
motives. If prospective franchisees are seeking a high level of support, they may not 
flourish in a franchise system during the early life cycle, when the franchisor cannot offer 
a deep level of support services. Individuals with a great deal of experience, on the other 
hand, may not want the level of handholding offered by established franchise firms and 
may find newer franchise systems a more optimal environment. Likewise, franchisors 
may want to better understand why individuals are pursuing a franchise venture to ensure 
they can meet the prospective franchisees' needs. 
Why Individuals Choose Franchising 
Early franchising literature suggested that the trademark of the brand drew 
individuals into the franchise realm, along with a "package" offering training and 
assistance, thereby decreasing the individual's risk of pursuing a business as a solo 
entrepreneur. The seven distinct categories that emerged from Izreali's study (as cited in 
Peterson & Dant, 1990), included: (a) lower development costs, (b) established brand 
name, (c) lower operating costs, (d) less management involvement, (e) greater 
independence, (f) better investment, and (g) training. 
Peterson and Dant (1990) sought to validate Izreali's list of reasons for 
franchising. Using franchisees from a service based organizations, Peterson and Dant 
partially supported Izreali's findings in that the top reasons to pursue franchising 
included: (a) an established brand name; (b) greater independence, and; (c) training 
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provisions from the franchisor. Peterson and Dant's research, however, refuted Israeli's 
finding that owning a franchise would result in "lower operating costs" and also 
disagreed with the assessment that there would be less managerial involvement from the 
franchisor. External events during the years between the two studies may have mitigated 
those advantages. The cost of franchising would have risen as franchisors added more 
rules, and monitoring may have escalated. 
Ease of entry appears to be at the heart of the decision to pursue a franchise. This 
is not surprising given the high risk involved in becoming a business owner. Also, for 
those individuals who wish to be self-employed and do not have the business idea or skill 
set, franchising offers the opportunity to potentially overcome these deficiencies by 
purchasing a ready-to-go business format. In addition to the rational economic reasons, 
on a more emotional level, the desire for autonomy sparks individuals to pursue 
franchising. Stanworth and Curran (1999) suggested that franchisees' motivations may 
lie somewhere in between profit and self-actualization. 
Although greater independence is a key motivator, there is little argument that 
when individuals pursue a franchise operation they have traded some level of autonomy 
by signing a contract with the franchisor. Franchisees must abide by contractual 
specifications and accept conditions imposed by the franchisor, in addition to paying a 
portion of their earnings in the form of royalties. 
Social exchange theory suggests that although franchisors and franchisees are 
motivated by self-interest, they recognize the need for cooperation for the relationship to 
be mutually beneficial. Harmon and Griffiths (2008) presented a conceptualized 
framework that suggested that franchisees define the value of the franchise relationship as 
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a trade-off between the franchisees' perceived net value of the tangible and intangible 
benefits of belonging to this relationship versus the perceived costs of being in the 
relationship. The tangible benefits can be defined as financial performance outcomes, 
whereas intangible benefits are associated with the franchisee's perception that the 
franchisor is flexible, values the franchisee's contributions, and shows restraint in its use 
of power. These intangibles become the seeds for discontent in the relationship and can 
pit the franchisor and franchisee against one another. The next section explores the 
potential areas for conflict in the relationship. 
The Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship 
The franchisor relies on franchisees to execute the brand in a consistent manner. 
Customers typically do not know if an organization is corporate owned or franchisee 
owned. Franchising, therefore, requires a high need for coordination between the parties 
to ensure consistency for the consumer. Because franchisees are not employees who can 
be fired, and because the termination of a franchise contract is often a lengthy, time-
consuming process, franchisors must collaborate with franchisees to maximize their 
performance and profitability (Combs et aI., 2004; Spinelli & Birley, 1998). How the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship is both governed and nurtured has received significant 
attention by researchers over the last 30 years. In 1980, Guilitan, Rejab, and Rodgers 
found that coordination between franchisors and franchisees was more likely when the 
franchisee believed that he or she had a part in the decision-making process and when the 
franchisor's communication with franchisees was perceived as useful. 
Research since 1980 continues to support the finding that franchisee satisfaction 
is enhanced when franchisees have frequent contact with the franchisor and believe their 
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contributions are valued. A study of 162 fast-food franchisees by Gassenheimer, Baucus, 
and Baucus (1996) revealed that communication promoted goal alignment, positively 
impacted satisfaction, and reduced the amount of opportunism exhibited by the parties. 
Similarly, Spinelli and Birley's (1998) study among 421 U.S. franchisees demonstrated a 
positive correlation between franchisee satisfaction and goal alignment and adequate 
franchisor services. Studies on why franchisees leave the system have also linked poor 
communication to disruptive franchisee exits (Frazer & Winzar, 2005). Weaven, Frazer, 
and Giddings's (2010) study of Australian franchisees and franchisors supported the 
value of communication towards contributing to a positive relationship between the 
franchisee an4 franchisor. Based on interview data, these authors argued that franchisees 
desired to be their own boss and therefore wanted a high level of involvement in 
decision-making processes. 
Communication and a voice in the decision-making process are not the only areas 
that have led to tension in the franchisor-franchisee relationship. Considerable academic 
attention has focused on identifying other problems that arise in this interdependent 
business format. 
Areas of Conflict 
Relationships of all types are prone to conflict. Franchising scholars have 
attempted to pinpoint the issues that derail the relationship to spawn ideas for minimizing 
dissension, as well as resolving disagreements once they surface. At the forefront of 
these investigations is the issue of autonomy versus control. White's (2010) study of fast 
food franchisees found that systems providing a higher level of autonomy to franchisees 
were positively correlated with a higher degree of trust in the franchisor-franchisee 
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relationship. Systems with strict formal controls, on the other hand, decreased franchisee 
morale and were correlated with lower levels of trust. Lack of trust has been linked to 
noncompliance, which impacts financial profitability (Davies, Lassar, Manolis, Prince, & 
Winsor, 2009). 
Previous research has shown that the longer franchisees are in the system, the 
more independence they crave (Dant & Gundlach, 1998; Gassenheimer et aI., 1996) and 
the more they associate success from their own efforts as opposed to the franchisor's 
brand name (Grunhagen & Dorsch, 2003). Recent research by Tikoo (2005) added 
credence to prior studies on control and autonomy. Using a U.S.-based mailing and 
business services franchise system, Tikoo found that as franchisees became less 
dependent on the franchisor, they tended to resent the franchisor's recommendations. 
When franchisees had a higher level of dependence on the franchisor, they were less 
likely to perceive tension and conflict when the franchisor recommended actions. 
Research on franchisee dependence, however, has tended to produce conflicting 
findings. Morrison's (1998) study of franchisee satisfaction found that although 
franchisees desired to have input, they craved more, not less, contact and links with the 
franchisor, at least in some domains. Dant and Gundlach (1998) also found that the 
relationship between autonomy and dependence was more complex than previous 
research had suggested. These scholars discovered that the franchisees' desire for 
autonomy was dependent upon the level of competition, their business success, and their 
level of multi-unit ownership. In their empirical study of 176 fast food franchisees using 
personal interviews and structured questionnaires, franchisees in low-level competitive 
environments, those owning multiple units, and those with a high concern about growing 
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their market share were more likely to crave franchisor involvement and less likely to 
seek autonomy. 
Although the amount of autonomy franchisees desire may vary by domain, the 
issue surrounding autonomy impacts the brand name when franchisees deviate from 
operating standards. This question was addressed by Cochet et al. (2008) in a study of 
German franchisees operating within 11 different franchise chains. Their study found 
that franchisors tended to embrace more relational forms of governance to address 
compliance issues when their franchisees had a higher level of autonomy. Relational 
governance in the study was defined as the "unwritten codes of conduct, which safeguard 
exchanges against potential conflicts" (p. 53). Cochet and Ehrmann (2007) argued that 
decentralization, which grants franchisees more autonomy, can work effectively as long 
as relational governance norms are in operation. 
Reframing the Relationship 
A classic OD problem occurs when an organization is decentralized and there is 
an attempt to force change from a hierarchical structure (Moss-Kanter, 2006). As 
Galbraith (1954) noted, power displayed on one end establishes the need for 
countervailing power to arise on the other end. One OD solution for breaking down the 
political silos that divide organizations is to create communities (Moss-Kanter, 2006). A 
community model suggests a willingness to abide by the rules governing an organization 
that is based on collaboration versus command and control hierarchies. 
Effective communities of practice in organizations can increase knowledge 
transfer, identify subject-matter experts, and foster a collaborative environment for 
employees (Wenger, 1998). These communities may be employer sponsored or created 
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by a group of people with shared interests (Fisher & Bennion, 2005). An exploratory 
study of 22 employee advisory boards established by small, blue-collar worksites found 
that how the board formed was not associated with the level of enthusiasm but that those 
boards with higher levels of enthusiasm showed more participation by employees than 
worksites with less enthusiastic boards (Thompson et al., 2005). 
One form of community in a franchise system is the franchise advisory board. 
Although today these boards are viewed as mechanisms to help foster collaboration, the 
roots of these boards arose from discord and distrust. The next section of this paper 
addresses the historical background of franchise boards and discusses their roles and 
responsibilities. 
Franchise Advisory Boards 
Historical Context 
The first independent franchise associations were created in the 1970s by 
franchisees that banded together to battle franchisors (Luxenberg, 1986). By the end of 
the 1970s there were over 40 independent franchise associations in the US (Luxenberg, 
1986). In their early days these franchise associations were compared to labor unions 
based on their message of "protecting franchisees' rights" against the large franchisor. 
One of the first independent associations was the Midas Dealers Group, organized 
by Harold Forkas, a successful Midas automotive shop dealer. Forkas ignited fellow 
franchisees to form an association to protect their interests against future ownership 
changes. Management at Midas did not initially recognize the association led by Forkas. 
After trying and failing to create their own association, Midas's corporate management 
ultimately decided to recognize the Forkas-Ied association (Luxenberg, 1986). 
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Independent franchise associations, such as those established for the franchisees 
who operate Midas Muffler Dealerships, Holiday Inn Hotels, and Kentucky Fried 
Chicken restaurants, are still in existence today. These independent associations do not 
have legally protected collective bargaining power and cannot strike, but over the years 
the franchisees in many of these organizations have negotiated a variety of rights to 
ensure that their input is heard. 
A study by Lawrence and Kaufmann (2010) acknowledged the lack of research on 
the subject of formal franchise organizations. They reported that 12 of the 20 largest 
franchise systems have active, independent franchise associations, which are defined as 
entities that function separately from the franchisor, often funded by dues paying 
members. Their study, however, did not address the vast array of franchise boards or 
councils that are appointed by franchisors that serve in an advisory capacity. Lawrence 
and Kaufmann's qualitative study also does not address ad hoc franchisee groups that are 
initiated by groups of franchisees that mayor may not include the franchisor as part of 
the membership. Furthermore, their scholarly research was based only on franchisee 
interviews and did not examine the attitudes of franchisors. 
In practitioner literature, numerous examples can be found to demonstrate how 
franchise boards have influence<l;franchisor decisions. Franchisee attorney Andrew 
Selden notes that "any group can influence decision-making by another, by creating a big 
enough fuss" (Sniegowski, 2010, p. 1). The Dunkin' Donuts Independent Franchise 
Owners are credited with forcing the resignation of the firm's chief legal officer 
(Sniegowski, 2010). As a result of pressure from the Wendy's franchise association, a 
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new CEO was appointed in 2007. The new CEO for Wendy's came from the ranks of the 
franchisees (Sniegowski, 2010). 
In response to the rise of independent associations, which occurred when cracks 
in the relationship have already formed, the IF A and many books in the field of 
franchising (e,g., Borian & Borian, 1987; Khan, 1999; Kinch & Hayes, 1986) all stress 
that franchisors need to create advisory councils early in the life cycle of the system. The 
IFA recommends that franchisors rely on these councils to.keep abreast of what concerns 
franchisees have, gather know-how from the field, and provide a mechanism for 
horizontal communication versus relying on a top-down approach (Wulff, 2005). 
Franchise boards are one OD solution that can facilitate linkages between the franchisor 
and franchisees. 
The IF A recommends that these boards be created as a joint venture with 
franchisees and that members be elected by their peers instead of being appointed by the 
franchisor (Wulff, 2005). Bylaws, which detail the eligibility, termination process, 
hierarchy, and roles of members of the council, are also considered critical. Though the 
exact number of recognized franchisor advisory councils is not available, the IF A 
indicates that "the vast majority of their members have established advisory councils" 
and "more than 90% of the advisory councils have their members elected by franchisees, 
rather than appointed by the franchisor" (Wulff, 2005, p. 4). 
In the one quantitative study located on the subject of franchise boards in the 
United States, Dandridge and Falbe (1994) surveyed members of the IF A to determine if 
fast-growing franchise systems would use advisory councils to reduce conflict and 
encourage entrepreneurism and innovation. Although the study did not find support for 
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the theory that a franchise advisory council was used by fast-growing systems as a means 
to reduce conflict, there was a positive correlation that suggested that advisory councils 
were used as a way to encourage franchisee innovation. 
In an empirical study of franchise advisory councils conducted in Australia 
(McCosker et al., 1995), a total of 88 franchisors and 80 franchisees from a range of 
industries responded to a mail survey. Sixty-five percent of franchisors (n = 57) 
indicated they had some form of committee, and 88% of these were franchise systems 
that had been in existence for more than 5 years. The industries varied widely. Although 
franchisees tended to agree on the roles of the board, they were not aligned with 
franchisors on their power to change operations. Franchisees rated their level of 
decision-making on boards higher than franchisors rated the franchisees' decision-
making input (McCosker et al., 1995). 
A case study of four Dutch drugstore franchise systems found the presence of a 
franchise advisory council provided franchisees a high level of participation and 
influenced the level of franchisees trust in the system (Croonen, 2008). A correlational 
study, conducted among German franchisees (Cochet & Ehrmann, 2007), found franchise 
councils were more prevalent in systems where the franchisor had more control over the 
operations of the chain. In addition to supporting Croonen's argument that councils· 
foster franchisees' participation in decision-making, Cochet and Ehrmann's (2007) study 
found councils provided a tool to monitor the franchisor. In this respect, trust may be 
garnered because councils serve as watchdogs that protect franchisees interests. 
A study by Grunhagen et al. (2008) compared the services provided by 
franchisors to franchisees in Germany and the United States. Systems with franchise 
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advisory councils were found to be less associated with system disruptions. Disruptions 
were defined as legal disputes or when unit ownership changes occurred or units closed. 
In a qualitative study of franchise associations, Lawrence and Kaufmann (2010) 
found that these structures are an important identity mechanism for inter-franchisee 
relationships by providing collective identity among franchisee members. These 
associations were also found to serve as stewards of the brand, providing stability in the 
face of frequent ownership changes. Finally, successful associations were able to reframe 
their relationships with the franchisor from combative to cooperative depending on the 
situation. 
Because franchise advisory organizations function as strategic alliances, OD 
efforts may help the boards achieve synergy. At the outset of any OD effort, however, it 
is necessary to understand the roles and responsibilities of the franchise advisory board to 
assess how the board is functioning. 
Roles and Responsibilities of Boards 
McCosker et al. (1995) studied franchise councils in Australia and found that 
franchisors and franchisees shared five reasons for forming these groups: (a) improving 
communications, (b) providing feedback on marketing, (c) assisting with product and 
service development, (d) sharing feedback regarding customers, and (e) problem solving. 
Except for communication, most franchisors perceived that their boards were effectively 
meeting these objectives. 
Several articles from the annual American Bar Association Forum on Franchising 
discussed the subject of franchise associations and councils. Franchising attorneys in the 
U.S. appear to support MCosker et al. 's findings, but also suggest that franchise 
29 
association boards serve as a monitoring mechanism to protect franchisee interests 
(Schumacher, 2001). 
Nonprofit Boards 
Due to the limited number of empirical studies on franchise boards, I conducted a 
literature review on the roles and responsibilities of nonprofit boards. Understanding 
what has been learned about nonprofit boards can provide useful comparisons with the 
practitioner literature on franchise advisory councils to determine where parallels exist. 
Over the last 15 years there has been a small but steady stream of scholarly 
literature devoted to the subject of nonprofit boards. Studies by Dulewicz, MacMillan, & 
Herbert (1995); Green and Griesinger (1996); Inglis, Alexander, and Weaver (1999); 
Cornforth and Edwards (1999); and Brown and Guo (2010), have each examined 
nonprofit-board characteristics, roles and responsibilities, and effectiveness. Although 
the objectives of each study varied, a common theme within this literature provides a 
baseline understanding of the roles and responsibilities of nonprofit boards. Each of 
these scholars classified the roles and responsibilities of nonprofit boards into typologies 
that attempted to capture the essence of specific functions. Their typologies suggested 
that tasks performed by nonprofit boards could be classified from three broad 
components up to 14 distinct categories, but the themes can be condensed into providing 
voice, stewardship, legitimacy, representation, and strategic direction. Figure 1 
demonstrates the high degree of commonality among these scholars. 
The five groups of scholars were in agreement that nonprofit boards playa role in 
strategy and planning, both in setting the mission and values and in providing long-range 
thinking. A second common theme was the role that nonprofit boards play in securing 
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financial resources and legitimizing the organization to the external world. Likewise, 
boards were seen as providing stewardship, which encompassed direction on operations 
of the organization, including the monitoring of programs and services. Four of the five 
collaborative studies specifically pointed out that boards have a key role in representing 
stakeholders in the community, and two articles specifically mentioned that boards 
provide "voice" in that they offer guidance, advice, and dispute resolution. 
Dulewicz Green & Cornforth Inglis Brown 
et al. Griesinger & Edwards et al. & Guo 
(1995) (1996) (1999) (1999) (2010) 
0' 0' 
0' 0' 0' 0' 
0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 
0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 
0' 0' 0' 0' 0' 
Figure 1. Nonprofit board classification of roles. 
Practitioner data indicate that franchise boards undertake many tasks that are 
similar in nature to the tasks that nonprofit boards perform. In an article in Chain Leader 
Magazine (Farkas, 2010), the Vice President of Church's Chicken, for example, indicated 
that his company's franchise board had provided input and solutions on product 
development, marketing, and operational decisions . In addition, he credited the board 
with creating a brand inspection form to measure performance standards. 
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In The Franchise Advantage, Boroian and Boroian (1987) suggested that 
franchise councils "provide a communications link between the company and its 
franchisees" (p. 207). Other practitioner studies have highlighted specific benefits of 
franchise boards, including the sharing of ideas, promoting feedback, providing 
networking opportunities, and allowing for evaluation of past programs (Dwyer, 2008; 
Powers,201O). Trade journals in the industry have recommended advisory councils as a 
mechanism that franchisors can use to help secure endorsements. The assumption is 
made that franchisees are often more willing to accept new ideas from fellow franchisees 
than mandated changes from the franchisor. The roles and responsibilities between 
nonprofits and franchise advisory boards parallel fairly closely as shown in Figure 2. 
Nonprofit Franchise 
Board Roles Board Roles 
Voice 0 0 
Representation 0 0 
Stewardship 0 0 
Legitimacy / 0 0 Resources 
Strategy 0 
Figure 2. Roles of nonprofit and franchise boards. 
Although franchise boards are not specifically involved in securing financial 
resources for the organization, the nature of the franchise relationship is economic. 
Franchisees provide royalties to the franchisor based on their sales. The one area of 
difference is strategy. Neither the limited empirical research on franchise boards nor the 
franchise attorney literature suggests that franchise boards typically playa role in 
establishing long-term strategies; rather, studies have found that boards are usually 
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brought in to provide input on franchisor recommendations (Barkoff, 2007; Darrin, 
Stadfeld, & Wulff, 1998; Ingage Consulting, n.d.; McCosker et aI., 1995; Mowji, 2006; 
Spandorf & Barkoff, 2003; Webster, 1986). 
Recent empirical research suggests that franchise boards can be an influential 
factor impacting the dynamics within the broader organization. In a conceptual paper on 
independent associations, Lawrence and Kaufmann (2010) argued that the presence of 
franchise associations contributes to the climate of the franchisor-franchisee relationship. 
These scholars suggested that the formation of an independent association may lead to 
stronger identification with the franchise group over the franchisor. They argued that 
franchise associations that form because of franchisor opportunism versus groups that 
form over strategic direction issues will have stronger identification with the franchise 
association than with the franchisor. 
Franchise boards, associations and councils will each assume characteristics of 
communities or coalitions. Occasional disagreement is highly likely between different 
parties in any group, and such discord can stifle collaboration and prevent synergy. 
Applying a stakeholder framework may contribute to the resolution of issues by 
providing a method of classifying the board relationships to understand the 
sociopolitical environment that is operating. The next section includes an overview of 
stakeholder theory, a review of the internal and external debates, and an overview of 
various stakeholder typologies offered by scholars. The section concludes with a 
conceptual framework depicting how franchise advisory boards can be classified into 1 
of 4 stakeholder cultures. 
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The Stakeholder Concept 
Freeman (1984) introduced the term stakeholder in his seminal work, Strategic 
Management: A Stakeholder Approach. In this work, Freeman defined a stakeholder as 
"any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organization's objectives" (p. 46). As early as 1959, theorists Cyert and March 
acknowledged the existence of stakeholder groups when they suggested that 
organizations consist of coalitions organized into sub-coalitions. These scholars argued 
that organizations change their purpose as new interests arise and discard other interests 
in response to environmental forces-in essence, firms bow to pressure from some 
coalitions and ignore others. Organization coalition members include managers, workers, 
stockholders, suppliers, customers, lawyers, tax collectors, regulatory agencies, and 
others. When resources are scarce or uncertainty exists, these coalitions either walk away 
from the firm or organize and confront the organization. Cyert and March suggested that 
these coalitions are semi-permanent forces that often have competing demands. Firms 
need stability and therefore must attempt to satisfy these multiple coalitions. 
Since the publication of Freeman's work, the term stakeholder has become part of 
corporate America's lexicon. The definition of who qualifies as a stakeholder, however, 
is open to various interpretations. Popular lists of stakeholders are often similar to the 
coalitions noted by Cyert and March (1959). Donaldson & Preston (1995) include the 
following groups: employees, shareholders, customers, competitors, vendors, strategic 
partners, the local community, and the environment. Other stakeholder theorists argue 
that a close relationship must exist between a firm and a coalition for that coalition to be 
designated as a stakeholder (Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003). 
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As introduced by Freeman, stakeholder theory is prescriptive in nature. Freeman 
(1984) argued that managers must understand the phenomenon of stakeholder groups and 
how they can impact the organization if they hope to respond in an effective manner. 
Freeman (quoted in Agle et al., 2008) argued that it doesn't make sense to talk about 
business without talking about ethics; he further elaborated that stakeholder theory 
provides organizations with an "idea about what it means to be well managed" (p. 166). 
This idea, however, has been a source of a great debate in the field. In particular, does 
the organization address stakeholder issues because it is the right thing to do, or because 
it is the wise business decision? 
The Agency Theory-Stakeholder Theory Debate 
The debate between agency theorists and stakeholder theorists has raged for over 
a quarter of a century. Agency theory assumes a moral egoism (Hendry, 2001) on the 
part of both the principal (in this case the franchisor) and the agent (the franchisee) and 
that each will act in their own interests. To limit opportunistic behavior, organizational 
managers usually develop reward and governance structures to police behavior (Hill & 
Jones, 1992). The literature on agency theory indicates that divergent interests create one 
principal-agent conflict. Agency theorists argue that the firm is surrounded by efficient 
market forces, which allow principals and agents to freely enter and exit relationships 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Put simply, this idea assumes that if stakeholders are unhappy in 
the relationship they can leave the relationship. Agency theory relies on the assumption 
that stakeholders are not held hostage by circumstances. 
Built upon the principle that that the single objective of the firm is to maximize 
shareholder value, agency theory dates back to the 1970s. Long before the actual term 
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agency theory emerged, economist Milton Friedman contended that the only moral 
responsibility of managers in an organization was to serve the interests of the 
shareholders. Often referred to as "shareholder theory," this philosophy was 
characteristic of the 1980s when free market enterprise dominated under the Reagan-
Thatcher era (Hendry, 2001). Although capitalism was the driving force at the time, a 
spate of takeover activity was creating the need for antitakeover legislation, which began 
to suggest that the principal-agent relationship was not characterized by equilibrium and 
power was a factor in the relationship. 
Freeman (1984) challenged the agency theoretical perspective by suggesting the 
emergence of "stakeholder groups and new strategic issues require a rethinking of our 
traditional picture of the firm" (p. 24). Stakeholder theory offered a competing view to 
agency theory. Stakeholder theorists (Hill & Jones, 1992; Donaldson & Preston, 1995) 
argued that agency theory ignored power differentials, which make it impossible for 
some agents to disengage from principals. In addition, market conditions are often 
characterized by friction, which sustains disequilibrium as opposed to eqUilibrium. 
Stakeholder theorists argued that other groups beyond stockholders have legitimate 
claims on the organization and its resources, and that firms have an ethical obligation to 
address these other claims (Freeman, 1984; Phillips et aI., 2003). 
Since 1984, hundreds of articles have been written on stakeholder theory. Critics 
have bashed (Steib, 2009; Jensen, 2002), while fans have hashed and rehashed (Agle et 
aI., 2008; Phillips et aI., 2003; Hendry, 2005; Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001; Jones, Felps, 
& Bigley, 2007) the view that firms must cast a broader view of their mission than 
merely driving financial profit to shareholders. Some scholars have also attempted a 
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reconciliation of the two views. Hill and Jones (1992) proposed a stakeholder-agency 
model that explained certain behavior of the firm using a modified view of agency theory 
that accommodated power differentials. These theorists contended that this stakeholder-
agency model was a more predictive view of how firms realign when disruption occurs 
due to power differentials. Shankman (1999) also argued for a theoretical integration of 
the two theories. He suggested that stakeholder theory was simply a broader 
conceptualization of the firm, whereby shareholders were one of many stakeholders 
(Shankman, 1999). 
A 2007 Academy of Management symposium brought both agency theorists and 
stakeholder theorists together in an attempt to find common ground between the two 
perspectives. In a follow-up essay from this symposium, Freeman suggested that the 
"Friedman-Freeman" debate was dead and that it was no longer useful to separate 
questions of business and questions of ethics. He wrote, 
Milton Friedman, Oliver Williamson, and Michael Jensen are stakeholder 
theorists ... if one understands the spirit of their work ... and if we have a 
slightly more expressive idea of businesses than have most economists, then the 
tensions between economists and stakeholder theorists simply dissolve. (Agle et 
aI., 2008, p. 162) 
Freeman suggested that "jointness" is in line with capitalism and that stakeholder theory 
is not a theory of the firm but a way to make capitalism work better. This idea of 
jointness indicates that organizations know that to maximize shareholder value they must 
recognize others who can help them deliver the goods (Agle et aI., 2008). 
Jensen (Agle et aI., 2008) was less conciliatory, but did suggest that "value 
maximization is equivalent to enlightened stakeholder theory" (p. 168). He pointed out 
that organizations will not succeed in driving profit if they ignore or mistreat employees, 
customers, suppliers, and other stakeholders in the community. However, Jensen also 
37 
noted that a deep divide still existed because the values of organizations differ, which lies 
at the heart of conflict. He opined that "the danger of stakeholder theory ... is that those 
who advocate it simply assume managers would do the right thing so as to benefit society 
as a whole" (p. 168). Jensen maintained that this assumption was naive because 
managers have no way of knowing what would benefit society and the assumption would 
leave managers unaccountable for their actions. Subsequent articles have suggested that 
the debate between agency theorists and stakeholder theorists continues despite the 
attempt of the symposium to create unity. For instance, in an essay assessing Freeman's 
Stakeholder theory, Steib (2009) suggested that stakeholder theory is an attack on 
capitalism and this concept is in no way compatible with libertarianism as Freeman 
suggested. 
In addition to the external debate between stakeholder theory and agency theory, 
the stakeholder paradigm has been subject to internal bickering as stakeholder theorists 
have attempted to ground the theory using different interpretations. Attempts to clarify 
the theory have been criticized by some scholars in the field and lauded by others. The 
next section outlines how the construct of stakeholder theory was subdivided into 
mUltiple approaches in an attempt to better understand how variations of stakeholder 
theory have been applied to different research questions and have spawned different types 
of research. 
Attempting to Address Ambiguity in Stakeholder Theory 
Until 1995, scholars examined the term stakeholder from different perspectives, 
leaving the concept open to the criticism of being "fuzzy" (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). 
In an effort to corral the literature and bring clarity to the concept, these scholars 
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discussed the three main perspectives of stakeholder theory: normative, instrumental, and 
descriptive. Donaldson and Preston's (1995) seminal work has been widely cited by 
subsequent researchers, with some embracing the categorizations (Hendry, 2001; Iawahra 
& McLaughlin, 2001), some suggesting that these are actually three different stakeholder 
theories (Jones et al., 1995; Iawahar & McLaughlin, 2001), some arguing that they are 
different research agendas (Egels-Zanden & Sandberg, 2010), and some dismissing the 
divisions as irrelevant (Freeman, 1999). 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argued that describing and explaining the behavior 
of firms and managers is "unarguably descriptive" (p. 66). Therefore, by presenting a 
model of what "is," stakeholder theorists were able to empirically test the existence of the 
concept. The goal was to determine whether observers and participants view the firm as 
a constellation of cooperative and competing interests. Hendry (2001) suggested that 
descriptive stakeholder theory "proposes stakeholder answers to questions of fact" (p. 
163). 
In this respect the question becomes, "How does the firm view its responsibility to 
stakeholders and what actions should managers take?" Literature in this vein also covers 
the characteristics of the firm, how board members think about the interests of others 
connected with the firm (Hosseini & Brenner, 1992), how organizations are managed 
(Clarkson, 1995), and how individuals behave within those organizations. This stream of 
research has focused on different perspectives, including the firms' and stakeholders' 
viewpoints, as well as embraced multiple research methodologies (Butterfield, Reed, & 
Lemak,2004). 
39 
The second body of literature on stakeholder theory was classified by Donaldson 
and Preston (1995) as "instrumental." This approach suggests that stakeholders are a 
means to an end. In other words, organizations will recognize stakeholders to maximize 
profits and returns, without specifically doing so for ethical reasons. The arguments 
proposed in this line of literature suggest that managing stakeholders in a strategic 
fashion can at times improve a firm's financial performance (Butterfield et aI., 2004; 
Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999). 
When stakeholder theory is used to describe what "ought to be" based on ethical 
and moral guidelines, the literature assumes a normative stance (Donaldson & Preston, 
1995). One conceptualization of normative stakeholder theory, based on Donaldson and 
Preston's (1995) argument, is that stakeholders are individuals or groups who have an 
interest in the firm and that all stakeholders have intrinsic value. Donaldson and Preston 
maintain that although the three approaches differ, they are mutually supportive and the 
normative base provides the critical linkage for the overall theory. 
Evans and Freeman (1988) argued that corporations should not only act with the 
interests of all stakeholders in mind, but that organizations must allow stakeholders to 
participate in decision-making. Hendry (2001) argues that the concept of normative 
stakeholder theory is in disarray because theorists have ranged from the modest theory of 
treating stakeholders with respect to the more demanding theories of offering 
stakeholders participation in decision-making. Hendry maintains that this wide 
continuum has left the normative stakeholder theory open to criticism. Empirical research 
on normative stakeholder theory has also been unable to support the argument that 
organizations pay attention to stakeholders because of a moral obligation. Rather, Agle, 
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Mitchell, and Sonnenfelds's (1999) study of CEO's found that the attributes of "power, 
urgency and legitimacy" affect how managers treat different stakeholders. 
Likewise, a study by Berman et al. (1999) tested the instrumental versus 
normative stakeholder definitions outlined by Donaldson and Preston (1995). Using 
Fortune 100 companies and data available from the KLD Socretes database from 1991 to 
1996, these scholars found that firms that addressed the concerns of employees and 
customers out of a desire to maximize profit were more likely to improve their financial 
performance. Meanwhile, the authors found no support that addressing stakeholder 
concerns for moral reasons impacted financial results. Given the study was based on a 
database and a mediated regression model versus survey data that captured managerial 
intentions, it is possible that the categorization of firms' intentions as normative was 
invalid. 
Some studies in the field can be described as both descriptive and normative. 
Kochan and Rubinstein's (2000) case study of Saturn, for example, was partly normative 
and partly descriptive. These authors sought to provide evidence that alternative 
organizational forms exist (descriptive) and that maximizing shareholder wealth should 
not be the sole purpose of organizations (normative). These scholars conducted over 100 
interv~ews and multiple focus groups, and their data provided evidence that a company 
can be crafted by labor and management in a manner that is consistent with the definition 
of stakeholder theory. 
Despite all of these arguments, there is overlap between the descriptive, 
normative, and instrumental approaches. Some stakeholder scholars have questioned the 
legitimacy of isolating these strands or suggested means for converging the approaches. 
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Freeman (1999) argued that Donaldson and Preston's segmentation of stakeholder 
approaches was "dubious" and led stakeholder theorists in the "wrong direction" (p. 233). 
Other theorists (Jones & Wicks, 1999) suggested that for stakeholder theory to move 
forward, the normative or ethical-based approach must be converged with the 
instrumental and descriptive lines of research. By taking this convergent approach, 
managers can determine "what kinds of stakeholder relationships are both morally sound 
and practicable" (p. 216). The heated debate amongst stakeholder theorists continues to 
focus on whether stakeholder approaches to management must be based on an ethical 
component or whether recognizing stakeholders is just good business. 
Having examined the external debate between shareholder and stakeholder 
theorists, as well as the internal tension amongst stakeholder theorists regarding 
descriptive, normative, and instrumental stakeholder lenses, different stakeholder 
typologies will be reviewed. By focusing on what typologies exist to define st~eholder 
groups, it becomes evident that new research efforts are needed to better understand what 
practical strategies franchise boards might adopt to create greater collaboration. 
Examining Stakeholder Typologies 
The broad definition of stakeholders acknowledged by Freeman include primary 
stakeholders, who have an authorized, contractual relationship with the firm, and 
secondary stakeholders, who are any group not included in the primary stakeholder list 
(Freeman, 1984). Recent scholarly work has attempted to provide greater clarity of the 
term stakeholder by taking these broad groups and subdividing them into smaller units to 
provide more precision and allow for empirical research to be undertaken. Four 
typologies are examined in this paper. Figure 3 provides a synthesis of four models using 
42 
a ladder of rungs to reflect the categorization process. The least influential stakeholder 
can be found at the bottom of the ladder. Stakeholders move up the ladder as they 
become more central to the organization. 
Freeman Mitchell et al. Frooman Ford et al. 
1984 1997 1999 2009 






Primary Firm power competitors 
Dangerous 
Shareholder power Quiet competitors 
Demanding 




Dormant Weak friend 
Figure 3. Visual representation of four stakeholder typologies. The level of stakeholder 
importance increases at each elevation in the grid. 
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A seminal contribution to the literature was offered by Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 
(1997), which has been widely cited and validated by other scholars. In this theory, 
stakeholder types are based on whether they have the attributes of power, legitimacy and 
urgency. The framework suggests that stakeholders can be classified based on specific 
situations. This type of classification allows managers to predict the behavior of these 
various stakeholders under different conditions. Managers can create tools ahead of time 
to deal effectively with various stakeholder situations. 
Power is a critical element in the stakeholder relationship, and stakeholders must 
not only be aware of but also willing to exercise their influence on the firm. In addition 
to power, stakeholders must have legitimacy, but power does not guarantee legitimacy 
and legitimacy does not guarantee power. Urgency is the third variable in the equation. 
The importance of a claim is determined by its time sensitivity. The seven classifications 
depicted by Mitchell et al.'s (1997) model include definitive, dependent, discretionary, 
dominant, demanding, dangerous, and dormant stakeholders. 
This model assumes that stakeholder groups shift into or out of different 
classifications based on specific situations in which power, legitimacy, or urgency are 
gained or lost. Agle et al. (1999) empirically tested Mitchell et al.' s (1997) model by 
examining decisions made by CEOs of 80 large U.S. firms. Measures of power, 
legitimacy, and urgency were developed, and factor and reliability analyses demonstrated 
construct validity for all three measures. Findings from the survey confirmed that 
stakeholder attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency individually and collectively 
were related to whether CEOs perceived stakeholders as salient. This suggests that these 
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three attributes impact how leaders of organizations prioritize stakeholders (Agle et al., 
1999). 
Knox and Gruar (2007) operationalized and tested Mitchell et al.' s (1997) theory 
in their qualitative study of a nonprofit medical charity in the United Kingdom. The 
researchers created and tested a qualitative survey instrument to record the views of 
managers regarding key stakeholder constituencies. Mitchell et al.' s model was credited 
for helping the organization identify and prioritize stakeholders. 
Another typology of stakeholders is offered by Frooman (1999) and was based on 
resource dependency theory. Frooman argued that there must be conflict in a relationship 
for a stakeholder relationship to even exist. Divergent interests and the potential for 
conflict are the cornerstones of his typology. Relying on a resource dependency 
perspective, Frooman (1999) generated four types of firm-stakeholder relationships: firm 
power, high interdependence, low interdependence, and stakeholder power. 
Frooman's (1999) typology outlined influencer strategies that different groups of 
stakeholders are apt to employ to get what they want. He argued that stakeholders can go 
about influencing firms in two ways. Groups may engage in a resource-control strategy, 
whereby the firm's need for a given resource creates the stakeholder relationship. In 
essence, this is similar to the power attribute that Mitchell et al. (1997) offered in their 
typology. The difference between Frooman's and Mitchell et al.' s models, however, is 
that Frooman argued that stakeholders can exercise resource control by working through 
an ally to control the flow of resources to the firm. Frooman offered a case study as 
validation of this theory. The case centered on consumers threatening to boycott StarKist 
Tuna due to the foreign fishing policies of companies that StarKist used. This 
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withholding strategy influenced StarKist to require their foreign suppliers to adopt 
different fishing strategies. A subsequent qualitative study by Hendry (2005) used 
Frooman's typology and found his model "too parsimonious to adequately describe 
stakeholder influencer strategies" (p. 79). In his four case studies, Hendry found that 
although Frooman's withholding strategy was operating in the firm-stakeholder 
relationships, other influencing tactics were occurring at the same time. 
Recently, Ford, Peeper, and Gresock (2009) offered a new contribution to 
stakeholder typologies. Specifically, they wrote a detailed case study of convention and 
visitors bureaus that suggested a categorization of stakeholders as friends, foes, or 
neutrals. Similar to Frooman, these theorists relied on resource dependency theory to 
assess stakeholders by their ability to influence resource allocation. The difference was 
that these theorists suggested that congruence with the firm's mission is the second 
attribute to determine how stakeholders can be classified. Their six categories included 
critical friends, weak friends, quiet competitors, indifferents, aggressive competitors, and 
the envious (Ford et aI., 2009). This typology expands earlier classification schemes by 
suggesting that stakeholders may not fall into either the friend or foe class, but may be a 
neutral faction. 
Although stakeholder literature has focused on who the stakeholders are and how 
to classify different stakeholders to help managers assess what is important to the 
stakeholders, few empirical studies have tested the theories (Polonsky, Schuppisser, & 
Beldona,2002). The conceptual framework proposed in the next section is designed to 
assist franchises and franchisors understand the type of stakeholder relationship operating 
within the context of the franchise board. Because stakeholder relationships evolve over 
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time (Hosseini & Brenner, 1992), franchise boards wanting to collaborate effectively will 
need to understand the type of stakeholder relationship that exists. The research study 
conducted here will determine if the conceptual framework provides an appropriate 
classification schemata. 
Conceptual Framework for Franchise Boards 
When attempting to evaluate stakeholder relationships, it is important to 
remember that a number of moderating factors impact the relationship (Polonsky, 
Schuppisser, & Beldona, 2002). Morgan and Hunt (1994) found that trust and 
commitment were among the variables that impact relationships. The hypothesis 
presented in this conceptual framework suggests that the normative governance processes 
operating on boards can be examined to assess the type of stakeholder relationship that 
exists between franchisees and franchisors. The four normative governance categories 
were influenced by Cornforth and Edwards' (1999) study of nonprofit boards. Cornforth 
and Edwards (1999) suggest the four governance tasks that boards perform include; 1) 
safeguarding assets or what could be termed a monitoring role; 2) adding value by 
improving decisions in a partnership role; 3) representing others' interests which differ 
from the organization that is characterized as a political role; and 4) presenting a united 
front to external constituencies in a supporters club fashion. 
Norms of Governance 
I maintain that the norms of governance used by boards have a relationship that 
can be reflected as opposite endpoints (see the grid in Figure 4). The monitoring frame 
represented on the far-left horizontal axis suggests that the main function of the board is 
to ensure control of the organization. Stemming from agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 
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1983) this franchise board would be characterized by mistrust between the parties. On 
the opposite end of the horizontal axis is the supporters club frame, which is 
characterized by the operating philosophy that boards are legitimizers (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977) who help the long-term survival of the franchise. 
The vertical axis is represented on the bottom by the political model. In this 
mode, boards are viewed as representing stakeholders. Under this lens the 
acknowledgement is made that franchisee stakeholders have different interests than the 
franchisor, requiring a continual negotiation between the two parties. Board members are 
viewed as resources to achieve certain objectives (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). On the 
opposite end of the vertical axis is the participation frame. In this mode the franchisor 
and franchisee board members operate as partners and hold substantive dialogue and 
debate prior to making decisions. Relational theory (MacNeil, 1981) provides the 









Figure 4. Conceptual framework illustrating the four governance processes defined by 
Cornforth and Edwards' (1999) and the application of stakeholder relationships by 
quadrant. 
Linking Board Governance to Stakeholder Dynamics 
The four-quadrant grid of normative governance frames provides a process for 
categorizing stakeholder relationships of franchise boards. Figure 4 depicts the four 
stakeholder groups (antagonists, agents, activists, and allies), which are described below. 
Antagonists 
In this schema, boards that operate between the political and monitoring frame are 
characterized as having an antagonistic stakeholder relationship. Board dynamics are 
fraught with dissension and distrust between franchisees and the franchisor. Each side 
uses various power bases to exert influence, and rather than trying to achieve a common 
goal, each side simply wants to dominate or control decision-making. The most extreme 
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example of antagonistic board relationships might end in a courtroom with a judge ruling 
on disputed issues. For example, the KFC franchise association once sued KFC 
corporate over the right to develop and control the advertising strategy. A 2-year court 
battle ended with the judge siding with the corporation on their ability to direct the 
national advertising agency, but also siding with the franchisees that they can make and 
approve advertising plans (Schreiner, 2011). After this protracted battle in which both 
sides won or both sides lost, the franchisee-board relationship may either begin to heal or 
it may remain stagnant in an antagonistic mindset. 
Agents 
Boards that behave politically but retain a supporters club mindset would be 
considered as agent stakeholders. This agent relationship can be contextualized by 
suggesting that franchisees have "gone native," becoming indoctrinated into the trappings 
of being part of the board and the advantages that are associated with that position. 
Boards may be little more than rubber stamps in this context. In an agent-stakeholder 
relationship, power is most often concentrated with the franchisor. Franchisors operating 
in an agent stakeholder relationship may be relying on the presence of the board to attract 
help attract new franchisees by demonstrating the corporation's commitment to listening 
to franchisee voices. Franchisors might also rely on the board to help legitimize 
decisions within the broader franchisee community. 
Franchise consultants warn franchisors about establishing councils with appointed 
members who are friends of the organization. The risk is an overly supportive council 
that is easy to work with, but one that quickly loses respect among the broader group of 
franchisees in the system (Ingage Consulting, n.d.). 
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Activists 
In the upper left quadrant are activist stakeholders. These boards want to be 
intensely involved in decision-making on key issues. There is a more competitive 
relationship based on the mindset that they must protect their turf. Because of prior 
experiences, franchisees tend to be suspicious of the franchisors' intentions. The activist 
board understands that franchisors and franchisees share the same goal, but strategies for 
achieving that goal may differ between the groups. Franchisors, for example, are 
frequently more willing to pursue aggressive discounting to bolster sales, because they 
receive royalties regardless of whether the franchisees are profitable. Franchisees, on the 
other hand, often resist aggressive pricing strategies because they erode earnings. 
Franchisee board members may view their role as protecting franchisees from the 
franchisors' marketing efforts that will drive sales, but reduce profit. 
Franchisors acting in an activist stakeholder frame seek franchisee input and 
participation and view franchisee input as valuable. They rely on the board to help 
safeguard the brand by ensuring attention is focused on issues of importance to the 
collective system versus becoming mired in grievances from a small number of 
franchisees. Franchisors may also believe that franchisee board members will serve as 
operational role models for the rest of the system. 
Allies 
Moving above the horizontal axis, boards in the participatory model with a 
supporters club lens can be characterized as allies. Stakeholder boards functioning as 
allies have two-way discussions, and both franchisees and franchisors bring insight and 
advice to meetings. The franchisees' attitudes are one of trust towards the franchisor. 
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Power in this relationship is shared and the franchisor brings issues to the board early to 
seek advice and encourages dialogue between franchisees. Recognition that franchisees 
are a valuable resource characterizes this relationship. In a Wall Street Journal article 
dated February 14, 2011, the new owner of H-1 Auto Care commented on using the 
advisory council as a way to seek franchisee approval for company proposals. He 
commented, "It's much better to have a buy-in than a cram-down" approach. This 
sentiment is at the heart of a stakeholder relationship that is built upon trust. 
Unlike prior stakeholder typologies that identify stakeholders according to their 
influence over resources (Ford et aI., 2009; Frooman, 1999) or by the level of power, 
legitimacy, and urgency stakeholders hold (Mitchell et aI., 1997), the proposed 
framework classifies board-stakeholder relationships based on the normative governance 
models that are operating. Each of the four archetypes provides OD practitioners a way 
to characterize the stakeholder relationship of the board at the onset of any type of board 
evaluation. 
The stakeholder relationship grid may be applicable to assessing a single board 
meeting since every group will demonstrate behaviors and attitudes that could align with 
any of the four quadrants. But these are temporary attitudes and perceptions, which tend 
to change rapidly. Long standing groups will tend to develop a dominant style of 
working together that lasts over a period of time. This study focuses on those embedded 
patterns that define the overarching stakeholder relationship. This is not to imply, 
however, that franchise board stakeholder relationships remain static. When an 
environmental jolt occurs, such as a new franchisor comes aboard, key leaders depart 
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from the board or some upheaval occurs that threatens the firm, the franchise board's 
relationship may shift from one quadrant to another. 
Summary 
A stream of franchising research has demonstrated that franchisee satisfaction 
increases when information is shared openly, franchisee ideas solicited, and the 
entrepreneurial spirit respected. Franchise boards provide one mechanism to promote 
franchisee satisfaction. The proliferation of advisory boards is expected to continue as 
more firms embrace the franchise business format. 
While the literature has explored the franchisor-franchisee relationship, little 
attention has been paid to franchise boards. Given the amount of time, money, and 
energy expended by franchise systems on these boards, this represents a gap that warrants 
scholarly attention. Are franchise boards fostering collaboration, engendering trust and 
satisfaction, and enhancing their organizations for long-term success? This question 
poses both an opportunity and a challenge that franchise systems need to address. The 
conceptual model to be tested in this research could help identify the type of stakeholder 
cultures operating within these boards. This type of knowledge could generate practical 
advice for young franchise systems adopting franchise boards as mechanisms to create 
and maintain strong relationships between the franchisor and franchisee. More 
established franchise systems could benefit by analyzing their current board statuses and 




Studies of nonprofit boards, franchising, and stakeholder theory have each 
covered a wide of range qualitative and quantitative techniques. One of the more widely 
used survey tools for nonprofit board effectiveness is the Board Self-Assessment 
Questionnaire (BSAQ; Jackson & Holland, 1998). Case studies have also demonstrated a 
popular design for studies of nonprofit boards. 
Franchising has been studied from both a qualitative and quantitative lens, yet 
limited empirical work has been conducted on franchise boards. Stakeholder theory has 
also been examined using multiple empirical tools with a heavy reliance on the Kinder, 
Lydenberg, Domini, and Company (KLD) index of social performance. In a review of 
stakeholder studies for a special edition of the Academy of Management Journal, 
Harrison and Freeman (1999) argued that a wide variety of methods are needed in 
organizational research. These scholars suggest that one methodology is not superior to 
another. They maintain that examining whether the techniques used were carefully 
executed, empirically valid, and appropriate for the research questions being addressed 
are the critical questions reviewers must ask. 
A recent study of franchise associations (Lawrence & Kaufmann, 2010) embraced 
a qualitative research design that relied on an analysis of secondary data of franchise 
websites, unstructured interviews of franchisees, and observations of three unique 
franchise-association national conferences. Kaufmann and Lawrence's (2010) work 
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provides evidence that qualitative tools can shed light on these constructs. Following this 
line of research, this study will use a qualitative design, but encompass a broader 
spectrum of franchise boards, including franchisor-sponsored councils and ad hoc groups. 
In addition, this research will examine both franchisee and franchisor perspectives, as 
opposed to Kaufmann and Lawrence's focus only on franchisees. 
The assumption is made here that robust qualitatively-based research has the 
ability to help organizations understand how board dynamics work on a deeper level 
before applying solutions designed to improve the relationship. Stake maintains, "how 
things work can be more complicated than they seem at first" (p. 37). Scholars in the 
field of OD are familiar with the habit of organizations to want fast fixes before they truly 
understand the problem (Short, Keefer, & Stone, 2009). Stake (2010) argued that the 
main goal of social research is not just understanding how things work, but understanding 
how things work in their particular settings. Likewise, Miles and Huberman (1994) 
argued that qualitative data provide rich descriptions that evoke understandings of 
processes in local contexts that help researchers move past initial thoughts of how things 
work to generate or revise conceptual frameworks. This study was guided by the belief 
that franchise boards represented complex entities that reflected specific types of 
stakeholder relationships. Using a qualitative approach, this study developed an 
understanding of the purposes and roles of these boards, as well derived evidence about 
whether the conceptual framework proposed provided a fruitful typology of franchise 
board stakeholder cultures. 
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Research Design 
This study was conducted in two phases. Phase 1 provided an exploratory step to 
gain insight into franchisor and franchisee attitudes toward franchise advisory boards. 
These insights provided background on franchise boards prior to entering Phase 2' s 
comparative case study of three franchise boards. A more detailed description of each 
phase is described below. 
Phase 1 
During Phase 1, I relied on a qualitative research design using multiple interviews 
with franchisee and franchisor boards members from various organizations around the 
U.S. This took place over an 17 -month period. I focused primarily on exploring 
Research Question 1 (understanding the reasons franchise boards form) and Research 
Question 2 (examining the roles these boards playas perceived by board members from 
both the franchisee and franchisor perspectives). Interviews in Phase 1, however, also 
explored board structures and uncovered aspects of board culture, including tensions that 
arose between franchisees and franchisors. Phase 1 helped inform Phase 2 by providing a 
cross-category perspective on reasons why franchise boards form and informed my 
thinking with respect to how franchisees and franchisors may view their roles on the 
board different! y. 
Phase 2 
During Phase 2 of the study, I used a comparative case research design to 
examine three franchise boards, focusing on Research Question 3 (how board structures 
and processes operate in context) and Research Question 4 (what types of stakeholder 
relationships are reflected by these boards). The comparative case studies offered 
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insights into the internal governance patterns of franchise boards and provided 
verification of the research in Phase 1 by demonstrating what roles boards play in 
practice. 
Creswell (2008) stated that case studies are a type of ethnographic design and 
have their roots in sociology and anthropology. Yin (2003) offered a broader position, 
suggesting that case studies are comparable to whole experiments in that they are 
generalizable to theoretical propositions. Comparing multiple case analyses to detective 
work, Yin (1981) described how detectives begin with a tentative explanation or theory, 
and as new cases and new evidence emerge they make modifications to their mental 
model. Connecting a string of case studies together is made easier if the study is built on 
a clear conceptual framework or, at a minimum, the central questions of the study are 
identified beforehand (Yin, 1981). 
The conceptual framework in this study proposed that four types of stakeholder 
relationships operate within franchise boards: allies, agents, activists, and antagonists. 
Each franchise board represented a case that was analyzed by examining the attitudes and 
behaviors of board members, along with the governance processes that operated. The 
dynamics of the stakeholder relationships of three franchise boards represented the unit of 
analysis for Phase 2 of the study. Current members on each of these boards represented 
one boundary for the study, and a 6-month board cycle represented another boundary. A 
case study allowed for observations of board dynamics to be compared to how board 




The population for Phase 1 included board members of franchise associations, 
franchise advisory councils, and ad hoc groups formed by franchisees. I used a 
heterogeneous stratified purposeful approach and snowball sampling technique for Phase 
1 interviews. Heterogeneous purposeful sampling ensured that the study examined 
multiple types of franchise boards, including independent associations, franchisor 
appointed boards, and franchisee ad hoc councils to determine if there was common 
thinking as to why boards form, similar ideas around the roles these boards play, and an 
understanding of various board structures and relationships that have emerged. 
The study used a stratified sample to have both franchisees and franchisors 
represented. Both viewpoints were captured to determine similarities and differences 
between these groups. I also interviewed franchisors and franchisees from multiple 
industries and multiple types of boards. Participants were current or former members of 
independent associations, franchisor sponsored advisory councils, or belonged to ad hoc 
franchise groups. Finally, I employed a snowball sampling technique, whereby each 
interviewee provided the name of another knowledgeable individual who had experience 
with franchise boards. Table 1 lists the interview participants, franchise industries, and 




Phase I Interview Participants 
Franchisee board 
members Industry Type of board 
Micky B. Marketing services Ad hoc council 
TomC. Tax services Franchisor board 
Melissa H. Signage Franchisor board 
Corinne G. Brokerage Ad hoc council 
Greg A. Personal grooming Independent association 
TimT. Restaurant Independent association 
Jason T. Restaurant Franchisor board 
Franklin C. Restaurant Independent association 
Dale C. Health & beauty Independent association 
Kevin S. Fitness center Franchisor board 
Toby R. Fitness center Franchisor board 
Franchisor board 
members 
Milt W. Restaurant Independent association 
BethM. Car care Franchisor board 
Dave H. Restaurant Franchisor board 
JimO. Restaurant Franchisor board 
Donny L. Car care Franchisor board 
RonP. Restaurant Franchisor board 
SamP. Restaurant Franchisor board 
David B. Restaurant Independent association 
Diane P. Restaurant Independent association 
Jerry M. Restaurant Independent association 
George D. Restaurant Franchisor board 
Phase 2 
The sample for Phase 2 of the study consisted of a purposeful sample that included a 
franchise board and two franchise advisory councils in U.S. franchising systems. I did not 
have prior work experience at the companies represented by these boards. The three cases 
represented two different types of boards, industries, and franchise life cycles. Stake (2006) 
argued that multicase studies must identify the quintan, or umbrella idea, that is being 
examined. In my study the quintan was the stakeholder relationships that existed within 
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franchise boards. My analysis focused on each individual case to understand the similarities 
and differences that helped tell about the quintan. For this reason, heterogeneity with respect 
to types of boards and industries was desired. This allowed me to understand whether 
mUltiple types of stakeholder relationships existed and helped determine the relevancy of the 
conceptual framework. Gaining access to board meetings and conference calls required a 
two-pronged approach. The first approach relied on my network of industry contacts to 
secure entry, and the second approach relied on cultivating relationships with the informants 
from Phase 1. 
Case participants. The first case, hereafter referred to by the pseudonym Portini's, was a small 
restaurant chain located on the West Coast. A professional colleague introduced me to the 
president of this franchise system, helping to secure entry. I had no prior acquaintance with this 
organization. This restaurant began franchising in the mid-1980s and currently has 
approximately 150 restaurants in fewer than 10 states. This is a franchisor-sponsored advisory 
council with five franchisee members and two franchisor members. I attended the fIrst board 
meeting in April, 2011, and was present on three subsequent monthly board conference calls. In 
addition, I attended the board meeting prior to the chain's national convention. 
The Portini's board offered the opportunity to learn about a franchisor-sponsored 
board that has been in existence for over 20 years. Some members of the board had served 
multiple times over the years, and others were newcomers serving their first term. The 
founder of the chain was no longer on the board, but remained active in the firm. In addition, 
the founder's children were involved in the business. The current president of Portini' s 
suggested that this board could be characterized by participation in decision-making. While 
there were no contractual obligations to allow the board voting rights, the franchisor brought 
measures forward and sought board endorsement. 
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The second case, referred to'by the pseudonym Zen Masters, was a consumer 
service health oriented franchise that had been in existence for fewer than 10 years and had 
approximately 58 franchisees while the research study was underway. The franchisor 
recently initiated a franchise advisory council, and I gained entry through a colleague who 
currentl y works with the owners. I attended the first board meeting in the spring of 2011, 
and joined six monthly board conference calls. I also attended the September board 
meeting, which was held prior to the franchisor's convention. 
Zen Masters offered the opportunity to understand in greater detail the early life 
cycle of a franchisor-sponsored board. This allowed me to explore how rules are 
established and what normative behaviors develop. Particularly important, I was able to 
observe how the structure evolved and dynamics formed based on that structure. This 
board provided a balance to Portini' s in terms of longevity. 
The third case, referred to by the pseudonym Euro Salon, was an independent 
franchise board. This board has been in existence for over 30 years. This board differed 
from the other cases in that it reflected an entity loosely connected to an independent 
franchise association. Euro Salon was an established brand that had undergone ownership 
changes. The national advertising board that I observed was comprised of franchisees and 
the franchisor. There was some tension in this board's system due to a possible sale of the 
brand. Although I had access to six monthly conference calls, I was not able to attend the 
one board meeting that occurred during the study. 
Data Collection 
I secured IRB approval for Phase 1 in February, 2010 (Appendix A). The method 
of data collection for Phase 1 was semi-structured interviews. IRB approval for Phase 2 
was secured in March, 2011 (Appendix A) to allow for participant observation. During 
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Phase 2, I recorded field notes during meetings and conference calls and conducted semi-
structured interviews using the same interview guide as in Phase 1. I also engaged in 
unstructured interviews with board members. Finally, I reviewed board documents, 
including agendas, meeting minutes and bylaws. Using multiple sources provided the 
necessary triangulation of data to help match what was heard with what was observed. The 
outsider, or "etic" perspective was brought forward by the researcher and used during 
observations, whereas the "ernie" perspective was gained through participant interviews. 
Capturing both perspectives enhanced the reliability of the findings. 
Timeline 
Phase 1 of the research began in March, 2010 and was completed in J ul y, 2011. 
Phase 2 data collection began in April 2011 and was extended over an 8-month period. 
Figure 5 provides details of the timeline. 
62 
Literature Review and Practitioner Experience 
tage One 
March 2010 - July 2011 
tage '0 
April 2011 - Decemb r 2011 
Figure 5. Timeline representing flow from phase 1 to phase 2 of the study, as well as the 
constant comparative approach used during the process. 
Interviews and Conversations 
During Phase 1, I conducted 22 interviews over a 17-month span. The interview 
protocol ensured inclusion of key questions based on the research questions guiding the 
study. Questions covered why boards form in the first place, what roles these boards 
play, and how boards operate internally with each other, as well as externally with other 
members of the franchise system. The researcher also asked probing questions to seek 
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expansion on specific themes or clarification of comments made by the participant. 
Appendix B includes the list of interview questions. 
Identifying individuals with codes ensured the participants' anonymity. Codes 
identified each participant as either a franchisee (z) or franchisor (r) and then assigned a 
mutually exclusive number from 1 to 20 for tracking purposes. In-person or telephone 
interviews ranged between 45 and 90 minutes. With the permission of the participants, 
all interviews were taped and transcribed. I also took notes as a back-up mechanism. I 
relied on manually recorded notes for two interviews due to poor tape quality. 
During Phase 2, I relied on both formal and informal interviews to gather data. I 
conducted 25 semi-structured interviews with board members and board attendees, either 
in person, or by telephone. All interviews were recorded and transcribed, but handwritten 
notes were taken to provide backup in case the recorder distorted words. While attending 
meetings, I engaged in numerous informal conversations and unstructured interviews 
with board members and regular board attendees. After these informal conversations, I 
captured the content from those conversations on paper, within 24 hours, to ensure 
accuracy. 
Observations 
In addition to observing four face-to-face franchise'board meetings, I attended 
three board dinners and joined 14 board conference calls. Typically, franchise board 
meetings lasted a full day and conference calls spanned an hour to 90 minutes. Field 
notes captured the type of questions posed, detailed franchisor-franchisee interactions, 
formal and informal rules, and normative behaviors with respect to decision-making. I 
created an observation checklist based on interviews from Phase 1, and from the literature 
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I had reviewed. Appendix C shows the observation checklist used during face-to-face 
meetings. 
Document Analysis 
Documents were analyzed from board meetings to supplement observations and 
interviews, providing another level of triangulation. I compared written agendas 
provided at the meetings to what transpired during the sessions to determine if boards 
stayed on topic or deviated from the formal agenda. Likewise, I reviewed minutes of 
board meetings to assess how information was officially communicated. Document 
analysis provided me the opportunity to check content of field notes to ensure all 
decisions were captured. 
Data Management 
Miles and Huberman (1994) describe qualitative data analysis as a "continuous 
iterative enterprise" (p. 12). Because qualitative data analysis is a more fluid process, 
Miles and Huberman recommend explicitly defining the data-analysis process before data 
collection begins and documenting each step of the process in detail. For Phase 1, data 
management included a matrix of interviewees containing the following type of 
information: first name, last initial, date interviewed, identification as a franchisee or 
franchisor, franchise industry, type of franchise board, age range of franchise board, and 
code number attached to the interviewee. This matrix was included in a binder with all 
24 transcripts and 24 contact summary sheets that were compiled and attached to each 
transcript. 
For Phase 2, I used a binder system to organize each case and house hard copies 
of transcripts, field notes, and other documents related to the case study. A matrix for 
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each case included the following type of information: case letter, type of franchise 
system, age of franchise system, board size, age of board, board meeting dates, first name 
and last initial of each board member, date board members were interviewed, and a 
unique code for each interviewee. 
Data Analysis 
During Phase 1, I used contact summary sheets to synthesize the data. Miles and 
Huberman (1994) defined contact summary sheets as a simple I-page form written after 
field notes have been transcribed to capture the main ideas, concepts, and impressions 
from the interview. These forms make it easy to conduct rapid retrieval and can be useful 
to read prior to an upcoming interview. Appendix D shows the contact-summary-form 
template used during Phase 1. Miles and Huberman recommend preparing contact 
summary sheets within a few days after receiving typed transcriptions. Contact summary 
sheets were prepared for all eight transcripts by the end of December, 2011, and the 
remaining interviews had contact summary sheets prepared within a week of receiving 
the transcripts. 
My journaling began in January 2011. Journal entries occurred weekly and 
included my concerns, ideas, and reflections on the research process. I reviewed prior 
journal entries before interviews or meetings to determine if new themes have surfaced 
that warrant new probes. 
I used an iterative process of reviewing the contact summary sheets and journal 
entries to create the coding schemata. The first-order coding cycle used a combination of 
coding processes. Attribute coding enabled identification between franchisors and 
franchisees, as well as to track each participant. The initial coding technique also relied 
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on descriptive codes based on participant content related to each research question 
(Saldana,2009). At times the codes reflect an in vivo approach where the participants' 
words were used to capture certain themes. This coding process allowed for both "etic" 
and "emic" perspectives to emerge. 
Manual coding by the researcher involved cutting field notes into thought units 
and placing these on index cards where they were read and coded. White index cards 
contained units of thought from franchisors, and color-coded cards contained franchisee 
commentary. Each card contained the attribute code on the bottom to distinguish each 
participant. An example would be GA-5z, signifying that this was Greg A, the fifth 
franchisee interviewed. Next, each thought unit was content coded based on the coding 
schemata mentioned above. Twenty of the index cards were given to a fellow student 
along with the coding sheet. The student then coded each card to provide a level of 
interrater reliability. An interrater reliability score of 90% was achieved. 
Stake (2006) argued that the quintain is better understood when multiple cases are 
studied. During Phase 2, I examined each of the three franchise boards to understand 
similarities and differences that provided evidence with respect to the types of 
stakeholder relationships that were operating. I utilized worksheets to capture the themes 
about the quintain. I also relied on matrices to generate and track assertions (Stake 
2006). The case sources are outlined in Appendix E. 
Researcher as Instrument 
In both quantitative and qualitative studies, the role of the researcher is to 
determine the purpose of the study, formulate the research questions, and design the 
study to answer the questions. In qualitative studies, however, the researcher is also an 
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instrument (Patton, 2002). The knowledge, skills, and rigor that the researcher applies 
impacts the credibility of the research endeavor. It is important for the qualitative 
researcher to understand how their own background and predispositions may influence 
what they observe and how they understand what they observe (Patton, 2002). Morrow 
and Smith (2000) argue that the researcher's knowledge mediates the information 
gleaned from the observations. 
In this study, I brought 15 years of practitioner experience from the franchising 
industry. Over my corporate career I attended and participated in roughly 50 franchise 
board meetings across three different restaurant franchise systems. This type of 
background gave me the opportunity to enter this study with a series of sensitizing 
concepts to orient the fieldwork and helped me craft the conceptual framework. 
Sensitizing concepts are useful for providing a starting point and allow the researcher to 
"[break] the complexities of planned human interventions into distinguishable, 
manageable, and observable elements" (Patton, 2002, p. 279). Denzin (1978) offered the 
following perspective on how sensitizing concepts can guide fieldwork: 
The observer moves from sensitizing concepts to the immediate world of social 
experience and permits that world to have and modify his conceptual framework. 
In this way he moves continually between the realm of more general social 
theory and the worlds of native people. (p. 9) 
My prior experience with franchise boards illustrated that in qualitative research 
the observer may not represent a blank slate. This suggested the need for reflexivity on 
my part. Reflexivity allows the researcher to remain cognizant of the participants' 
perspectives and voices in the process. During my study, I continually asked myself, 
what I knew, and how I knew it, to manage potential bias. The personal journal I 
initiated during Phase 1 and maintained throughout the study served as a means of 
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reflection. I also included a level of skepticism and sought alternative explanations about 
what I heard and observed. 
Trustworthiness 
Researchers using a naturalist inquiry approach need to demonstrate that they are 
representing the participant's mental constructions fairly. Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
recommend that qualitative researchers use five techniques to ensure credible findings 
and interpretations. This study incorporates all five as outlined below. 
1. Prolonged engagement, persistent observation and triangulation. In this 
study I observed multiple board sessions and supplemented observations with 
interviews and document analysis. I was in the field for 21 months providing 
a long period of engagement. 
2. Peer debriefing with an impartial colleague to propose and attempt to explain 
working hypotheses. As a doctoral student I relied on my advisor and 
committee members as sound checks for my theories. Periodic discussions 
about observations allowed me to learn how these scholars might interpret 
specific board behaviors. 
3. Seek negative case analysis, whereby continual refinement of the hypothesis 
occurs as new learning takes place and refutes prior conceptualizations. I. 
continued to refine the conceptual framework as new observations added 
context to the study. 
4. Benchmarking what is found by holding parts of the research in the archives 
for later comparison. I set aside three interviews that I did not code until my 
paper was completed. I then listened to those interviews to determine if the 
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themes identified in my study fit the comments shared by these franchisees 
and franchisors. 
5. Member checks, whereby the researcher "plays back" to respondents what is 
learned. In this instance I will sough participants' verification of what I 
learned by asking for clarification and rephrasing of what I heard. 
6. In addition to using multiple sources of information, peer debriefing can offer 
a valuable method of triangulation. I borrowed additional expertise. I 
discussed my findings with various practitioners in the franchising field who I 
have worked with in the past. 
Strengths and Limitations 
A strength of Phase 1 of this study was the inclusion of multiple franchise 
industries, including restaurants, food service, grooming, automotive care, printing, 
public relations, and financial-planning services. Another advantage was that I was able 
to include a broad spectrum of board types. The boards ranged from ad hoc franchisee 
councils to franchisor-sponsored boards to independent franchise associations, which 
provided a holistic overview of many franchise organizations. Franchisors and 
franchisees were evenly represented, which helped to reduce bias. The scope of the 
research in Phase 1, however, was limited to 22 interviews and was dependent upon the 
willingness of the participants to provide candid information regarding their perceptions 
of franchise boards. A possible limitation was that 55% of the interviews during Phase 1 
were with people who worked in the food industry, but this high percentage is reflective 
of the dominance of this industry in franchising. 
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Yin (2003) argued that multiple case comparisons are valuable for generalized 
theory building, provide more compelling evidence than a single case, and elevate the 
stature of the study (Yin, 2003). Phase 2's use of multiple cases was an asset because it 
provided three single cases to address the research questions and generated an additional 
25 interviews, bringing the total number of interviews to 47. In addition, Phase 2 allowed 
me to collect evidence on behaviors and attitudes in different franchise boards. 
The most obvious limitation in Phase 2 was the small number of cases examined 
due to time and financial resources. On the other hand, the small sample also offers an 
opportunity for future empirical work to continue to refine the conceptual framework as 
more franchise boards are analyzed. Another limitation of this study was reactivity, 
whereby my presence at board meetings and on conference calls may have altered the 
board members' behaviors to some degree. Additionally, my 15 years of franchise 
industry experience may have had some impact on my perspective. Finally, I did remain 
cognizant of all of the limitations and have attempted to ensure that my readers can fairly 
evaluate my assertions, analysis, interpretations, and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PHASE 1 FINDINGS 
Introduction 
The data for this study have been collected in two phases. Phase 1 consisted of 22 
interviews with franchisors and franchisees from multiple industries. These interviews 
took place over the course of 17 months. Phase 1 findings are reported in this chapter. 
Phase 2 of this study occurred over an eight-month period, during which I conducted 
three case studies of franchise boards in three organizations. Findings from my 
observations, interviews and document analysis of these three cases are reported in 
Chapter 5. The final chapter of this dissertation, Chapter 6, includes my discussion, 
implications, strengths and weaknesses of the work and future research opportunities. 
This chapter begins with a review of three different types of franchise boards. I 
then shift to address the research questions of why do boards form, and what roles do 
boards play in franchising systems? This discussion is followed by a review of board 
structures, which addresses my third research question. Next, I use four governance 
models as my frame of reference to answer my Phase I research question: what types of 
stakeholder relationships operate on franchise boards? Finally, I conclude with a chapter 
summary that examines my conceptual framework in light of the findings from the 22 
interviews conducted during Phase 1 of my study. 
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An Array of Franchise Boards 
Practitioner-oriented franchising literature advocates establishing franchise boards 
early in the lifecycle of the organization. In the book, The Insider's Guide to Franchising 
(Webster, 1986), the author recommended that franchisees who become involved with 
companies lacking boards should "consider working with them to form one" (p. 197). 
Likewise, the International Franchising Association (IFA) suggests that when considering 
the purchase of a franchise, entrepreneurs, as a part of their due diligence, should inquire 
as to whether the franchisor supports the creation of franchise owners associations -- or 
franchise advisory councils. If so, do the franchisors actively participate in board 
meetings and activities? 
The difference between independent association boards and franchise advisory 
councils becomes meaningful in the context of board formation. An independent 
association is formed by franchisees, designed to benefit franchisees, funded by 
franchisees, and operated by franchisees. Franchise advisory councils, on the other hand, 
are formed by the franchisor and can be disbanded by the franchisor (Barkoff, 2007). 
This statement was confirmed by several of the participants in this study. Milt W., one of 
the franchisors interviewed for this paper, distinguished between the two types of boards 
with his observation that: 
Franchise advisory groups give advice to the franchisor primarily at the 
franchisor's request. A real important thing is that the franchisor is essentially in 
control of that type of organization and can listen to them or not, as they see fit. 
They can disband them or change the makeup, or the frequency of meetings. The 
other type is the independent association. This is formed by the franchise 
constituency who elects representatives, they can meet when they want to, and the 
franchisor can either recognize them or not. (MW, 6/12) 
With respect to the types of boards operating within this group of respondents, 
eight interviewees discussed their independent associations, 12 reflected on their 
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franchise advisory councils and two interviewees spoke about their ad hoc groups. In 
five instances, both an independent association and a franchise advisory council co-exist. 
In these situations, interviewees answered questions relating to the board on which they 
participated. 
The practitioner literature (Barkoff, 2007; Borian & Borian, 1987; Luxenberg, 
1986; Wulff, 2005) has described independent franchise associations as legal entities that 
are funded by the dues of the membership, as opposed to being financed by the 
franchisor. However, among the eight independent associations represented in this study, 
two have budgetary allowances from the franchisor. In these cases, the franchisor 
reimburses franchisees' travel expenses to and from the board meetings. One franchisor, 
David B., commented, "when the independent association board formed we matched their 
dues to help them launch. We didn't want the relationship to be adversarial. Today, we 
continue to pay for franchisees' travel" (DB, 3/14). 
The second type of entity is the franchise advisory coul)-cil. Advisory councils 
vary in form across different systems. Donny L., a franchisor of a mid-sized restaurant 
chain, said his organization created their advisory council once it had 20 franchisees in 
the system. Donny offered the opinion that franchisors should refer to these sponsored 
entities as "councils," as opposed to using the term "board." He opined that the 
franchisor must keep decision-making power, and that the term "board" indirectly implies 
a decision-making body that oversees company operations (DL, 12/31). 
Variation in the franchisor's approach to establishing and managing advisory 
councils was evident when a franchisee, Melissa H., indicated that her franchisor's 
advisory council was not widely known. She commented, "I am not sure there is a lot of 
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perception about the council. I mean it is prestigious to be invited, but there is no 
ceremony to say 'here is your franchisee advisor' in front of other franchisees." Melissa 
went on to say that there were probably many franchisees either not aware of the council, 
or not familiar with what it does (MH, 8/13). Meanwhile, Beth M., an automotive 
franchisor, indicated high visibility for her organization's franchise advisory council. 
Beth indicated that the corporation holds annual elections for members, issuing a public 
relations piece on each candidate to every franchisee in the system (BM, 9/2). 
Other interviewees mentioned a third type of entity, the ad hoc council. These ad 
hoc councils are formed by franchisees, but unlike franchise independent associations, 
these councils do not register as legal entities. With respect to ad hoc councils, the 
franchisor mayor may not be invited to participate. In this study, two franchisee 
interviewees said they had created their own councils. Connie G., a franchisee who 
formed one of the ad hoc councils, stated: 
When I started this council, I didn't have information on how to do it. That would 
have been helpful. But, if we had waited to have 70 franchisees, we would have 
missed the ship along the way. Franchisors need to understand that this is one of 
the tools to implement early to help franchisees. (CG, 9/22) 
Motives for Board Formation 
Interviewees suggested three primary reasons why boards are created. These 
include the desire to achieve the following: (a) address some form of stress on the 
system; (b) exchange information and pool resources; and (c) preempt franchisees from 
organizing an association. These findings support papers issued by franchising attorneys, 
franchise trade associations, and franchising consultants. Boroian and Boroian (1987) 
have recommended that franchisors form franchise associations or councils early to avoid 
franchisees "threatening a revolt" later down the line (p. 207). Franchising attorney, 
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Rupert Barkoff (2007), in the trade journal article "Franchisee Associations: Nothing to 
Fear But Fear Itself." suggested that change of management, bankruptcy, or a perceived 
breach in the franchisor's performance drives franchisees to organize and form 
associations. In an interview with Barkoff for this paper, he indicated that, while this 
point remains true, he has seen "a slow trend" for franchisors to form independent 
association groups. Barkoff commented that franchisors are beginning to recognize that 
the communication chain in these associations can be good for them, as well as for the 
franchisees (personal communication, July 2011). 
Addressing Stress 
Twenty interviewees suggested franchise boards may form "out of stress" on the 
system. Stress could occur when a franchisor is near, or declares, bankruptcy, there is an 
ownership change, new corporate executives are appointed, or some form of litigation 
against the franchisor is filed. Each franchisee interviewed mentioned stress as a possible 
reason for board formation. Meanwhile, nine franchisors mentioned stress as the driving 
force for the initiation of these boards. Interestingly, three of the participants interviewed 
discussed how their boards transformed from independent associations to franchise 
advisory councils, or vice versa. Stress, or the removal of stress, was the harbinger of 
these changes. 
In the first two instances, bankruptcy proceedings incited the franchisees to form 
independent associations and to dismantle their franchise advisory councils. In the case 
of the mid-sized restaurant chain, Milt W. noted that a franchise advisory council had 
previously been in existence. The franchisee board members participated on a "volunteer 
basis." When the franchisor was in financial trouble, however, the franchisees "felt they 
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needed to speak with one voice and did not believe the franchise council was going to 
represent their interests." Milt said the franchisees formed the franchise association 
because "they [franchisees] had to look out for themselves, because they owned roughly 
40% of the units." He reported that the relationship at this time was extremely 
adversarial (MW, 6/11). 
A restaurant chain also made a similar transition from an advisory council to an 
independent association. The shift occurred when the brand stopped growing and was in 
the process of refinancing debt. David B., the franchisor, reported that the "franchisees 
felt the company was not open and progressive so they decided to organize their own 
board." In this case, the franchisee council members solicited all franchisees to join the 
new association and become dues-paying members. The funds collected were used to 
obtain legal representation and to create the bylaws. David indicated that the same 
people who served on the franchise advisory council also served on the new association 
board. He noted, however, that the franchisor worked "arm in arm" with the new 
association. David indicated that it was not adversarial because the franchisor wanted to 
work with the new association to "keep the peace" (DB, 3/14). 
In contrast, an automotive franchise system switched from an independent 
association to a franchise advisory council. Beth M. shared that, when she became 
president, one of the first things she had to deal with was a newly formed association 
with "upset and angry franchisees." In discussing her reaction to the situation, Beth said, 
"The thing that was key, was that I understood their feelings because I too had been a 
franchisee." She reported that, after 18 months the association that had formed decided 
to disband, and the franchisor, in conjunction with the franchisees, established a new 
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franchise advisory alliance (BM, 9/22). This franchisor-sponsored alliance is still 
operating today. It is one of only two boards, amongst those in this study, which 
annually surveys the broader franchise community to calibrate the effectiveness of their 
franchise advisory alliance. 
Other interviewees also suggested that stress was the precursor to association 
formation. They pointed to lawsuits, or systemic problems, as the flame that often 
ignited the match. Tim T., a franchisee, observed, "Our lawsuit garnered a way for us to 
have a unique relationship with the corporation" (TT, 2/8). Another franchisee phrased it 
succinctly, "typically boards form because something precipitates the need, such as new 
owners or sales declines" (MW, 6/11). Along the same vein, Dale C., the franchisee in 
the grooming industry, referred to their franchise association as a "pit bull on a chain, 
whose job is to keep mischief away from the doorstep" (DC, 5/6). 
Pursuing Communication 
The findings also clearly show that boards form to exchange information, pool 
resources, and grow the business. Half of the respondents (11) offered this rationale as 
the guiding force behind board formation. Roughly an equal number of franchisees and 
franchisors discussed the role of boards as mechanisms to share ideas and grow the 
business. Franchisee, Greg A. said, "we pool our monies to purchase television 
commercials, radio commercials, posters, and other sales materials" (GA, 1/31). 
Likewise, Tom C. said, "Our responsibility is to manage and run the funds for marketing" 
(TC,8/11). In this situation, Tom's board oversees the marketing funds collected from 
the franchisees by the franchisor. Two franchisees discussed the board as a way for the 
franchisor to get ideas from smart people "for free." Other respondents mirrored this 
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view by suggesting boards help figure out problems and come up with new ways of doing 
things. In contrast, an alternative perspective about the pooling of resources focused on 
leveraging strength in numbers. Several interviewees suggested franchisees come 
together to gain a "seat at the table." 
Striving for Control 
To a more limited degree, the data suggests that franchise boards and councils are 
formed as a defensive strike by franchisors wanting to avoid having an independent 
association created. While often heralded by consultants as the reason for board 
formation (Ingage Consulting, pg. 1), less than one-fourth of the individuals interviewed 
for this study suggested this as a motive. One franchisor distinguishing why franchisors 
need to act early, said, "If a franchise organization grows and never forms a council, at 
some point, the franchisees will create an association. This is not the same thing, this is a 
union" (DH, 10/1). 
Articulating Roles & Responsibilities 
Franchising consultants and attorneys suggest that boards provide "feet on the 
street" feedback from operators who are in the field. Boards also allow both parties to 
bring new ideas, programs, and suggestions forward. Furthermore, they evaluate 
upcoming or past programs, improve communication with the franchisor, and represent 
the broader group of franchisees' interests. In some instances, they even protect the 
franchisees by creating a legal entity that can challenge the franchisor in court (Barkoff & 
Green-Kelly, 2006; Darrin, Stadfeld, & Wulff, 1998; Gurnick & Wharton, 2000; Ingage 
Consulting, n.d.; Spandorf & Barkoff, 2003). 
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I asked all participants to describe the roles of their franchise boards. Through an 
iterative process, these roles were classified to reduce redundancy. For example, one 
participant described the role as being a sounding board, while another participant 
suggested the role was to offer the franchisor input on ideas. While these board functions 
were initially classified separately, upon review it was apparent they expressed a similar 
idea. From this investigation three themes emerged, encompassing seven roles. Table 2 
includes the themes, roles, and frequencies (the number of participants who indicated this 
role, as well as the number of times the role was mentioned). Following the summary 
table, each theme will be discussed. 
Table 2 
Board Member Roles Classified by Franchisors and Franchisees 
Franchisors Franchisees 
# % # % 
Themes Categories Mentioning Mentioning Mentioning Mentioning 
Spreading the News 
Sounding Boards 





Building Bridges and Bonds 
Mentoring Opportunities 
Create Camaraderie 






















The board functioning as a communication forum emerged as the most widely 
cited role. David B., whose organization has had both a franchise advisory council and 









feedback." He went on to suggest that the board may offer granular input on a new 
product idea, or broad perspective by engaging in dialogue on where the company is 
headed (DB, 3/14). Another franchisor, Sam P., confirmed the sounding board role by 
suggesting that boards provide "expertise and perspective from frontline owners in 
shaping brand marketing and other decisions" (SP, 2/8). Ron P., a franchisor with a large 
restaurant chain, lauded the value of communication when he said, "we have a general 
belief that, as a franchisor, you need to make sure you are listening to franchisees." Ron 
went on to say that it never works when franchisees and the franchisor are not aligned on 
key initiatives (4/25). Along the same theme that communication is a necessary element 
for collaboration, Dave H., a franchisor, offered the opinion that good communication 
improves the relationship between the franchisor and franchisee. Dave also added that 
having an advisory council improves the relationship among franchisees. He suggested 
there was value in having franchisees sharing their knowledge and experience with other 
franchisees in the system (DH, 10/1). Beyond the tangible benefits of improving ideas or 
direction, franchisor, Donny L., observed the intangible communication benefit that 
boards allow everyone to be heard (DL, 12/31). 
Not all franchisees were convinced that their franchisor supported this concept of 
communication. One franchisee said, "I think our system [referring to the franchisor] is 
just starting to learn that there is value in franchisees communicating and sharing best 
practices and sharing worse practices" (CG, 9/22). Connie G., one of the other newer 
franchisees, in a young franchise system, formed her own ad hoc council for the very 
purpose of communication. She said she invites all franchisees to the monthly 
conference calls because it is an efficient way to gather and share information (CG, 9/22). 
81 
While communication was most widely-cited as a means to share ideas and information, 
Dale c., the franchisee from the grooming industry, offered another perspective. He 
reported that his franchisor wants to use the independent association board to share ideas, 
but he, and others, have resisted because they view the board's role as strictly a 
mechanism to express their grievances to the franchisor (DC, 5/6). 
Promoting Power Plays 
Interviewees described a number of board roles that can be captured under the 
umbrella of politics. As described in subsequent paragraphs, four specific board 
functions that ensconce political elements include: (a) providing representation of rank 
and file franchisees; (b) serving as a monitoring mechanism; (c) influencing decisions; 
and (d) legitimizing people, processes and decisions. While both sides mentioned 
political functions, the research uncovered differences between franchisee and franchisor 
perspectives. This was one of the more interesting findings: franchisee board members 
expressed a broader number of political roles, and they more heavily emphasized 
decision-making and monitoring functions. Meanwhile, franchisors focused on the 
board's function of conferring legitimacy of their initiatives and providing representation 
of the broader franchise community. Figure 6 displays how franchisees and franchisors 
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Figure 6. Franchisor versus Franchisee perceptions of political roles boards play. 
Representation role. A franchisor, Jim 0., expressed the role of representation 
when he said, "as systems grow, the boards role is to bring the perspective of the 
franchisee community to the table." He went on to say, "given the proxy by constituents, 
they [boards] become important to the franchisor." Jim noted that the backing by the 
board for a franchisor initiative helps pave the way for acceptance amongst the rank and 
file constituents (10, 10/4). Beth M., the automotive franchisor, echoed this sentiment by 
indicating her system sends out surveys to franchisees. The surveys help ensure 
franchisees know how to reach their franchisee board representative (BM, 9/2). 
Meanwhile, only half of the franchisees listed representation as a role of the board. It is 
possible that franchisees consider the role of representation to be implicit, given that their 
peers elect them. 
Monitoring role. Franchisees were more likely to suggest the primary role of 
boards is to ensure franchisors are monitored. Words used to describe this monitoring 
responsibility included the actual word "monitor," as well as, "checks and balances," 
83 
"protection," and the colorful phrase "hold the franchisors' feet to the fire." Eight out of 
the 11 franchisees interviewed offered this idea. Examples of monitoring included the 
need to watch for, among other things, changes to the language in franchise contracts, 
corporate expansion plans, marketing and operational initiatives, as well as unit 
redesigns. Greg A. commented that their board is like "insurance." He elaborated on the 
boards compliance responsibility using Al Capone's famous quote, "You can go a long 
way with a smile. You can go a lot further with a smile and a gun" (GA, 1131). 
Decision-making role. Another political role that varied significantly between 
franchisor and franchisees was decision-making. Nine of the eleven franchisees 
mentioned that the board functions to allow franchisees to be involved in making 
decisions. Franchisees mentioned their input on the allocation of marketing funds, new 
products, and operational processes influenced decisions made for the system. 
However, only two of the 11 franchisors interviewed discussed the decision-
making aspect of the board. In both instances these franchisors quickly added that their 
boards functioned in an "advisory only" capacity. One of the two franchisors, Ron P., 
commented, "we use to get votes on a lot of issues, but now we are shying away from 
these." Ron went on to say that, as the level of trust has built up over the past few years, 
the need to vote on every issue has decreased (RP, 4/25). It is worth noting that Ron's is 
a franchise advisory council, but a separate independent association also exists in his 
organization. George D., the only other franchisor to mention the decision-making role 
of the board, suggested, "the board gives input to help understand the pros and cons of 
why something would or would not work" (GD, 6/12). Unlike Ron, however, George's 
board does not include a voting process. 
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Legitimizing role. Finally, interviews highlighted the idea that boards legitimize 
people, processes, and decisions. Half of the respondents, almost equally split between 
franchisees and franchisors, mentioned this as a board function. A franchisor, Sam P. 
said, "The number one role [of boards] is to give credibility to leadership decisions" (SP, 
2/8). A complementary statement was offered by David B., who stated, "When we, [the 
franchisor], say we discussed something at the last board meeting this provides validation 
to the franchisees" (DB, 3/14). Another franchisor indicated that the buy-in occurs 
because, "franchisees feel better if their peers are involved" (GD, 6/12). 
Among the franchisees who indicted boards offer legitimacy to decisions, there 
was open acknowledgement that this was a tactic used by their franchisors. Kevin S., a 
fitness franchisee, bluntly stated his franchisor's board [now disbanded] served as 
"smoke and mirrors" to assuage franchisees that everything was working (KS, 6/24). 
Another franchisee stated that at times their board functioned as "shills." This same 
franchisee maintained that being on the board was viewed as a "status thing" because it 
means you are a good operator (JT, 3/1). 
Building Bridges and Bonds 
The idea that boards foster collaboration, allow for mentoring, and promote a 
sense of belonging was reaffirmed in the Phase I data. Both franchisees and franchisors 
mentioned this role, though to a much lesser degree than fostering communication or 
providing political capital.' A franchisee, Connie G., said, "Boards provide you a back-
pat and hoorah, it's a sharing of success with others." She went on to say, "We are all 
sitting here by ourselves. It's good to have that camaraderie, it allows everyone to bond" 
(CG, 9/22). Dave H., a franchisor, commented that some franchisors fail to grasp how 
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important franchisee interactions are and how they benefit the system (DH, 10/1). 
Another franchisor, Beth M., offered that their council has a mentoring program for other 
franchisees to be coached by their peers (BM, 9/2). 
Some Common Governance Patterns 
The primary mechanisms used to fill board member terms are elections. Out of 
the 22 boards providing data in Phase I, sixteen hold annual elections. Depending on the 
size of the franchise system, the board may be divided into regions, with franchisees in a 
certain region electing their representative. Amongst this group of interviewees, where. 
elections were held, each franchisee had one vote. Boards appointed by the franchisor 
occurred twice. One board self-selected members, and the remaining two boards invited 
all franchisees to participate. 
Depending on whether it was a franchise advisory council, or an independent 
association, the level of franchisor involvement in the electoral process varied. 
Associations handled their own electoral process while franchisors were more involved in 
publicizing candidates and elections in franchise sponsored boards. Table 3 shows the 
breakdown by board type, illustrating little difference between independent associations 
and franchisor sponsored councils in terms of how seats on the board are secured. 
Table 3 
Member Selection Process 
Members Ind Assoc FAC Ad Hoc Total 
(n= 8) (n = 12) (n = 2) 
Elected 7 9 16 
Appointed 2 2 
Self-
Selected 1 1 
Everyone 1 2 3 
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In one of the franchise appointed councils, the franchisee reported that the 
franchisor controlled not only who was on the board, but also who was appointed the 
chair. In this situation, the franchisee, Kevin S., said "the franchisor asked me to chair 
the council and I asked why." He told me that "People listen to you." Kevin S. 
explained that the franchisor wanted the former chairperson removed from office about 
the same time a rogue franchisee tried to start an independent association. While the 
independent association never took root, the franchisee members of the board did hold a 
secret meeting with franchisees. Kevin S. described the climate at the meeting as 
"venomous," with franchisees holding the franchisor in low regard. The franchisees on 
the board met with the franchisor to let them know how angry they had become, but this 
news only served to further strain the board relationship. Kevin said the board disbanded 
not long after this meeting. He indicated that the franchisee board members realized that 
they were "impotent" to make change; therefore they saw no need in continuing to serve 
on the board (KS, 6/24). 
How and When Boards Convene 
Fourteen of the 22 boards hold quarterly meetings, five meet one to three times a 
year and three boards hold monthly conference calls. The independent association boards 
and franchise advisory councils represented in these interviews, tend to embrace face-to-
face meetings. The ad hoc councils reported relying on conference calls. Out of the eight 
independent associations, only one group does not include the franchisor for any portion 
of the session. The other seven independent association boards invite the franchisor to 
attend at least a portion of the meetings. See Table 4 for the breakdown of meeting 
processes by type of board. 
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Table 4 
Number of Face-to-Face Meetings by Board Type 
Meetings Ind Assoc FAC Ad Hoc Total 
(n= 8) (n = 12) (n=2) 
Quarterly 5 9 14 
1-3x year 3 2 5 
None 1 2 3 
Formal Versus Informal Processes 
Nine of the 11 franchisors interviewed emphasized the importance of formal 
board structures. Examples of formal board structure and processes include: how 
members are chosen, how long they serve, who attends the meetings, how agendas are 
established, the importance of establishing and using bylaws, and when and whether 
voting should occur. Franchisors tend to emphasize structure more heavily than 
franchisees. For example, a total of 73 instances of formal elements of board structure 
were mentioned by franchisors. Franchisees, on the other hand, mentioned formal 
elements of board structure in 53 instances. 
One example of formal rules, cited by the franchisors, involved specific criteria 
that franchisees had to meet in order to run for office on the board. Typically, the 
standards required franchisees to be in compliance with the system targets, in terms of 
sales and operational measures, before their name could be listed on the ballot. 
Independent association boards, managed by franchisees, did not require these . 
compliance measures. 
Franchisee Members Communication Protocol 
The funneling of communication to the rank and file constituents varied widely 
among the franchisee board members. One franchisee, discussing how she 
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communicated back to her constituents, said, "I may come back from a meeting and call 
some of the key owners that I trust and say 'what do you think about it [referring to a 
decision made by the council]?'" (MH, 8/13). Greg A. indicated his communication 
with franchisees is "not terribly structured" (GA, 1/31). On the other hand, Jason T. 
indicated when he was chair of the advisory council, he encouraged other members to 
communicate immediately after a meeting with a recap of what occurred (JT, 3/1). 
Stakeholder Dynamics 
Dulewicz et al. (1995) had found that effective boards work together and have 
mutual trust in the relationship to allow for objectivity and constructive conflict. The 
relationships among board members may not only shape how they define their roles, but 
may also influence board behaviors and attitudes. Cornforth and Edwards' (1999) 
posited four governance models: partnership, political, compliance, and supporters club, 
to identify board behavior. In considering these a priori themes, I asked participants a 
series of questions to understand how issues are surfaced, how boards reached agreement, 
what tensions existed on boards, and a characterization of the relationship between 
franchisor and franchisees on their board. 
Power and Politics in Play 
Governance entrenched in the politicaL frame is evident when groups attempt to 
gamer authority. Political maneuverings and outright power plays were mentioned by all 
respondents. Both franchisors and franchisees commented on command and control 
behaviors that did, or could, operate in their boards' environments. The examples 
ranged from not acknowledging the board, jockeying for position, attempting to divide 
and conquer, using backroom politics to sway opinions, and trading favors. 
89 
Cornforth and Edwards' (1999) described the political governance frame as 
dominated by the belief that members represent divergent interests. In this case, 
representatives rely more heavily on power and control to negotiate outcomes. I heard 
from four respondents how franchisors had failed to acknowledge, or work with, the 
boards. This lack of recognition created tension in these organizations. In two instances, 
the boards were affiliated with independent associations, and the other two boards were 
franchise advisory councils. Franklin C., a seasoned franchisee, shared the story of how 
his franchisor had resisted working with the franchise board up until the time the 
franchisor needed support for a corporate initiative. After the attempt to strong arm the 
franchisees failed, the franchisor sought out three members of the advisory board for 
advice. Franklin commented, "I told him I could make this [the project] happen, and it 
kinda felt like I was Jimmy Hoffa or something" (FC, 3/14). Through negotiations, 
Franklin secured more active recognition of the board. In return for the franchisor's 
agreement to work with the board, Franklin and his fellow advisory board members 
called every franchisee and convinced them ~o agree to the corporate project. Franklin's 
example illustrates a quid pro quo tactic that can be used by boards to achieve stature. 
This type of reluctance by the franchisor to participate on boards can occur when there is 
an ownership change, or when litigation against the franchisor is initiated. 
A franchisee, Kevin S., commented that, after the sale of his franchise, the new 
owners ignored the advisory board for a period of time. This led to disgruntlement within 
the franchise community. The franchisees on the board held a separate meeting to gather 
a list of complaints to take back to the franchisor. Ultimately, their board disbanded due 
to their inability to have any influence (KS, 6/24). Franchisors may also disband councils 
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when they are unhappy with the tone of the organization. Dave H., a franchisor, shared 
that at one advisory council meeting with the franchisees, a franchisee read a letter into 
the record asking that the brand be sold. Dave recounted that the immediate reaction of 
the franchisor was to end the meeting, and within the next month the franchisor had 
appointed a new council (DH, 10/1). 
Diane P.'s franchise organization cannot disband its independent association 
board, but she did indicate that management "does not take the board seriously." She 
explained how the franchisor worked around the board by co-opting key franchisee 
leaders. The franchisor was a private equity firm. Diane candidly acknowledged that 
equity firms were not interested in "long term relationships" with franchisees (DP, 4/2). 
Other visible displays of power were also discussed. Franchisees reported not 
inviting the franchisor to attend conference calls, and having the lawyer for the 
association communicate to the franchisor by letter (MB, 3/3; GA, 1131). Jerry M.'s 
organization had recently settled a lawsuit with their independent association. Jerry 
commented that, over his 20-year tenure with the franchisor, the current board had 
proven to be the most dysfunctional. He offered the colorful analogy that, at the moment, 
both sides were doing a "flamingo dance." Furthermore, he noted that neither side was 
reaching out to mend the relationship (JM, 5/16). 
According to several interviewees, this idea of trading favors also played a role in 
how decisions were secured. One franchisor, Sam P., acknowledged, one of the 
"greatest" ways to secure agreement is by "horse-trading." When asked for examples of 
what was traded, Sam indicated it could be anything from the franchisor overlooking a 
board member's failure to meet an operational hurdle, to franchisees on the board being 
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given early rights to bid on a new territory (SP, 2/8). A franchisee also indicated that 
franchisors, aware of which franchisees were the leaders in the broader community, spent 
more time courting these individuals (JT, 3/1). 
Finally, the choice of words used to reflect the governance process was mentioned 
by five of the franchisors. Jim 0., a franchisor for a restaurant chain, said, "You have to 
be careful and not use the word 'recommendations.'" He elaborated by stating "we are 
sharing and seeking input, not seeking approval, and that's important" (JO, 10/4). 
Interestingly, no franchisees commented on the politics of word choice. 
Working Together 
In describing a partnership frame, Cornforth and Edwards (1999) suggested the 
board members are engaged in adding strategic value and partner with management to 
achieve the vision of the organization. While some interviewees discussed their boards 
within the political frame of reference, other franchisees and franchisors focused more 
heavily on the participatory aspect of board behavior. Among the 22 interviews, half of 
the respondents, equally divided between franchisees and franchisors, discussed the need 
for the board to work together and grow the business. However, of the eleven 
respondents voicing this idea, only two franchisees indicated this type of behavior 
operated on their boards. By contrast, four franchisors described boards as solidly 
aligned with partnership as the goal. 
A franchisee, Tom C., offered that his franchisor, as part of the franchising 
agreement, created a franchise advisory council to oversee the marketing funds. The 
franchisees on this board recommend the level of assessment. Once this recommendation 
had been made, all franchisees in the system voted. Tom mentioned that, not only did the 
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franchisor reI y on the advisory council to handle marketing, but they also used the 
council as a sounding board on other issues. Tom attributed this relationship to the 
franchisor's good leadership skills and franchisee board members who had an attitude of 
wanting to make things work, versus taking an adversarial approach (TC, 8/11). 
Connie G., the leader of an ad hoc franchisee council, indicated that her franchisor 
was at first concerned about the formation of the group. The group, however, worked 
hard not to let the calls become "bitch sessions" and the franchisor subsequently had 
joined the quarterly calls. When asked for her perception of the council's impact on the 
business, Connie offered that the board was "developing the brand." She went on to say 
that the council's brainstorming had led to several new product lines. Connie opined that 
her franchisor would offer a similar view of the council's effectiveness (CG, 9/22). 
Beth M., the automotive franchisor, compared her company's franchise advisory 
council to a "board of directors." She added that she wants transparency with the board, 
and that the goal is to grow the business together. Furthermore, Beth suggested that the 
board relationship would deteriorate quickly if the franchisor started to carry "a big stick" 
or treated the franchisees like "children." In Beth's organization, the franchise-
sponsored advisory council replaced an independent association. 
George D., a franchisor in the restaurant industry, indicated that his organization 
has initiated a council in the past year because a recent ownership change created anxiety 
among the franchisees. Prior management, according to George, had not worked 
effectively with franchisees. He stated his belief that the franchise advisory council will 
heighten franchisee involvement. George reflected his belief in partnership when he said, 
"the relationship has to be led through participation, input and alignment" (GD, 6/12). 
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A United Front 
Cornforth and Edwards (1999) described boards operating in the supporters club 
frame, as ones which focus on managing relationships with external audiences. The idea 
that boards serve as a mechanism to show alignment to outside audiences was noted by 
half of the respondents. These outside audiences could include franchisees, prospective 
franchisees, Wall Street investors, and even customers. It is not uncommon for franchise 
boards that file litigation against the franchisor to appear in the mainstream press. 
Franklin C., a franchisee, pointed out that bad publicity hurts both sides, and boards need 
to be diplomatic to avoid "mutual annihilation" (FC, 3/14). 
David B. pointed out the importance for franchisee board members to believe in 
the essence of the brand and to have an accepting attitude. He maintained that, if 
franchisee board members believe the brand is "dead," then they will fight every idea. 
Dave indicated that in his organization, the board's relationship was still emerging, but 
the new CEO had convinced the franchisees on the board that he cared about the 
relationship (DB, 3/14). 
Both franchisees and franchisors mentioned the danger when franchisees come to 
be viewed as mouthpieces for the corporation (SP, 2/8; KS, 6124; TR, 7/14). In this 
situation, the board loses their credibility with the franchisees and they become less 
valuable to the franchisor. How franchisees were coopted focused on the "wining and 
dining" aspect of being on the board. Examples of benefits bestowed on franchisee board 
members included: being picked up by car services at the airport, being present to ring 
the New York Stock Exchange opening day bell when the stock went public, meeting 
with the upper echelon of corporate management, having board meetings in desirable 
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locations paid for by the corporation, and receiving tickets to premier events. 
Franchisees were up front about the possible perks for serving on the board. Each 
recognized the risk of functioning like a rubber stamp, as opposed to the positive aspect 
of providing shared accountability for managing the business. 
Melissa H.' s experience as a "supporter" differed from the others interviewed. 
Melissa's franchisor invites her to speak to new groups of franchisees and help with their 
training. Her franchisor also has a group of high-performing stores with permanent seats 
on its advisory council. According to Melissa, the franchise advisory council is a mix of 
established franchisees and new franchisees deemed by the franchisor to be up and 
coming leaders in the system. In this organization, apparently they have followed the 
mantra, "once a member -- always a member" of the franchise advisory council (MH, 
8/13). 
Dynamic Tension 
Under the monitoring frame ensuring compliance is a key board activity. As 
noted earlier, franchisees were more likely to mention monitoring as a key role of the 
board than were franchisors. When the franchisors discussed monitoring, it was in a 
limited context. One franchisor, Sam P., offered the idea that, ideally franchisee board 
members would monitor other franchisees. Sam acknowledged, however, that this was 
probably "delusional thinking," as it would be highly unlikely for franchisee board 
members to shine a negative spotlight on those who elected them (SP, 2/8). 
In another example of franchisor monitoring, Jerry M. discussed how his 
organization had taken the lead on communicating to the rank and file franchisees. Jerry 
indicated that his organization, frustrated with franchisee board members not 
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communicating information back to their constituents, has stepped in to fill the void with 
the following process: 
Every time there is a vote we [corporate] send out what happened immediately to 
every franchisee. Within eight hours, the franchisees know how their board 
members voted ... We just started doing this and have already gotten thanked by 
franchisees in the system. (JM, 5116) 
Jerry candidly admitted that, from his vantage point, both the franchisor and franchisee 
board members should receive failing grades for communication. According to Jerry, 
this new practice would force "both sides to mind their p's and q's" (JM, 5/16). 
Franchisees on these boards brought up monitoring in a variety of contexts. Some 
discussed boards needing financial power to retain lawyers in case litigation is necessary 
to protect franchisee interests. Others discussed monitoring as a means to block 
franchisors from making operational changes that require capital investment on the part 
of the franchisees. Still others, such as franchisee Toby R, discussed monitoring in a 
more low-key manner. He offered the example of ensuring that test marketing of new 
products occurred prior to national launch. 
Franchisee Dale C. was working with his fourth franchisor owner. The 
independent association in this franchise took root over twenty years ago when the firm 
was expected to go bankrupt. An elected board of franchisees governed this association 
with Dale serving as the long-standing president. Dale indicated that the board had met 
two years previous to his interview with the franchisor and had gone through a list of 
grievances. He added that little had been done to address the issues, which was why the 
board was starting to take action. 
Franchisee Franklin c., similar to Dale, had witnessed multiple ownership 
changes of his brand. Franklin made no bones about it; the contract favors the franchisor, 
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not the franchisee. Therefore, in his opinion, the board functioned as an "agitator" to 
protect the franchisees (FC, 3/14). Tim T. commented that he was not a fan of his own 
board because the leadership "likes to send up smoke signals so the tribes can come 
together and the board members can tell each other about how the white men [the 
franchisors] are stealing our [the franchisees'] women and children." According to Tim, 
franchisee board members were focused on being watchdogs to enhance their own 
credibility with the rest of the franchisees in the system (TT, 2/8). 
The monitoring role of boards was also raised by franchisees serving on franchise 
advisory councils. Jason T.'s experience had been both positive and negative. In earlier 
ownership regimes, he commented that the advisory council was involved in decision-
making, even to the point of selecting the advertising agency. Under the then-current 
management, however, Jason indicated that the franchisor was more focused on 
"ramming" things through. He maintained that the council provides "checks and 
balances." Jason's organization had both a franchise advisory council, on which he 
served, and an independent association board that the franchisor did not recognize, but 
regularly met with "out of courtesy" (JT, 3/1). 
Attributes for a Successful Board Relationship 
Participants were asked what attributes are needed for a good board-franchisor 
relationship. Half of the franchisees interviewed offered the terms openness, trust, and 
transparency. Franchisee Jason T. commented that honest engagement was needed, while 
Kevin S. focused on transparency. Connie G. expressed the need for open 
communication in a non-threatening manner. 
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Half of the franchisors echoed the qualities of openness, trust and transparency, as 
needed elements for effective boards. Don H. offered the thought that, if franchisors and 
franchisees on the board trusted each other, then they created an environment in which 
they can get things done (DH, 10/1). George D. offered his opinion that "trust is at the 
heart of it." He went on to say that "board members need to be able to speak openly and 
frankly and should be shielded from politics" (GD, 6/12). Jerry M. offered the thought 
that you must have transparency on both sides. Regarding transparency, he went on to 
say: 
That means if you have warts on your face you can't cover them up, you have to 
show them. Where our board has fallen down in the past is that there have been 
hidden agendas on both sides. One side or the other hasn't been transparent. (JM, 
5/16) 
Another needed attribute offered by nine respondents, almost equally split 
between franchisees and franchisors, was the idea that the board must be focused on 
common goals. Franchisee Jason T. suggested both sides must work towards the 
common goal of making the brand better (JT, 3/1). Kevin S. practically mirrored this 
answer, but added that everyone must be working towards making money. He 
commented "I know this sounds like capitalism, but we are not operating non-profits" 
(KS,6/24). Franchisor Diane P. offered that she believes there must be common 
understanding of business strategy and respect for both long-term and short-term needs. 
She added, "you need to speak in each other's language and have a stake in each other's 
businesses" (DP, 4/2). Another poignant explanation of sharing a common goal that's 
diametrically opposite of making money, but equally relevant, was shared by Dale C. 
who commented, "We are both in this canoe. If I see he [the franchisor] is going 
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underwater, then I don't think I should be giddy happy. After all, I'm on the other end of 
that boat and I'll be going down too" (DC, 5/6). 
Influence of Board Type 
When the themes were examined by the three types of boards (ad hoc councils, 
franchise advisory councils, and independent associations), the most significant 
differences appeared between ad hoc councils and the two other board types. Franchisees 
on the two ad hoc councils offered more narrow views of boards' roles and, not 
surprisingly, they had less formal governance. With respect to why boards form, there 
was high similarity between the three board types, with independent association members 
slightly more likely to suggest stress, and a little less likely to mention communication. 
Although independent association members did not mention communication as 
the primary reason for forming, they favored this as a role of the board, even over 
representation. The role of representation was noted by more franchise advisory council 
members. Monitoring, however, was a role favored by those on independent associations 
over the other types of boards. The three types of boards showed similarities with respect 
to dynamics, with two exceptions. Franchise advisory councils members spoke more 
often about having a united front than either ad hoc councils or independent association 
members. Meanwhile, independent association members spoke more about monitoring 
than either type of council. 
The desirable attributes of trust, openness and transparency surfaced amongst 
members of all board types, with franchise advisory council members showing slightly 
more emphasis on these qualities. Ad hoc council members did not mention the need for 
common values, but this was mentioned by half of those on franchise advisory councils, 
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and to a limited degree by members of independent associations. Table 5 provides a 
summary of themes by type of board. 
Table 5 
Themes by Board Type 
Board Types 
and Ad Hoc Councils Advisory Councils Independent 
Themes Associations 
Stress on the Stress on the Stress on the 
Reasons for system; followed by system; need for system; need for 
Board Formation need for communication; communication; 
communication desire for control desire for control 
Sharing news; Representation; Spreading the news; 
Board Roles decision-making; spreading news; representation; 
and camaraderie legitimizing monitoring; and 
decisions; and legitimizing 
decision-making decisions 
Everyone invited; Election process; Election process; 
Governance Relies on face-to-face face-to-face 
Processes conference calls meetings held meetings held 
Power and politics; Power and politics; Power and politics; 
Dynamics followed by with equal emphasis followed by tension 
on working together on working together and monitoring 
Board and providing a 
united front 
Trust, openness and Trust, openness and Trust, openness and 
Desired Attributes transparency transparency; transparency; 
followed by followed by 
common goals common goals 
Chapter Summary 
Four research questions guided this study. The first question was: What 
precipitates board formation? Significant commonality was found between franchisor 
and franchisee perspectives on the primary reasons why boards originate. Both sides 
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recognized stress as a precursor to board formation. In addition, franchisors and 
franchisees identified boards as a means to exchange information and pool resources. 
These findings offer empirical support to practitioner theories espoused in franchising 
trade journals, and on franchising consultant websites. 
The idea that franchisors form boards as a mechanism to prevent independent 
franchise associations from arising is widely referenced in practitioner literature. 
Amongst this group of interviewees, however, only a small number of franchisors 
mentioned this as a motive. One possibility is that franchisors were reluctant to admit 
this more nefarious rationale. It is also possible, and perhaps more likely in today's 
competitive environment, that franchisors understand the value of an open 
communication channel with franchisees and the importance of leveraging franchisees' 
knowledge. 
The findings in Phase 1 of this study did not suggest that having a franchise board 
in place is a panacea for creating trust or building a collaborative relationship between 
franchisees and franchisors. Rather, this exploratory study provides some evidence that 
the four types of board stakeholder relationships (allies, agents, antagonists, and 
activists), outlined in the conceptual framework, were all operating to varying degrees 
among the 22 franchising organizations being studied. 
Furthermore, the findings suggest that boards are apt to slide between the grids in 
the stakeholder model when major events occur in the systems. It is a relatively common 
practice for private equity firms to purchase franchise organizations out of bankruptcy, or 
from the original owners who wish to divest. These equity firms typically have less 
reason to build franchise relationships, given their expectation is for short-term 
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ownership. A possible outcome of private equity ownership may be for a franchise 
advisory council to morph into a franchise association and thus to offer franchisees the 
"insurance" that their interests are represented. A change in board type is likely to 
impact the type of stakeholder relationship operating. 
The second research question of this study was: What roles do franchise boards 
play? Both franchisees and franchisors emphasized that the board functioned as a 
communication forum and opportunity to pool resources. After agreeing on this point, 
however, the franchisees' and franchisors' positions on roles eventually diverged. 
Franchisors focused on representation of the broader franchise system, along with the 
ability of the board to legitimize decisions. Meanwhile, franchisees focused on 
monitoring the franchisor and being part of the decision-making process. This discovery 
suggests the need for boards to regularly conduct self-assessments to rethink members' 
roles and work on building trust in the relationship. 
The third research question was: What governance structures operate within 
franchise boards? One prominent finding is that both independent associations and 
franchise advisory councils rely heavily on election processes. Only two franchisors 
appointed their board members. One of those two boards had since been disbanded. Not 
surprisingly, in-person board meetings were also very common among independent 
associations and franchise advisory councils, while ad hoc councils relied more on 
conference calls. Informal aspects of franchise boards centered around how franchisee 
board members communicated (or failed to communicate) information back to the rank 
and file franchisees. This finding may be traced back to franchisee board members not 
actively acknowledging their role in the democratic process as one of educating 
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constituents about what they learn. Further research on rank and file franchisees could 
determine the scope of this issue. 
The fourth research question was: What type of stakeholder relationships are 
operating amongst franchise boards? This question is directly linked to my conceptual 
framework. I postulate that a grid typology for franchise boards can be used to identify 
whether the boards operate as: antagonists, agents, activists, or allies. The framework 
relies on four governance models to help identify the behavior and attitudes of board 
members. The results from the interviews, as noted earlier, illustrated that all four 
stakeholder relationships occur, and the framework appears to be a good fit. The 







Figure 7. Conceptual framework illustrating the four governance processes defined by 
Cornforth and Edwards' (1999) and the application of stakeholder relationships by 
quadrant. 
Allies 
Franchise boards that tend to behave as partners, and whose members share an 
attitude of allegiance to one another, can be classified as allies. These boards are focused 
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on building the business together, and stand united in their representation to external 
audiences. A high level of trust is evident between the two groups. 
Tom c., a franchisee in the brokerage services category, provided an example of 
this relationship. Beth M., an automotive franchisor, also described her franchise 
advisory alliance in terms that indicated high participation from franchisees, with strong 
promotion from the franchisor that these franchisee board members are "model" citizens 
in the system (BM, 9/2). 
Agents 
The agent stakeholder relationship is positioned between the supporters club and 
political models. These boards focus on demonstrating unity to external audiences, but 
often use political capital to negotiate outcomes. Franchisors in this relationship are 
seeking the board to confer legitimacy on their proposals to bring the rest of the system 
along. Meanwhile, franchisees in this quadrant are garnering stature in the system, as 
well as enjoying the perks that membership confers. 
Franchisor Donny L.'s board appeared to be situated in this quadrant. Donny 
discussed the idea of "pre-meeting politicking" taking place prior to the meeting (DL, 
12/31). This tactic allows corporate to more easily "sell" in the initiative that the 
franchisor desires. Sam P.'s board also appears to be in an agent stakeholder 
relationship. Sam stated that the number one role of the board is to give credibility to 
leadership decisions. While Sam stated that he wants franchisee input and voices to be 
heard, he indicated he takes great care not to let the council tum into a "mother may I 
situation." He also indicated that you "horse trade, you play the game of trading one thing 
for another" (SP, 2/8). 
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Antagonists 
This stakeholder relationship is the most volatile because both parties are driven 
to accumulate power. The two governance models in play are the political frame and the 
monitoring frame. Franchisees in this relationship often have extensive grievances with 
the franchisor and may even have a history of litigation or may be undergoing litigation 
currently. Franchisors in this situation have a mindset of command and control. 
A number of interviewees aptly described antagonistic stakeholder board 
relationships, including Dale C., Kevin S., Jim 0., and Jerry M. Franchisor, Jim 0., 
characterized his current council functioning with a level of tension because when he 
came into position he "took power away from the group." Kevin S.'s board ultimately 
disbanded due to the deterioration of the relationship. Franchisor Jerry M. noted that 
there were numerous hidden agendas operating on his board, and he had "never seen the 
system as divided as it is today." Jerry went on to say that there were private closed-
door sessions, without corporate in attendance, in which franchisee board members were 
"telling other franchisee board members how to act towards the franchisor" OM, 5/16). 
Activists 
In the activist stakeholder relationship, there is a high level of participation from 
the franchisees. There is also, however, recognition that each side operates from a 
different vantage point. Because there is acknowledgement about divergent interests, the 
monitoring aspect of the board is conducted without malice. 
Ron P.'s board appeared to be thriving in this space. Ron indicated that for 
several years there had been an adversarial relationship, but an offsite meeting last year 
helped tum around the relationship. Ron reported that there had emerged a "vigorous 
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debate," but it represented constructive conflict, as opposed to the "yelling and name 
calling" that operated in the past (RB, 4/25). In an opposite situation, franchisee, Jason 
T. pointed out that prior corporate leadership on the franchise advisory council allowed 
for a high level of franchisee board involvement in key decisions, and "franchisees were 
treated as the guys who had all the ideas." John went on to say that while the then-
current management was "well-meaning" they were using the council to give credibility 
to their decisions in order to sell the idea to the larger group of franchisees (JT, 3/1). It 
would appear that Jason's advisory council had shifted from activist stakeholders to agent 
stakeholders under the new franchisor. 
This chapter presented Phase 1 findings associated with the four main research 
questions guiding the study. Chapter five presents three in-depth case studies of 
franchise boards in action. These case studies allow for additional data to help identify 
the applicability of the conceptual framework as a tool for classifying board relationships. 
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CHAPTER V 
PHASE 2 FINDINGS 
Introduction 
The three franchise organizations studied in this research are U.S. based firms 
with no international presence. These franchise systems spanned multiple industries and 
included a restaurant chain, a health service organization, and a personal service firm. 
Two of the organizations were privately held, and the original owners were still involved. 
In the third case, a private equity firm owned the brand. 
I used the following methods to gather the data for each case: (a) mUltiple 
interviews with 25 board members and regular attendees of these meetings; (b) 
approximately 34.5 hours of observation from four board meetings and 14 conference 
calls; (d) attendance at 3 board member dinners; and (e) review of board bylaws, meeting 
agendas, and meeting minutes. All interviews were taped and transcribed, and I recorded 
observations at meetings and on conference calls. Constant comparative analysis was 
used to analyze the data according to the following research questions: 
1. Why do franchise advisory boards form? 
2. How do franchisee and franchisor board members view the roles of these 
boards? 
3. How are boards structured? 
4. What types of stakeholder relationships exist? 
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The first section in this chapter provides an overview of the three franchise boards and a 
description of the board members. The subsequent sections address each of the research 
questions, in tum, for each case. A cross case analysis is provided at the conclusion of 
each of these sections to compare the patterns found amongst the three boards. 
The Three Corporations and Their Franchisee Boards 
Portini's Restaurant 
Portini's is a small restaurant chain located on the West Coast. The restaurant's 
original owner, Joe, and his wife, Debbie, began franchising their restaurant in the early 
1980s. Debbie is no longer a part of the business due to her divorce from Joe and his 
buy-out of her half of the company. Currently, Portini's has 95 franchisees in the system; 
most are one-store operators. The largest franchisee owns five restaurants. The franchise 
corporation owns and operates 30 restaurants for a 80120 split between franchisees versus 
corporate-owned units. Despite a weak economic environment, sales over the last year 
have been positive for both franchisees and corporate stores based on monthly operator 
reports (Observations, 3129; 5/19; 6/10; 7128; 9126). Joe, the founder, is still involved in 
the system, but he no longer attends franchise advisory council meetings. 
When I refer to Portini's franchise advisory council, I will use the abbreviation 
FAC. The FAC operates under a set of bylaws that were shared with me by the 
franchisor. Over a six-month period, I attended two board meetings, two board dinners, 
and three conference calls. In addition, I interviewed every member of the FAC, two 
regular attendees, one alternate member of the board, the board secretary and Joe, the 
original owner of Portini's. Along with the formal interviews, I had multiple informal 
conversations with F AC members during meetings and dinners. 
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Current board members. The Portini's board is composed of five elected 
franchisees based on five geographic districts. In addition, key participants include an 
elected chair, an elected vice chair, and the corporation's president. Current members 
include a mix of long-standing franchisees, and one newcomer, to the board who was 
elected last December. The franchisee board member with the most extensive history on 
the FAC is Marty A. A franchisee since the early 1990's, Marty has been a member of 
the board for almost as long as he has been in the system. The owner of three units, 
Marty noted that he and his wife have served the FAC in multiple roles over the years, 
including holding the positions of chair and vice chair. Currently, Marty represents one 
of the five districts. 
Betty H. has been a member of the board for ten years. She operates one unit. 
Betty's husband, Gordon, serves as the elected vice chair of the FAC. Mitchell G. is one 
of the larger operators, owning five units. Mitchell G. is in his second term, but at the 
recent national convention, he indicated to me that he might not seek office in the future. 
Another franchisee board member, Mel S., is in his second term. Mel has recently sold 
his unit and will be exiting the system to move East for family reasons. Due to the 
franchisor's comment that Mel's leaving the system was "bad news for us," the parting 
appears amicable. Karen F. is the newest and youngest member of the council. She has 
been in the system for three years and is serving her first term in office. 
The franchisor's chief operations officer, Ken M., is the elected chair of the FAC. 
Ken, in prior years, was a Portini's franchisee. Matt P., the president of the corporation, 
represents the franchise office and has been with Portini's for 13 years. He has held the 
position of president of the franchise for the last three of those years. The franchisor's 
109 
director of marketing, Dee B., attends all meetings. A representative of the brand's 
advertising agency, Danny S., also joins every conference call and board meeting. 
Finally, the secretary, Beverly P., attends meetings and calls to take notes. Beverly is a 
corporate employee of the franchisor. 
Zen Masters 
The second case, Zen Masters, is a consumer service health-oriented franchise 
that was founded by a husband and wife team in 2004. The owners began franchising 
several years later and have expanded into 18 states. There are approximately 58 
franchisees in the system, most operating one store. There are three corporate owned 
stores for a 5/95 split between corporate and franchise units. Based on sales reports from 
board meetings, both the corporate stores and franchisee stores have had low single digit 
sales growth over the last 6 months (Observations, 3/9; 3/31; 4127; 5120; 6121; 8/31; 9/18; 
10/19, all 2011). The franchisor initially raised the issue of a national advisory council at 
the 2010 national convention. In early 2011, the first council was elected, and the first 
conference call occurred in March of that same year. 
I will refer to Zen Masters council as the national advisory council (NAC). 
Though a relatively new council, they do have a set of bylaws they refer to as "The Rules 
of the NAC." These were shared with me by the franchisor. Over a six-month period, I 
attended the inaugural board meeting, a board dinner, and a board meeting that was held 
before the national convention. I also observed five conference calls. Finally, I 
interviewed every member of the NAC and held numerous casual conversations with 
these individuals. 
Current board members. All five elected franchisee members have served on 
the NAC for less than a year. Two of the franchisee board members, Jay D. and Travis 
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G., have been franchisees of Zen Masters for five years. Travis operates one unit, and 
was nominated by the NAC to serve as chair. Jay D. is the largest operator with eight 
units in total. 
Tori c., a franchisee representing the West region, has owned one unit for three 
years. Franchisee NAC member, Dusty D., currently operates two units. Pete E., 
considered one of the most financially successful franchisees, operates two units and is 
about to open a third. Pete has been in the system just shy of three years. 
Finally, the franchisor representative, Shelly E., is one of the original owners and 
holds the title of chief operations officer. She and her husband opened the first Zen 
Masters in 2004 and quickly shifted to a franchise model when the concept "took off." 
Shelly's background is in sales and marketing. As the corporate representative, she is 
designated as the vice chair on the NAC. On limited occasions, the director of marketing 
from the corporation has joined the NAC to address a specific issue. 
Euro Salon 
The third case, Euro Salon, a personal-service franchise system, has had multiple 
types of franchise boards over the years. The organization's founder started the company 
in the 1970's, but has since passed away. The firm has been through multiple owners, as 
well as survived bankruptcy proceedings. There are approximately 1,300 points of 
distribution, with an 80/20 split between franchise and corporate owned units. An equity 
firm on the East coast is the current franchisor. Presently, at Euro Salon, there are 
approximately 30 top-tier franchisees that own regions of the country. They can operate 
units, as well as license the brand name to other individuals. The current franchisor is 
increasing the number of corporate owned units through buy-back acquisitions from 
franchisees. The board does not discuss sales at meetings, but this larger chain's 
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financial information was publicly reported. Industry data indicated that while overall 
sales growth has increased by 1.5% over the last year years, the number of outlets for the 
franchise has shrunk by 6% (Maze, 2009; Maze, 2010, Maze, 2011). 
At Euro Salon, two franchise boards co-exist and they are loosely linked. The 
first is an independent franchise association, which has existed for over 20 years. I will 
refer to this board as InF A. When the franchisees became concerned that the brand 
would file for bankruptcy, they banded together and created InFA. This board is a legal 
entity offering a level of protection to franchisees. When a former franchisor filed 
bankruptcy in the 1990s, InFA made a bid to purchase the company. The bid failed and 
an equity firm acquired the brand. All of the top-tier franchisees are members of InFA. 
The InF A board meets once every other year or when needed. 
The second board, and the focus of this study, is the franchise advertising board, 
which will be referred to as the F AB. Though not all interviewees agreed on when the 
FAB was formed, all did agree that it has existed for many years. Perhaps the best source 
is Theresa N., the F AB 's administrator. Theresa is the sole employee of the F AB, and 
has worked for the board since the day it was initiated. She indicated that the FAB was 
created when the original owner began to franchise units in the early 1980s. The FAB 
collects advertising funds from franchisees on a weekly basis. These pooled monies are 
collected to enable the regions to test new products and market new services. Eighty-five 
percent of the monies are used to pay for advertising efforts the franchisees themselves 
undertake. Each franchisee is told their budget, and once they spend money for approved 
marketing tactics, they can send in their receipts for repayment of those expenditures. 
Theresa then sends the franchisee a reimbursement check. The remaining fifteen percent 
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of the monies collected from the franchisees are pooled to cover the cost of developing 
creative and marketing materials, as well as funding her position as FAB administrator. 
In addition to InFA and the FAB, the current president of the FAB, franchisee 
Adam G., shared with me that the former owners created a franchise advisory council. 
The six appointed members of this council had monthly conference calls with the 
president of the corporation. Adam indicated that, when the current equity firm 
purchased the brand, this group dissolved (AG, 1/31). 
The FAB's annual meeting occurred in February before my research began. Their 
second meeting occurred just as I was beginning my research, and the advertising agency 
was uncomfortable with an outsider's presence. There were no additional meetings 
planned during my data collection. I did attend five of the F AB conference calls. I 
received a copy of the bylaws and the F AB policy statement from the president of the 
board, Adam, a franchisee whom I have interviewed twice. Additionally, I interviewed 
the CEO and board member of the franchise corporate office, the F AB administrator, 
three of the other five FAB members, and the president of the ad agency, who attends the 
monthly conference calls. 
Current board members. The F AB is dominated by seasoned franchisees, but 
there are two newcomers in their midst. The four top-tier franchisees have each been part 
of the organization for numerous years. These top-tier franchisees are elected to serve on 
the FAB. The President of the FAB, Adam G., has over 20 years in the system as a 
franchisee. As he phrased it, "I have served multiple tours in office for the FAB" (AG, 
1/31). Adam is one of the larger franchisee operators in the chain with 90 units. Nelson 
N. came into the organization from a family connection. Nelson's father was one of the 
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early franchisees; Nelson and his brothers have since bought territories. He has been an 
owner for 10 years and became involved with the FAB when someone on the council 
nominated him for office a few years ago. David B. a long-term franchisee owner, is 
only in his second term of office. The third top-tier franchisee owner, Terry B., was not 
available for an interview and was absent from four of the five conference calls I 
attended. 
Two other members are second-tier franchisees, and they were appointed by the 
four elected franchisee members. John, a second-tier franchisee, became involved from a 
family connection. John's father had been an operator since the 1980s and served on the 
FAB Council in prior years. Amy B. is also a second-tier franchisee, a relative newcomer 
to the organization; she was appointed to F AB just last year. 
Steve C., the franchisor representative on the board, is the CEO of the parent 
corporation, which in this case is an equity firm. Steve has been in his position for six 
years. He came from a large franchise restaurant chain and had experience with franchise 
boards. Although not a member, Rita S., the corporation's director of marketing, is 
regularly on the calls. Rita has only been in her position for a year. Also in attendance 
on every call is Sean O. Sean is the president of Euro Salon's advertising agency. The 
agency has been employed by FAB for over 25 years. Finally, FAB's administrator, the 
one paid employee of F AB, Theresa, attends every call and meeting. 
Cross Case Comparison 
The three cases examined in this study represent a variety of industries and 
variously-sized organizations. Two boards are in their mature life stage, and one still in 
its infancy. All three boards rely on elections, though Euro Salon is a hybrid that relies 
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on both elections and appointment. The four top tier Euro Salon franchisees are elected 
by their regions and in turn they appoint the two second tier franchisees. Each of the 
boards has a similar number of members, and each operates with a set of written bylaws. 
In the two more established boards, Portini's and Euro Salon, these bylaws are extremely 
detailed. In contrast, the Zen Masters bylaws are relatively short and based on a template 
from the International Franchising Association. Two boards, Portini's and Zen Masters, 
are classified as franchise advisory councils, while Euro Salon is a registered board in 
one of the 50 states. Among the three cases studied, Euro Salon is the only one where an 
independent franchise association also operates. The four top tier franchisees are all 
members of the franchise association. Table 6 provides an overview of the boards. 
Table 6 
Overview of Cases 
Case Portini's Zen Masters Euro Salon 
Industry Restaurant Health Service Personal Service 
Total # Units 150 70 1,300 
Type of Board 
Franchise Advisory Franchise Advisory Franchise 
Council Council Independent Board 
Independent 
No No Yes 
Association Exits 
Age of Board 
20-25 <1 30+ (years) 
Total # of Board 
7 6 7 
Members 
Elected or 
Elected Elected Elected + Appointed Appointed 
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The Origins and Functioning of the Associations 
Portini's 
An interview with the original owner, Joe, provided a backdrop for the formation 
of Portini' s F AC. Joe acknowledged that he started the council to avoid having to "say 
no" to the franchisees (JL, 9126). Once 40 franchisees were in the system, Joe found his 
time being absorbed by listening to franchisees' ideas on everything from the type of 
cookies to sell, to how to design the store. He thought that instituting a F AC would help 
him hear about the franchisees' ideas, but also allow others in the system to playa role in 
decision-making. Joe said: 
At our first FAC meeting, we had 89 items on the agenda. I purposefully put 
every idea down. Once people saw how many items franchisees desired, it helped 
convince them we couldn't do everything everyone wanted. (JL, 9126) 
Joe specified in the bylaws that the FAC was only an advisory group, but he incorporated 
language to ensure that only franchisee members could cast votes. While there are 
currently two corporate representatives on the board, the president (Matt P.) and the chief 
operations officer (Ken M.), neither participates in voting unless a tie ensues. 
The FAC votes on marketing promotions, operational issues, and new product 
offerings. Joe stressed that neither he, nor his current president, has ever over-ridden a 
council's decision. Joe's outlined his philosophical stance on how to build a strong 
franchise as follows: 
Dictatorship doesn't work. Democracy, on the other hand, is an under-utilized 
tool. But you [the franchisor] have to give up the fact the council is not just 
advisory and you have to be willing to live by their vote. They [franchisee board 
members] have to be allowed to stub their toe in the process. (JL, 9/26) 
By allowing the FAC to set policies, approve marketing campaigns, and help to develop 
new products, Joe mused that this strategy makes it harder for the franchisees to "attack 
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corporate." Furthermore, Joe spoke about a monitoring role that the council plays when 
he added: 
They [franchisee council members] let us know when there are problems in the 
community. They watch over the community, and if they see problems, such as 
old bread being served, or poor labor practices operating, they bring these to us. 
There are no secrets. They deliver the word and take the heat from constituents 
on how they vote. (JL, 9126) 
Joe's description of the F AC' s purpose mirrors the bylaws, which specify that the F AC is 
designed to "promote open and candid communications between the franchisees and 
parent company." Moreover, the bylaws specifically list tasks for the council to tackle. 
These include advising on the image, deciding on the advertising, approving new 
products, and specifying operational guidelines (P. bylaws). 
The formation of the board by Joe and the "rules" guiding the board illustrate a 
degree of partnership operating from the franchisor's perspective. Current members of 
the board offered additional evidence that Portini's FAC remains true to the initial 
mission of seeking input. Ken M., a corporate employee and the board's chair, said, 
"When the company started to grow, FAC was put into place so that it wouldn't just be 
corporate decisions" (KM, 4/8). The president of the brand, Matt P, provided additional 
insights about growth. He noted that the board was even more important in the chain's 
early years because, at that time, corporate only owned 3% of the units. Matt clarified 
this comment by sharing that, with so few corporate units in the beginning, it was key to 
have franchisee involvement in the decision-making process. Matt followed with: 
Franchisees have to have a seat at the table. .. They have to have a part in the 
decision-making process. When push comes to shove, we [corporate] will make 
the decisions that we believe we have to make when we have to make them. But 
we try in every sense of the word to involve our franchisees .... we don't make any 
decisions without consulting those franchisees on the council, they are a part of 
the process. (MP, 10/3) 
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Marty A., the longest serving franchisee FAC member, supported this assessment. 
He described how other board members encouraged him to run for office in the early 
1990s. Reflecting back, Marty said his peers told him "that they [the corporation] never 
overrode the council's decisions." Marty indicated he found this idea intriguing because 
it meant that his input would be valuable. He illustrated with an example of how the 
owner, Joe, took the four board members (at that time there were only four districts) to 
Las Vegas, Reno and Los Angeles to participate in the advertising agency review. Marty 
said that he and his peers helped Joe select the agency of record (MA, 4111). 
Zen Masters 
In an interview, Shelly E., one of the owners of Zen Masters, indicated that the 
NAC was initiated for two reasons. First, accelerated growth in large geographic regions 
meant that it was becoming harder for corporate to stay in tune with issues. Shelly 
pointed out that the NAC helps collect ideas, track issues, and keep a pulse on the 
competition. She went on to say: 
We knew we needed to use the expertise of the franchisees in the markets as 
operators, as well as their former expertise from other organizations, to help us 
grow the company. Instead of 70 franchisees coming at us with all of their ideas, 
it seemed like forming a council would allow us to have some control and show 
the franchisees we cared about what was on their minds. (SE, 10/3) 
Second, Shelly explained that she and her husband were dealing with a heated issue about 
the Internet with a number of franchisees. The controversy centered on the URL address, 
with corporate wanting to require all franchisees to use the same corporate URL, as 
opposed to continuing with URL's they may have already established. In concluding her 
thoughts about the council's formation, Shelly noted that she and her husband thought a 
council was needed "sooner versus later," and they hoped this new entity would address 
the "chaos" that had erupted over the Internet issue (SE, 10/3). 
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All franchisee board members uniformly noted that the growth of the system 
created a need for a more formal process to allow for franchisee input. Tori, the West's 
region council member, commented that communication between franchisees and 
franchisor was becoming harder as the chain grew in size (TC, 9/29). Franchisee Dusty 
D. also offered that communication had become difficult as the organization had 
expanded into new geographic territories (DD, 10/4). Two NAC members, however, did 
acknowledge that there was some umest in the system. Pete E. explained, "The 
corporation was fighting with certain franchisees who felt they were not getting enough 
attention." Pete continued, "I sympathized with the corporation because I understand the 
dilemma of a business person being pulled in so many directions" (PE, 9/19). 
Euro Salon 
Theresa N., the FAB's administrator, indicated that the Euro Salon board was 
initiated to govern the advertising funds (TN, 10/7). Sean 0., the advertising agency 
president, provided a more detailed explanation. Sean, like Theresa, has also been part of 
the FAB since its inception. He noted that the board was the brainchild of a top-tier 
franchisee who had come into the organization with prior franchising experience. 
According to Sean, this franchisee wanted some control of marketing so he "pushed for 
the creation" of the board. The original owner of Euro Salon agreed to this formal 
structure because he had been paying for the advertising out of his own pocket. With the 
creation of the FAB, an advertising budget would now be funded by the franchisees (SO, 
10/17). Franchisee Adam G., the current president of the FAB, said that the original 
owner had to have his "hand smacked" a few times for wanting to dip into the funds. 
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Adam attributes the reason for the tension between the franchisor and franchisees serving 
on the FAB to the large sum of money that the board oversees (AG, 8/22). 
Other franchisee F AB members also attributed the formation of the board as a 
mechanism to manage advertising and to watch over the marketing dollars. John R. said 
that FAB was started to "protect money from the home office" (JR, 10/3). David B., 
outlined four reasons FAB formed, including: ensuring high-quality advertising; 
redistributing funds to allow for local marketing; building a fund for possible national 
advertising; and keeping the budget away from corporate control. David commented 
that the funds should be "managed away from political influence." He went on to say 
that it "is a really good thing that FAB is not under the control of corporate" (DB, 
10/31). Even the CEO of the parent corporation, Steve, acknowledged the monitoring 
aspect that F AB performs. Steve reported that an "urban legend" circulates that the 
founder was accused of trying to dip into the ad funds and the F AB came to the rescue 
(SC, 9/29). 
Cross Case Comparison 
The themes that emerged from the three cases validated prior evidence from 
Phase 1 and confirmed practitioner theories regarding the impetus for board formation. It 
is the need to exchange information and pool resources that prompts franchisors to 
initiate these boards. While communication appears to be at the epicenter of board 
formation, there was also evidence, from two cases, that tension in the system can also 
serve as a trigger. The Internet marketing issue served as the other catalyst for the owners 
of Zen Masters to initiate the NAC. Although Euro Salon's FAB was formed prior to the 
rise of their independent association, the franchisees organized InF A when the franchisor 
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appeared headed for bankruptcy. InFA is a second board that operates alongside the FAB. 
These case findings add additional credence to the interviewees from Phase 1, many of 
whom attributed board formation to the onset of some unfavorable systemic issue. 
The Boards' Roles 
Portini's 
The current president ofPortini's, Matt P., offered a wide range of roles the FAC 
plays. Outlining the FAC's responsibilities, Matt noted that the council keeps corporate 
in tune with what's going on out in the system and helps corporate make decisions. He 
followed this observation with the comment: 
The [FAC members] clearly have a role with decisions made relative to budgets, 
relative to advertising decisions, and a significant voice in product related 
decisions. That doesn't mean we [corporate] wouldn't go out and select a pickle, 
but if it's a significant product decision, they are involved. (MP,3/21) 
From his vantage point, Matt views F AC members as having a clear responsibility 
for decision-making with respect to budgets, advertising and product development. He 
referred to the FAC members as "leaders" and "model franchisees." Matt also 
mentioned that the FAC members mentor newer franchisees (MP, 3/21). 
Matt's responses mirrored the founder's views on one level. Joe, Portini's 
founder, commented that the F AC serves as a "bridge between franchisees and 
corporate." Moreover, Joe suggested the role of the FAC is to help "set policies, develop 
advertising, offer new ideas and test new products" (JL,9/26). There were, however, 
important differences, between how Joe and Matt prioritized the roles of the F AC. For 
example, Joe opined that the FAC also plays a role in legitimizing decisions to the 
broader franchisee community. Matt, on the other hand, focused on how the franchisee 
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members of the FAC keep corporate honest. When asked about the most important role 
the F AC plays, Matt responded: 
I think the most important thing they do is keep us [the franchisor] in tune with 
what's going on out there. They talk to the issues that affect our restaurants at 
ground level on a daily basis ... Because our franchisees are in their restaurants 
every day, they are the foot soldiers. They are in direct contact with our guests on 
a regular basis. They keep an ear to the ground and they keep our nose to the 
grindstone to allow us to make educated decisions. (MP, 3121) 
Meanwhile, the five-franchisee FAC members focused on their role of guiding the 
decisions made by the organization. Several franchisees also referenced the important 
function of gaining alignment before moving forward on initiatives. Karen and Betty 
each mentioned how the F AC provides franchisees "voice" (KF, 4120; BH, 812). Betty 
said, "the FAC helps us [franchisees] feel like we are involved. I know we bought a 
franchise for their [the corporation's] expertise, but it's a lot better because we have a 
voice and we are heard" (BH, 812). 
The one contrasting view among the franchisee members came from Mitchell G., 
who had recently been reprimanded at a FAC meeting, by his peers, for testing a product 
without first gaining FAC approval. It is likely that Mitchell's perspective was skewed 
by this event. When asked about the roles of FAC, he said, "before I arrived, FAC was a 
puppet-board and did whatever corporate wanted." But, Mitchell also acknowledged, 
"that before today, we [the FAC], were a pretty congruent group." He also indicated that 
the current corporate president, Matt P., had been "good for a while" and "before today 
we were best friends" (MG,9/26). 
I also interviewed two regular FAC attendees, Dee B., the corporation's director 
of marketing, and Danny S., the advertising agency representative, who is also the owner 
of the agency. Both concurred that the FAC's role is input and decision-making (DB, 
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7/5; DS, 9/26). Danny compared the FAC to a board of directors. He explained that the 
"franchisees set policy and direction so management can go and execute" (DS, 9/26). 
Based on observations of two in-person FAC meetings and four conference calls, 
the FAC is intimately involved in decision-making. In each meeting, formal voting 
occurred. Issues voted on ranged from switching to low-fat mayonnaise, to deciding on 
what product to promote, to whether a new product being tested should rollout nationally. 
In every case, the franchisor encouraged discussion amongst the franchisees. 
Observations from multiple meetings confirm that, while collegial, the franchisees do not 
hesitate to point out issues or suggest changes to promotions. In one example, the 
franchisee board members made significant changes to the color scheme and font sizes of 
a new menu board layout proposal from the corporation (Observation, 3/29). 
Zen Masters 
The owner and franchisor representative of Zen Masters, Shelly, cited the NAC's 
role as "a liaison between corporate and franchisees." Elaborating on this role, Shelly 
indicated that NAC members can help corporate better understand franchisees' needs 
around marketing, operations, finance and training. Shelly shared that she hopes the 
NAC will become more proactive in the future. She specifically mentioned the idea that 
NAC could form pre-approved committees to address such items as research and 
development, marketing and operations (SE, 4/27). 
The NAC members all stressed communication as the critical role of the council. 
In describing this communication process, franchisees noted that the NAC serves as a 
means to share best practices, identify key issues, and provide a confidential way for their 
constituents to express grievances. Franchisee Tori C. opined that the council must learn 
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to listen to all franchisee voices in the system and create a process for addressing their 
concerns (TC, 9/29). Dusty D. echoed this thought when he said, "there are so many 
issues that come up, if corporate chased all of them, we would never get anything done. 
The board must help corporate prioritize" (DD, 10/4). When I probed on other roles, 
interviewees tended to repeat the idea that the NAC operates as a "sounding board" (JD, 
9/19; DD, 10/4; TC, 9/19) The chairperson commented that the NAC was still in its 
"infant stage," and needed to focus on being a strong liaison between the franchise 
community and corporate before tackling any new tasks (TG, 8/14). 
For the first four months of their existence, the NAC board spent their time 
discussing what they should be doing, and how they should be communicating with the 
franchisees in their regions. More recently, as the board prepared for the corporation's 
national convention, the franchisees began to reach out to their constituents via 
conference calls to amass issues and ideas percolating in their regions. Shelly took point 
to set up a dial-in number that each NAC member could use for their regions' conference 
calls (Observation, 6/21). At the national convention, Shelly also arranged for each NAC 
member to hold one hour, round-table sessions with their constituents. These forums 
were used to update the franchisees about NAC activities and to gain further insights 
about franchisee concerns (Observation, 8/31). Further demonstrating the franchisor's 
support for the NAC, Shelly mentioned the council three times during her various 
presentations at the convention, at one point thanking the NAC members publicly for 
their time on this ."important council" (Observations, 9/26). Other signals that NAC 
members had the ear of corporate also occurred. Council members jointly presented 
awards with the franchisor at the celebration dinner the last night of the convention 
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(Observation, 9/28). This look of unity was requested by Shelly, the franchisor, during 
the August conference call. On this call, all franchisee NAC members readily agreed to 
co-present the awards with the franchisor (Observation, 8/31). 
Euro Salon 
The role of the F AB for Euro Salon is tied directly to managing advertising. 
Steve, the current CEO of the corporation, indicated that F AB' s role is to create the best 
possible advertising to drive customer visits. Steve also pointed out that FAB serves to 
reassure the franchisees that their marketing funds are being well spent (SC, 9/29). The 
president of F AB and a top tier franchisee, Adam, echoed that the role of the F AB is to 
provide advertising support, but he expanded the board's mission beyond what Steve 
offered. Adam positioned FAB more as a "watchdog." He noted that the FAB reviews 
vendor contracts, ensures all monies are spent legitimately, and keeps the franchisor at 
arms length. Adam suggested that the franchisor would like more control and that Steve 
the franchisor representative, specifically, had tried to have a bigger role in governing the 
board and influencing how the advertising funds were spent (GA, 8/22). Theresa, FAB's 
administrator, also mentioned that the current and prior franchisors have at times "tried to 
get their hands on FAB's money" (TN, 10/7). 
Franchisee members of the FAB clearly delineated that the board collects and 
manages the advertising funds. Every person interviewed also noted the F AB serves a 
two-pronged compliance function. First, if franchisees do not contribute to FAB, then 
they face default letters and possible loss of their business. Second, FAB funds are not 
available to the franchisor. The term one franchisee used was "watch over the money" 
(JR, 10/3). David, a top-tier franchisee, who is also a member of FAB's audit committee, 
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suggested that "sometimes corporate tries to put the cart before the horse." He 
continued, "That's the problem with corporate controlled advertising, they [corporate] 
like to bleed money off into different things. What we have set up [FAB] is the best to 
prevent this" (DB, 10/31). In addition to a compliance function, the franchisees also 
described the decision-making role of the FAB. Examples they offered included, creating 
the marketing calendar, agreeing on promotional ideas, and approving the advertising 
materials for each promotional window. The board uses a formal voting process to 
secure approval for these initiatives. 
Cross Case Comparison 
Each of these three boards emphasized different roles. Examining how boards 
prioritize their roles helps begin to illuminate the stakeholder relationships that operate. 
Portini's FAC, for example, focused on a broad range of responsibilities, including 
decision-making, communicating, representing and mentoring. The FAC regularly voted 
on items, and its span of influence ranged from marketing, to operations, to new product 
development. Based on observations and interviewee comments, the partnership between 
the FAC franchisor and the FAC franchisee board members was strong. On calls and in 
meetings, the corporate president ofPortini's, Matt, continually asked for franchisee 
input on the ideas that the corporation, or other franchisees, brought forward. Frequently, 
it was Matt, as opposed to the chair, who took the time to specifically call out the names 
of franchisee members of the NAC and ask what they thought (Observation 3129; 5/19; 
6/10; 7128; 9126). This process took time and lengthened the meeting, but it also 
provided a high level of involvement. 
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In my interview with Matt, he specifically acknowledged that the board 
functioned as a way to keep corporate from climbing into their "ivory tower" (MP, 3/21). 
The relationship, based on how members defined their roles, and the fact that the 
corporation does not vote, suggested this board operates between the partnership and 
monitoring frames. Using the grid typology from my conceptual framework, this implied 
the board stakeholder relationship operated in the activist category. Interesting to note, 
the original owner, Joe, emphasized the board's role of providing credibility for 
decisions. This focus on legitimizing, coupled with the partnering governance structure, 
could indicate that the board, under Joe's leadership, might have been operating more as 
allies than activists. 
Meanwhile, Zen Masters NAC focused almost exclusively on the communication 
function. Zen Masters board members referenced their role as communication liaison 
between franchisees and the parent company. In meetings, and on conference calls, the 
franchisor and franchisees brought forth topics, but votes were not taken. Instead, the 
Zen Masters board came to agreement on issues. The board clearly leaned towards the 
partnership frame. At this early stage of the relationship, however, the franchisor and 
franchisees were also active supporters of one another, as evidenced by the public display 
of unity at the convention. Based on these roles, the Zen Masters stakeholder relationship 
appeared to be one of allies. 
Euro Salon's FAB, on the other hand, stressed protection and monitoring. 
All of the interviewees, including the corporate CEO, pointed out that the FAB "watches 
over" and managed the marketing efforts; including what programs were advertised, how 
those programs were advertised, and where those programs were advertised. The 
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franchisees lack of trust for corporate was expressed numerous times. The political 
overtones were also evident when Steve, the franchisor, commented that no one on the 
board "gives ground easy." This relationship appeared to be caught between the political 
and monitoring frames, suggesting the board was captured in an antagonistic relationship. 
Forms of Governance 
Portini's Council Context 
Portini's F AC was comprised of five franchisees, each representing a geographic 
district. Each elected district member of the council had one vote. The FAC members 
were required to be in compliance with the terms of the franchise agreement, but there 
were no term limits for franchisee members. Many of the current members had served on 
the FAC for many years. 
Elections were held every November for those districts in which the council 
member's term was expiring. The corporation handled soliciting nominations from each 
district and provided every franchisee in that district with a bio about the candidates. The 
corporation managed the voting details and announced the winner of the election. The 
electoral procedures were meticulously detailed in the bylaws. The bylaws for the FAC 
spanned sixteen pages and specified the definition of every major term used in the 
document (P. bylaws). 
In addition to the district representatives, the FAC included an elected chair and 
vice chair. The chair was elected by a majority of all district members and served a two-
year term. The chair only voted in a lieu of a tie and the chief operations officer of the 
corporation held this office, during the period examined. The vice chair was also an 
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elected office, but only voted in lieu of the chair (P. bylaws). The husband of one of the 
FAC members served as the vice chair. 
The bylaws of Portini's referred to the president as an "ex-officio" member of the 
FAC. Furthermore, the bylaws stated that the president was a non-voting member (P. 
bylaws). I asked the founder, Joe, about his rationale for this governance structure and he 
ruminated: 
Right from the beginning, I knew we had to have elections. If you appoint 
members, they have no legitimacy. But, I did work behind the scenes to ensure 
those who were elected were the ones I wanted. They had to be good franchisees, 
not mediocre. Good operators are not yes people, they think about better ways to 
do things ... I also refused to allow corporate to have a vote. This way it shifts 
the mentality away from us versus them. (JL, 9/26). 
Zen Master's Council Context 
The NAC members were elected by franchisees in four defined geographic 
territories. Three of the regions had one council member. The fourth region, because it 
was the largest, had two representatives. The NAC also included one corporate member, 
in this case, Shelly. In addition to founder, Shelly served as the chief operations officer 
for the organization. 
The document outlining the NAC's governance procedure was entitled "The 
Rules of the Council." While the NAC used this title instead of the more common term 
bylaws, the content mirrored the bylaw template offered in the IFA's book, Advisory 
Councils: Effective Two Way Communications for a Franchise System. The rules 
encompassed three pages and clearly indicated that the NAC members lacked formal 
voting powers. The language stated that the council had the "power of persuasion and 
information." Furthermore, the document described the council's role as a "sounding 
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board to help the franchisor gain a clear picture of the pros and cons of a particular idea" 
(ZM. Bylaws). 
Requirements for franchisees to serve on the council included operating at least 
one unit for a minimum of one year, being in compliance with franchise agreements, and 
being in good standing with the corporation in terms of payments and operational 
metrics. The franchisee council members were elected for two years and could not serve 
longer than two terms. The bylaws indicated that elections would be held every 
December and that franchisees could nominate themselves, or another franchisee, if their 
region had an opening (ZM. Bylaws). Because all original council members were elected 
at the same time, the organization faced the possibility of complete council turnover in 
2012. While the organization desired regions to hold staggered elections, no decisions 
had been made on how to make this change. 
Euro Salon Council Context 
The FAB board was comprised of seven members. There were four top-tier 
franchisees who were elected by their peers based on geographic regions. The current 
four elected members also belonged to InF A. Two second-tier franchisee members were 
appointed by the four franchisee elected members. The franchisor, in this case the CEO, 
accounted for the seventh member of the F AB. 
The FAB bylaws encompassed 24 pages and covered board offices, membership 
eligibility, election processes, meeting processes, voting procedures, and the requirement 
for an annual audit. In addition, a six-page FAB Policy Statement accompanied the 
bylaws. This document offered additional detail on the allocation of F AB contributions. 
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Terms of office were annual and staggered on the board. There was a three-year 
term limit for the top-tier franchisees. Each member had one vote and each· vote was 
equal in weight. The corporate representative, the CEO of the parent firm, also voted. 
The CEO of the corporation could assign someone else from corporate to the board (ESS. 
Bylaws). In the past, the director of marketing was the FAB corporate representative. 
Based on my six months of observation, both the corporate CEO, and director of 
advertising attended the monthly conference calls. The CEO of Euro Salon, Steve, casts 
the vote for the corporation. According to franchisee Adam G., the board extended the 
right to vote as a courtesy to the corporate office (AG, 3/30). Other franchisee board 
members interviewed, however, and the CEO himself, indicated that the corporation has 
a legitimate and equal vote (DN, 9/30; JR, 10/3; DB, 10121; SC, 9129). The bylaws also 
confirmed that, "the franchisor shall have the right to appoint one director to serve on the 
Board" (ESS. Bylaws). It is possible that Adam's statement that the corporate office did 
not have the right to vote was based on his personal feelings toward the current 
franchisor. 
Cross Case Comparison 
All three boards used geographic regions to define their electoral process. Each 
board had bylaws, but the two boards with the most longevity, Portini's and Euro Salon, 
had the more extensive documents. Likewise, both of these boards had staggered terms 
of office and detailed voting procedures for elected members. Zen Masters did not use a 




Governance Processes by Case 
Case Portini's Zen Masters Euro Salon 
Bylaws Yes Yes Yes 
Formal 
Yes No Yes 
Voting 
Corporate 
No No Yes 
Votes 
The Boards' Procedures 
To understand how boards work in action, a series of four questions were posed. 
These questions addressed agenda development, board topics most often discussed, 
leadership, and norms for reaching agreement. In addition to interviewing the board 
members and attendees, behaviors were observed during conference calls and meetings. I 
used observation checklists at meetings to ascertain members' engagement in the 
proceedings. With respect to telephone conference calls, I monitored the amount of 
social exchanges occurring or the amount of silence before the calls began. Finally, I 
reviewed meeting documents, including agendas and minutes to confirm observations. 
Portini's 
Agenda setting. The process for setting the FAC agenda was detailed in Portini's 
bylaws. Issues were first raised at district meetings where the board members regularly 
met with their constituents. Matters voted upon at the district meetings became eligible 
for the FAC agenda if the issue received majority endorsement by the district members. 
When a district issue received a majority vote, the board member was then allowed to 
bring the issue to the attention of the full council. The F AC members must place the item 
on the FAC agenda at last ten days prior to the scheduled FAC meeting (P. bylaws). In 
addition to this formal process, however, board members would also bring up "district 
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issues" that were not formally placed on the agenda. The last agenda item listed for 
every call and meeting is termed "District Issues." 
Topics covered. My observations from meetings, conference calls and my review 
of agendas, confirmed that the F AC covered a broad array of topics impacting the 
franchise system. These topics spanned marketing, operations, and new product 
development. There were also business updates provided by the franchisor. The 
corporation took the lead on developing and reviewing the agenda items. Matt, the 
president, indicated that the franchisees "look for corporate to do the work, so it calls 
upon corporate to lead the meeting" (MP, 10/3). 
Leadership. The bylaws indicated the chair was responsible for preparing the 
agenda, scheduling the meeting, and presiding as executive head of the NAC meetings (P. 
bylaws). In reality, however, the president, Matt, and his administrative assistant handled 
those responsibilities during my observations. Ken, the chair, candidly admitted that 
Matt wrote the first draft of the agenda (KM, 4/28). Matt's administrative assistant 
forwarded the agenda to all members ten days in advance. In my six months of 
observations, this never failed to occur on time. One meeting was moved by one week, 
but the agenda still arrived 10 days prior. 
Although Ken, the chair and member of the corporate staff, called the meetings to 
order and closed the meetings, during the time in between, Matt, the corporate president, 
controlled the meeting flow. When I asked franchisee FAC members who led the 
meetings, most franchisees clearly identified Ken, the chair, but then would quickly add 
that Matt was also involved (MA, 4/11; KF, 4/20; GH, 8/2). In speaking with an alternate 
board member, however, Bruce said, "Matt leads the meeting versus Ken. Matt's the one 
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to call upon each district to give an update on their region and he keeps the meeting 
moving along. Ken only calls for the vote" (BM, 7/5). When interviewing Matt, he 
acknowledged that, "99% of the time" he leads the meeting. Matt went on to remark, 
however, that in a "perfect world it wouldn't be that way." He indicated that in prior 
years the FAC has had stronger chairs (MP, 10/3). I asked Matt to describe his own 
leadership style and he characterized himself as democratic versus autocratic in nature 
(MP,3121). 
Norms for decision-making. When I inquired about the process the board used 
for making decisions, Matt, the corporate president, said that he "gives the group time to 
hash out stuff." He went on to elaborate that, after a topic is discussed by the FAC, 
"someone makes a motion, there's a second, and then we go around and each district 
votes" (MP, 10/3). Having witnessed 17 hours of board interaction, this process did 
occur. Matt, however, was typically the one to call for a motion. Out of 12 topics that 
were brought to a formal vote, Matt asked for the motion eight times, the chair three 
times, and the secretary once (Observations, 3129; 5/19; 6/10; 7/28; 9126). As noted 
earlier, Matt would frequently ask for members, by name, to share their opinions on the 
topics under discussion, indicating a partnering approach to decision-making. 
Furthermore, on twelve occasions he inquired if anyone had questions about the topic 
being discussed (Observations, 3129; 5/19; 6/10; 7128; 9126). 
In describing how agreement was reached, the F AC franchisee members shared 
similar overviews about the process. Marty A. said "the topic just gets beat up, with each 
of us going around the room giving our input and then we vote" (MA, 4/11). Karen 
commented, "Sometimes we have just done enough talking and it's time to vote" (KF, 
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4120). Betty and Ken in each mentioned that board members listen to research results to 
help them decide how to cast their votes (BH, 812; KM, 4128). During my observations, I 
witnessed board members reviewing data, debating pros and cons, and making revisions 
to programs. Not every topic required a vote, but, of the twelve votes taken through 
formal motions, all passed unanimously. 
When asked if there were issues FAC members didn't agree on, franchisees noted 
that test results typically provided data on any controversial topics. An example of a 
divisive subject, cited by three board members, was the hot sandwich line that required a 
capital equipment purchase (MA, 4/11; KM, 4/8; KF 4/20). The franchisor had to 
provide data from several test markets to provide enough evidence to win approval. I 
also personally witnessed controversy around moving to an automated customer loyalty 
program. This topic was discussed at all five meetings I attended (Observations, 3129; 
5/19; 6/10; 7128; 9126). One district was adamantly against the issue and was permitted 
to test a different version of the card. Karen, the FAC member for this district, shared the 
following: 
I feel my district is unique. I have a good relationship with corporate. But my 
constituents look at me negatively because of that relationship. My district is 
anti-corporate. They don't agree with most of the ideas that come out of the 
council. (KF, 4120). 
Based on my observations, the district that Karen represented was regularly 
referred to as being outspoken critics of the corporation. In one instance, Matt P. 
described attending their district meeting with the comment that "full body armor would 
not have been enough, I got the shit kicked out of me by them" (MP, 9126). While 
members of the NAC laughed at this reference, they all apparently understood the 
dynamics of the situation. Upon investigation, I learned that this district was the oldest in 
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the system, and most of the franchisees had been owners for twenty plus years. One of 
the most outspoken and critical franchisees in that district was the daughter of the owner. 
This franchisee, Susan, was mentioned on more than one occasion. Susan served on the 
board in prior years (BP, 8/29). Although her district had a tense relationship with 
corporate, the current district representative, Karen, did not display an adversarial stance 
towards the F AC, or the corporation. 
Zen Masters 
Agenda setting. Initially, Shelly, the corporate representative for Zen Masters, 
established the formal agenda for the NAC. The agenda for the first conference call 
included a review of the goals of the council, member responsibilities, election of officers 
to the NAC, and future meeting plans (Email, 3/7). Likewise, for the second call, Shelly 
established and released the agenda, asking ahead of time if other council members had 
issues they would like included (Email, 3/30). For the next conference call, the 
franchisee chair did step-up and take point on sending out the agenda (Email, 4/25). 
Shelly, however, also set the agenda for the first in-person meeting (A. 5/20). At this in-
person meeting the members identified the issue of training as the topic that they would 
focus on initially in conversations with their constituents. For the two subsequent 
conference calls the agendas were sent by Shelly E, and the following month by Travis 
G. (Email, 6/20; Email, 8/11). These agendas arrived anywhere from one to twenty days 
in advance. In an interview, Shelly expressed her frustration with the board when she 
said: 
I don't think we have enough participation. Even the agenda doesn't suggest 
people are thinking forward, it has gotten better, but I wish there was more 
participation and more emails going on about topics they [franchisees] wanted to 
discuss. (SE, 10/3) 
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Topics covered. As noted earlier, training was the first topic identified by Zen 
Masters franchisee council members as a perceived issue in the system. The NAC 
members were concerned that franchisees were not using the corporate training program, 
and each member agreed to canvass their constituents on the reasons why. The findings 
from their investigations led to changes in the training materials. Two other prominent 
issues included the test results for a new product, and a change in the print vendor 
(Observations, 5/20; 6/20; 8/11). 
Interviews with the NAC members confirmed that training was the most heavily 
discussed topic. Franchisee Tori C. laughingly responded, "we discuss training, and 
training and training." She went onto say that the NAC needed to address more than 
training and post convention there were a number of items that surfaced from the field 
(TC, 9/29). Dusty D., mentioned marketing as a topic that has started to surface in the 
field (DD, 10/4). 
Prior to the last NAC meeting, I asked Shelly if she expected any controversial 
subjects to surface. She cited an Internet marketing issue as one that could blow-up. The 
topic, however, was not mentioned at the board meeting before the convention. After the 
NAC meeting Shelly admitted to me that she was relieved the subject didn't surface (SE, 
9/18). The Internet topic did, however, arise with at the NAC franchisee board member 
roundtables held at convention (Observation, 9/19). I asked Pete, a franchisee NAC 
member, why the Internet topic didn't come up during the board meeting held before 
convention. Pete said that it was because Shelly would have "taken it personally" (PE, 
9/19). This comment, added further support to my observation that the franchisee board 
members have a close personal relationship with Shelly. 
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Leadership. Travis, the NAC chair, readily admitted that he had not been a 
strong leader. In an interview he said, "I should be contacting other members. I need to 
be whipping us into shape. We need to have structure reintroduced to the council again. 
It goes back to leadership and I've not done it effectively" (TG, 8/14). In an email 
exchange between Travis and the other members, three months into the life of the 
council, Travis volunteered to resign as chair (Email, 8/11). Tori C. and Shelly both 
responded to Travis's email and encouraged him to retain his role. Tori wrote, "I have to 
respond to the comment of an ineffectual chair, I believe you are missing the point here. 
We are a team and it takes time, and prodding from all of us to effective. I appreciate all 
that you have done and do not wish you to step down" (TC, 8/11). Shelly's followed-up 
with a note that also encouraged Travis to retain the chair role when she commented, 
"You are a good chairman. It just takes time, perseverance and a team effort" (SE, 8/11). 
The other board members, all men, did not comment. 
Approximately one month after the possible resignation of the chair, I asked the 
board members who led the meetings. Tori said, "Shelly has a huge part in how it is run. 
Travis is starting to become more involved at this point" (TC, 9/29). Echoing this 
observation was Jay D., who commented, "I feel like corporate still runs the meeting. I 
would like to see the franchisees on the NAC run it versus corporate" (JD, 9/19). Dusty 
D. was more diplomatic and said "Shelly and Tom, particularly Shelly" (DD, 10/4). 
Shelly, responding to this same question, noted that, "the chair should run the 
meeting. I think I ran the meeting for a while, but the chair has gotten better and is trying 
to run the meetings more now." Shelly commented to me on two occasions that she 
wished Tom, the chair, would take more of a leadership role (SE, 5/20; 6/20). In my 
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journal, after the first NAC meeting, I had written, "Shelly, despite verbally saying she 
will tum the meeting over, struggles to release the reins of the meeting" (Journal, 3129). 
At the second in person meeting in September, I did observe Shelly taking more of a 
backseat and Travis stepping forward to lead (Observation, 9/18). 
Norms for decision-making; The process of asking members to formally "vote," 
was not used by the Zen Masters NAC during my observations. Even the election of 
Travis as chair was not voted upon. Instead, Travis was nominated and Shelly asked if 
everyone "agreed" with having Travis chair, and everyone said yes (Observation, 3/9). 
Likewise, when determining that training would be the first issue to tackle, the group 
simply "agreed" and neither Shelly, nor the chair, went around the room to poll members 
(Observation, 3/9). Another topic that a franchisee member brought forward had to do 
with a pricing change. After discussing this topic, the NAC simply agreed not to make 
the change. No formal vote was taken (Observation, 3/9). 
When asked how agreement was reached, four out of five franchisee members 
commented that the NAC members were aligned on most topics. Dusty D., laughed as he 
said, "maybe this is not a good thing, but we are all like-minded people" (DD, 10/4). 
Tori mirrored this view when she said that most of the time the group is in agreement and 
on the few occasions when they are not, the party who is less passionate about the issue, 
or has less information, concedes (TC 9129). Only one franchisee, Jay D., mentioned that 
in the future he hoped that voting would occur (JD, 9/19). I believe the level of 
participation the franchisor, Shelly, had requested from the franchisees, with respect to 
decision-making, was deemed adequate by most franchisee members. 
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Euro Salon 
Agenda setting. Euro Salon's formal agendas were issued two days prior to the 
monthly conference calls, which were arranged by Theresa, the FAB administrator. The 
monthly calls occurred on the last Wednesday of every month. Members of the FAB, 
the advertising agency, the public relations agency and the corporate marketing director 
submitted items for the F AB agenda to Theresa. The agenda always included a section 
on the budget, as well as time for miscellaneous requests from external franchisees that 
involved marketing expenditures. 
Topics covered. Topics the FAB tackled over the last five calls were 
concentrated on marketing efforts, formation of new committees, and new product 
offerings. The marketing discussions spanned the gamut of what to promote during a 
calendar window, to what public relations opportunities to pursue, to what new products 
to launch. The dialogue also covered how to address franchisees' advertising needs, how 
to improve the creative, and how to manage the advertising budget. 
Both the advertising agency and public relations agency played significant roles 
on the FAB conference calls (Observations, 5125; 7127; 8/31; 9128; 10126). The 
representatives of these agencies brought forth the promotional ideas, opportunities, and 
advertising for the F AB to approve. I asked all interviewees if the franchisor brought 
issues forward. It was universally agreed that the FAB's process focused on the 
franchisor working with the agency, and the agency then presenting the 
recommendations. I noted that on two conference calls that the corporation's marketing 
representative, Rita, did offer short updates on topics (Observation 8/31; 10126). 
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During the five conference calls I attended, three controversial subjects arose. 
The first occurred on the August call and involved the Internet. Steve, the franchisor 
CEO, made it clear that he considered the F AB 's policy on reimbursable expenditures too 
narrow. In this verbal exchange, franchisee Adam countered with, "I don't know where 
F AB is holding people back from getting reimbursed, and we just say it has to be 
measureable." Jumping into this conversation, Theresa added that she wanted to cover 
this with the lawyer because a "world of hurt" could befall F AB if they were not careful. 
Sean, the advertising agency representative suggested a group be formed to "hammer 
out" the details. The president of FAB, franchisee Adam, and the corporate CEO went 
back and forth for a few minutes on who would be part of the team. Ultimately, they 
decided this new group would include John, Steve, Theresa, Rita and Sean (Observation, 
8/31). 
The second controversy arose over different perceptions in the system over how 
vendors can be paid. Rita indicated that there were those in the system who were 
unaware that a vendor could submit their invoice directly to the FAB. She planned to 
communicate this policy to the corporate stores. Theresa, the FAB administrator, 
appeared to take offense and argued that everyone was already aware of this policy. Rita 
continued to point out that the smaller markets did not know and that she was going to 
send an email. The verbal exchange described below highlights the tense tonality: 
Rita: I will do it in my markets. I will review it with you Theresa, but I think it 
would be good for the entire system to be reminded. 
[The silence for the next 45 seconds created unease] 
Adam: Feedback? 
Theresa: Rita, go ahead and write it up, I think it will cause confusion, but I can 
help and send it to those who I think don't know. 
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Rita: I am going to send it out to all franchisees in the corporate regions. 
Theresa: Go ahead and send it to me so I can ensure we don't cause confusion. 
Adam: Rita, are you happy? 
Rita: I am. (Observation, 8/31) 
The third controversy occurred over the agency commission. There was 
disagreement between the franchisees and the agency on whether the agency should be 
paid. After a few minutes of verbal exchanges, the franchisee president of FAB, Adam, 
offered the comment, "we have two or three other budget issues that we need to address, 
let's hold discussing this one until we see how the other stuff plays out" (Observation, 
7127). In this example, Adam, once again demonstrates his leadership. 
Leadership. All interviewees, including Steve, the CEO of the franchise 
corporation, acknowledged that the president of Euro Salon's FAB, Adam (a franchisee), 
leads the meetings. The observations that I made during five conference calls confirmed 
that Adam was in charge. He took roll, moved the group through the agenda, requested 
motions when needed, and called upon each member to cast their vote once motions had 
been made and seconded. I asked Adam about how the FAB operated and he laughingly 
commented, "the president makes up his own rules," but then he turned serious and said 
that, "I always call for a vote if it involves spending money" AG, 8122). 
Adam pointed out that, recently, he introduced some changes to the FAB. He 
created the position of vice president and added two committees. John was elected 
unanimously as vice president, and Adam indicated that it was highly likely that John 
would be elected president when Adam's term expired. Due to a number of "fiascos' 
that had occurred at the board level, Adam recommended to the F AB that an advisory 
committee be formed. During the July conference call he explained that this smaller 
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group would work together to ensure timelines were met and contracts reviewed before 
items would be presented to the entire board. Adam appointed John, a second-tier 
franchisee, as the leader. Other members he appointed to this committee included Amy, 
also a second-tier franchisee, Theresa, the FAB administrator, and Sean, the advertising 
agency representative. The corporate representative, Rita, asked if she could also be on 
the committee and Adam agreed. While Adam did not seek a motion or a vote, he did 
ask if anyone had strong objections to forming this committee as a means to help solve 
their "ready, fire, aim" approach. Also, Adam instituted a new audit committee. Further, 
he appointed David and Nelson, both top-tier franchisees, to comprise this group. This 
committee was tasked with conducting an audit of the books by the end of the year 
(Observation, 7127; GA 8122). Interestingly, corporate was not invited to be on this 
committee, nor did they request a presence. 
Consistently, Adam led a tight meeting and started the calls no more than one or 
two minutes past the official start time. He would point out which members were tardy. 
On three separate occasions the corporate representatives were late to the call. On the 
May call, Adam said, "Steve and Ruth [corporate representatives] are holding us up, we 
will give them a couple more minutes and then go" (Observation, 5125). Likewise, when 
Sean, the advertising agency representative, came late to a call and apologized, Adam 
said "some of us are on a short timeline, let's get started" (Observation 7127). Though he 
does not like tardy attendance, it is frequently Adam who breaks the silence or tension 
with a humorous quip. After hearing that $14 was left in the budget, Steve, the CEO, 
asked a question about the budget. Adam quickly followed-up with a quip, and told 
Steve he couldn't have the $14 (Observation 5125). 
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Norms for decision-making. All Euro Salon F AB members indicated that the 
governance process relied on the concept of "majority rules." Nelson N. commented that 
the FAB discusses the topic and tries to reach "a compromise to make everyone happy." 
Nelson said that there were also times when the "people in disagreement try and wear the 
other side down" (DN, 9/30). David B., another franchisee board member said that 
decisions come about through compromise (DB, 10/21). One of the second-tier 
franchisees, John R., offered the perspective that there is a healthy amount of debate, but 
indicated that "if people not willing to budge, then majority rules" (JR, 10/3). When I 
posed the question of how decisions are made to Steve, the franchisor, he confirmed that 
compromise is attempted, but ultimately it comes down to majority rules. 
Not every issue requires a motion to be made. There have even been occasions 
when Adam has asked Theresa if a topic needs to be brought to a vote (8/31; 9/28). 
Across the five conference calls I attended, motions were made on ten subjects. There 
was unanimous agreement on all of the matters brought to a vote. 
In an interview with Sean, the advertising agency representative, he commented 
that the committee is prone to asking for information and if they don't have enough data 
they postpone decisions. He also indicated that it is a "thorn in corporate's side" that his 
agency, as a vendor, has such a high level of respect from the franchisee members. The 
tightrope that the agency walks, between corporate and the franchisee board members, 
became evident during the October conference call. While reviewing photography, the 
agency and Rita had selected different shots. One of the agency employees who worked 
for Sean commented, "We want to ensure Rita is not unhappy, she has been instrumental 
in the fine-tuning process." Rita responded that she thought both photos were good and 
144 
that, "I won't die on a sword for the shot I liked, they are both good." The committee 
agreed to let the agency decide on the photos (Observation, 10/26). 
Cross Case Comparison 
Preparing the agenda. Interviewees and observations revealed that all three 
boards issued formal agendas prior to conference calls and meetings. Each board was 
inclusive in their approach to agenda setting, with all members, and even regular 
attendees, having the chance to add topics to the itinerary. Who developed the agenda, 
on the other hand, varied between the boards. 
In Poritini's case, the corporation was currently taking the lead on establishing the 
agenda for the F AC. In the past, however, the agenda task had been handled by the 
elected chair of the board. The current corporate president, Matt, was the leader at the 
meetings and on calls. Franchisees, however, had the opportunity at every meeting to 
bring up subjects from the field. The franchisor, Matt, also solicited input throughout the 
meetings displaying a partnership philosophy. 
Zen Masters was in a similar situation with respect to the franchisor having to 
engage heavily. In this case, the franchisee chair of the NAC had not stepped up to the 
leadership role. On five occasions, Shelly, the franchisor, stepped in to issue the agenda 
prior to the calls and meetings. Likewise, Shelly took a more active role in leading the 
meeting. On the last conference call, Shelly specifically turned the meeting over to 
Travis, which suggested the dynamics of the meeting were changing. 
Euro Salon was not plagued by a leadership issue. Adam G., a long standing 
franchisee and the president of FAB, kept the calls moving and navigated the politics 
145 
with the corporation. There was also a FAB administrator whose job was to solicit 
agenda items and issue the agenda prior to the conference ,calls. 
What's on the agenda. The three boards varied in where they focused their time. 
Euro Salon was primarily dedicated to marketing issues. Portini's FAC also focused 
heavily on marketing. However, Portini's board encompassed a wide array of other 
topics, including operational issues, business overviews, communication updates from the 
field, budget reviews, and new product development initiatives. In contrast, Zen Masters 
NAC emphasized training, and board development efforts; to a lesser extent, the board 
addressed communication from the field, meeting plans and marketing efforts. Given 
Zen Masters was a relatively new board, the focus on board development was not 
surprising. See Table 8 for a specific breakdown of agenda items covered on the calls 
and in meetings. 
Table 8 
Agenda Items by Case 
Agenda Items Portini's Zen Masters Euro Salon 
Marketing 15 4 20 
Budget 5 4 
Meeting Planning 5 5 2 
Business Update; Sales Reviews; Committee 
Reports 8 - 2 
Elections & Other Board Processes 1 7 -
Training & Operations 9 8 -
Legal Issues - - 3 
Communication with Constituents in the Field 7 5 
Review of Prior Meeting Minutes 5 - -
New Products 5 - -
Miscellaneous 1 4 5 
TOTAL 61 33 36 
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Leadership. The franchisors on the Portini' s and Zen Master's boards each 
played a prominent leadership role. The president of Portini's, Matt, openly 
acknowledged that he led the meeting, but shared that, "in a perfect world, the elected 
vice chair would take that accountability" (MP, 10/3). At the first in-person board 
meeting I attended, the conference room held a "U" shaped table. Both Ken (chair), and 
the corporate president, Matt, chose the two seats in the middle section that would be 
considered the "leader" chairs. During the second in-person meeting the room was in the 
same shape. In this instance, however, Ken and the vice chair (Gordon) took the two 
leader chairs, and Matt sat on one side of the room with other franchisee board members. 
Interesting to note, however, Matt still led the meeting, simply not from the leader's 
typical chair. 
During the calls and meetings, Matt, the corporate president, moved matters 
along, but called upon franchisees to provide input. He did not shy away from taking a 
stand and, at times, the franchisees voted in a different direction than corporate's 
recommendation. On one call, a franchisee brought forward a new vegetarian sandwich 
to test. The product had already been tested in Phoenix. Matt shared results that showed 
the product had not met the test market hurdles. He commented, "I'm of the opinion that 
this would be a mistake to retest based on Phoenix." The franchisees, however, wanted 
to give the market the opportunity to retest the product, and the veggie sandwich was 
approved. The topic didn't appear to cause any undue rancor between Matt and the 
franchisees and the meeting simply progressed (Observation, May 19). This behavior 
adds further evidence that this is an activist stakeholder board. 
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As noted earlier, the franchisor for Zen Masters, Shelly, also played a prominent 
role on the NAC. In one of our informal conversations, Shelly asked my opinion as to 
whether she was dominating the meeting. I was in an awkward position, but shared my 
thought that someone had to step in to take the reins when called upon (Journal entry, 
7/27). 
During both in-person board meetings, neither Shelly, nor the chair, Travis, sat in 
the leaders' chairs, both sat on one side of the table. On mUltiple occasions, and in front 
of the board, Travis demeaned his handling of the chair position. As noted earlier, the 
franchisor and one franchisee continued to support Travis and requested that he stay in 
the role. At the last meeting in September, Shelly still played a central role, but Travis 
moved the meeting along during the session by inserting the phrase, "what's next?" 
Travis also kept the meeting on schedule with respect to timelines for agenda items. The 
fact that the franchisor attempted to give the franchisees more control of the NAC 
suggested a high level of trust in the relationship. 
On the other end of the spectrum, Euro Salon's board was led by a franchisee, 
Adam, who served as president of F AB. There was no mistaking that Adam was the 
leader, and he kept the meetings on track. According to all interviewees there is a 
strained relationship between the franchisees on FAB and the franchisor's corporate 
representative, Steve. When I called in for the FAB conferences, there was palpable 
tension between corporate and the franchisee board members. While waiting for people 
to join the call, the members announced themselves. This was followed by an awkward 
silence as everyone waited for Adam or others to beep in. The silence, while only a few 
minutes, seemed to stretch on for eternity (Observations, 5/25; 7/27, 8/31; 9/25; 10/26). 
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In another example of a fractured relationship, on the last conference call, Adam 
commented at 3:31 pm that it was a minute past the start time, and, if no one objected, we 
wouldn't wait for corporate. No one objected, so the meeting commenced. Two minutes 
later, a beep was heard and corporate had joined the call (Observation, 10/26). Even the 
CEO, Steve, commented that with FAB "sometimes we are cordial and get a lot done and 
other times we agree to disagree." Steve elaborated that neither the franchisees, nor 
corporate, "gives ground easy" (SC, 9/29). 
During the August call, another example of the strained relationship transpired. A 
topic arose regarding default payments, and Adam, the president of F AB and a 
franchisee, suggested that a smaller group would discuss the matter offline and come to a 
recommendation. Steve the CEO of the corporation asked, "Adam, do you allow others 
to listen in?" Adam responded, "Do you want to?" Steve offered, that on this particular 
topic, the franchisor had a perspective they wanted heard. This issue was apparently such 
a hot subject that a new "subcommittee" was immediately formed. Adam and Steve went 
back and forth to determine who from the F AB community would be on this new 
committee (Observation, 8/31). The exchange between Steve and Adam was cordial, but 
it was apparent that neither one was compromising on their position. This provided 
further support for the assessment that this board is operating in an antagonistic 
stakeholder relationship. 
Relations Among Board Members 
While behavior can be telling, attitudes are also critical in understanding 
stakeholder relationships. What members think about one another and corporate, how 
they assess the board's performance, how they define the benefits for participating, and 
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how they characterize the climate of the meetings, provides relevant avenues of inquiry. 
I used the expressed attitudes of the interviewees, as well as the observed behaviors to 
help identify the type of board relationships that were operating. 
Portini's 
What I think of you. The most junior member of Portini' s F AC, Karen, 
acknowledged that there would always be differences between franchisees and 
franchisors that could not be resolved. Karen went on to say, "as franchisees, we have to 
understand there are rules we have to follow and that's what we signed up for" (KF, 
4120). Franchisees Betty and Gordon characterized the current F AC board as operating 
effectively because the group was familiar with one another. They alluded to some 
frustration in the past with the board and suggested that when the original owner, Joe, 
attended "he would get us off track" (BH, 812; GH, 812). 
Marty A., a long-standing franchisee member, commented that, in the past, there 
were some opinionated franchisees that were more concerned about their own personal 
situation as opposed to the betterment of the chain. He indicated that Matt, as president, 
has created calmer waters with things "flowing more smoothly." Similar to Betty, Marty 
A., noted that the original owner, Joe, liked to "stir the pot" (MA, 4111). 
Matt P., the corporate president, suggested the board operated with a sense of 
calm, but was always ready to provide honest communication. Matt, as well as other 
franchisee members, indicated that members disagree on issues, but after discussion they 
arrive at a mutually agreed upon position (MP, 3/21). I observed an air of good-natured 
ribbing on all of the calls and the in-person meetings and board dinners. Franchisees and 
the franchisor would make jokes, and laugh with one another. 
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One example of the humor used, however, served to remind everyone of the 
differences between franchisees and franchisor. During five board meetings, I observed 
the term "royalties" was mentioned seven times (Observation, 3/29; 5/19; 6/10; 7128; 
9/26). The franchisee royalty is a pre-determined fee that is paid monthly to the 
franchisor for the right to use the brand name. Royalties is a topic that divides franchisees 
and franchisors. Franchisors benefit by adding new units in a market because this 
increases the royalties received. Meanwhile, franchisees may suffer because further 
build-out of units increases the number of competitors. Matt or franchisee board 
members used the term in facetious quips to note the franchisor benefits from royalties 
that the franchisees' pay. At the March meeting when the corporate president, Matt, was 
discussing new store openings he said "it's all about the royalties." When no one laughed 
he added, "you know I'm joking" (Observation, 3129). 
Board assessment. Adjectives used by the Portini's franchisee board members to 
describe the FAC ranged from seasoned pros, to interacting board members, to passionate 
top class operators. The advertising agency representative referred to the board as 
dynamic and proactive, but wished they were a bit more innovative. Because of their 
lack of innovation, Danny S., gave the board a grade of B (DS, 9/26). The majority of 
franchisee board members graded the board an A. Mitchell G., the one disgruntled 
franchisee, refused to grade the board because he commented that he would only be 
grading himself (MG, 9/26). 
The corporate president, Matt P., gave the board a B. Matt commented, "I think 
they have been a steadying force through the last two to three years, but we have not had 
any home runs." Moreover, he suggested the FAC needed to continue to improve 
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leadership capabilities and communications with franchisees. Matt offered his opinion 
that the current board members were proud to be part of a group that directs and manages 
the concept. He also acknowledged that there were franchisees in the system who 
viewed corporate as the "bad guy." Matt elaborated: 
While F AC members are well thought of and looked up to by franchisees in their 
districts, sometimes the decisions they make as board members are not popular. 
Some of their votes cause issues for them [FAC franchisee members] and they are 
not always thought of in the warmest of terms. (MP, 10/3) 
Benefits of membership. When interviewing the owner, Joe, he shared that the 
FAC members were paid $100 a day for attending meetings, plus travel expenses. Joe 
indicated that because he can't pay them anymore, he "wines and dines" them. Joe 
suggested the social aspect of the board was important because it allowed him to build 
camaraderie (JL, 9/26). Taking a different position, the current president, Matt P., 
suggested the benefit for being on FAC had tangible and intangible benefits. The 
intangible benefit he described as the "feel good stuff," which revolved around being 
seen as a leader. Matt pointed to the tangible benefits of being part of the decision-
making process on a larger scale than just one store, and being exposed to a greater 
amount of industry knowledge (MP, 10/3). 
All five franchisee FAB members' comments, with respect to the benefits of 
being on the FAB, paralleled those of Joe and Matt. Franchisees, including Mitchell G., 
indicated that it is a chance to be involved and make changes on a larger scale (MG, 
9/26). Marty A. also commented that, as a FAB member, we help build a "tighter knit 
community" (MA, 4111). Karen offered a similar view when she said, "you have the 
opportunity to provide input and network with other districts" (KF, 4/20). Betty used the 
more colloquial phrase, "I get to put my two cents in" (BH, 9/26). 
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The atmosphere. I asked interviewees to describe the climate and dynamics in 
Portini's FAC meetings and on the conference calls. I then compared their assessments 
with my own observations. The Portini's franchisee FAC members characterized the 
current board meetings as being collaborative, while still engaged in healthy debate. 
Karen and Marty both used the same descriptive phrase, that things on the F AC "flow 
smoothly" (KF, 4120; MA, 4/11). Marty attributed this peaceful climate to the 
president's approach to overseeing the FAC and the current makeup of the board. Betty 
offered validation of Marty's views. She commented that prior boards had "growing 
pains" and were very corporate dominated. Betty followed this observation by saying 
that Matt, the current corporate president, had done an "awesome job" (BH, 812). 
The president of Portini' s used the term "calm" to describe the climate. Matt said 
that the meetings were not high-pressure, nor did they involve a lot of crises. He 
acknowledged that some personalities were stronger than others, but suggested this was 
common in any group (MP, 10/3). Observations of two in-person meetings and three 
conference calls supported the assessments made by both the franchisees and franchisor. 
The meetings and calls have been collegial, good spirited and even keeled for the most 
part (Observations 3129; 5/19; 6/10; 7128; 9126). Certain franchisees do not hesitate, 
however, to offer their opinion, but it is done in a cooperative manner. 
The one exception to the calm experienced at meetings and on calls arose at the 
September session held the day before the convention. The meeting followed similar 
patterns and was concluding on a jovial note as the franchisees decided to "name" a 
product after Ken M. However, when each franchisee member discussed the District 
issues, the tonality of the meeting shifted from good spirited to politically charged. 
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Mitchell G., the last to take his tum, shared that a "franchisee" had tested a new product 
without approval from the FAC. This franchisee now wanted permission to keep the 
product in his restaurant. Matt P., the president, remained silent. Meanwhile, the 
franchisee F AC members quickly began to condemn this errant franchisee and indicated 
that he or she should immediately stop selling the product. As the franchisee FAC 
members began to discuss who the "culprit" was, Mitchell G. finally admitted that he was 
the franchisee. The room grew silent and no one would look directly at him. I felt the 
tension in the room escalate. Mitchell G. quickly became defensive and indicated he had 
"already taken the heat from corporate." At this point, it was apparent that Matt P. knew 
about the issue, but had not communicated it to anyone. When I later asked Matt P. about 
this, he commented, "he [Mitchell G.] knew he was wrong. He asked ifhe could bring it 
up at NAC and I said yes, during the district issues. Matt added: 
He [Mitchell G.] made a huge mistake in how he brought it up, with his 'I have a 
franchisee who did this' .... this is what pissed people off. Up until that point they 
were calm, but when they realized it was him, and rather than him saying it 
upfront, they [other FAC members] were pissed off, and I don't blame them. He 
was trying to pull the wool over their eyes. They [the rest of the council] did what 
I hoped they would have done, they slapped his hand. The next day and a half he 
didn't speak to anyone or show up at the meetings. Finally, by Wednesday night 
he attended the awards dinner and he spoke to a few people. (M'P, 10/3) 
Matt characterized the closure of the September meeting as an atypical situation. 
When I asked about how the corporation operated on other sensitive subjects, Matt said 
that there were enough strong personalities on the board that, if corporate tried to use a 
"top down process," it would no doubt cause a good deal of fighting. However, he went 
on to say that this was not the type of process corporate wanted. He commented, "We 
[corporate] want a level playing field. We all have the same interests and we all want to 
find common ground on how to execute" (MP, 10/3). 
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Zen Masters 
What I think of you. The board members from Zen Masters offered solid praise 
for one another and for the franchisor. Pete commented, "We are all team players and 
want to see it work versus only worrying about what is good for me" (PE, 9/19). All of 
the franchisees commented that the franchisor is receptive and accessible. Franchisee 
Dusty D. also reported that being part of the NAC has helped him form new relationships 
(DD, 10/4). Even Jay D., the most outspoken of the NAC members, reported that there 
were no tensions in the relationship so far (JD, 9/19). 
The NAC members also appeared to be trying to protect corporate by being 
advocates. During a June conference call, one NAC member shared with Shelly a 
complaint from a franchisee. Shelly, the corporate CEO wanted guidance on how to 
address the issue because she believed corporate had already done what they could. The 
other NAC members, hearing her explanation, quickly came to her defense. Travis, the 
franchisee chair, even suggested that the role of the NAC was to help her "head off train 
wrecks" by alerting Shelly when franchisees show unrest (Observation, 6/21). 
Board assessment. Adjectives used by the Zen Masters franchisee NAC 
members to describe the board ranged from, knowledgeable, respectful and forward 
thinking, to proactive, serious and engaged. Shelly commented that the board was 
dynamic and filled with valuable leaders. She indicated that the relationship between the 
board and corporate was very good, and that having the council had "helped 
tremendously." Shelly elaborated, "I feel I can call any of them [NAC members] and 
discuss individual issues and have a professional conversation and get some sort of 
conclusion" (SE, 10/3). 
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In assessing their NAC's performance, the franchisee members offered similar 
responses. Tori would grade the board's performance with a B-. She indicated that the 
council was still in the "baby stage" and "none of us have devoted enough time to it" 
(TC, 9/29). Likewise, the chairperson, Travis, offered a grade of B- (TG, 9/23). Dusty 
D., gave the board a B+, but admitted that, being a new team, "we are still figuring out 
what we need to do" (DD, 10/4). Pete indicated that he thought the board started out as a 
C, but had progressed towards a B. He increased the grade based on the board's recent 
efforts to engage in more dialogue with their constituents (PE, 9/19). Shelly, concurred 
with Pete, and commented that she thought the board deserved a C to start with, but was 
now a B. Her improved assessment of the board was also based on the NAC members 
reaching out to the franchisees they represented (SE, 10/3). 
Benefits from membership. Shelly suggested that franchisees benefit from 
being members of the NAC because it enabled them to be on the forefront of corporate 
initiatives. She also commented that it was considered an honor to be elected to the 
council, and it affirmed the franchisees status in the community (SE, 10/3). When asked 
what benefits there were for serving on the Zen Masters NAC, all of the franchisees 
mentioned the value of being ahead on the knowledge curve. Pete even shared Shelly's 
sentiment regarding stature. He said that being a member of NAC provided "us the 
chance to lead" and to be seen as "role models" in the franchise community (PE, 9/19). 
In addition to giving them access to information early, four of the five franchisees 
mentioned that being part of the board helped them develop a closer relationship with 
corporate. One franchisee even referred to this as being part of the "inner circle" (DD, 
10/4). 
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The atmosphere. The Zen Masters NAC members described the climate as open, 
cooperative and respectful. Dusty D., however, laughingly commented that at times we 
go down roads less travelled ... and when this occurs, things tend to "drag on" (DD, 
10/4). Mirroring this statement, the chairperson, Travis G., offered that due to his own 
lack of leadership there has been some "disarray" in how the meetings were conducted. 
Tom furthered his thoughts by suggesting that because the board was "new" things have 
not yet solidified. 
From the franchisor's vantage point, there had not been enough participation. 
Shelly observed that while participation was improving, she would like more franchisee 
members to vocalize their thoughts. Shelly followed up this observation with the 
comment, "I want someone else to take control. I want this to be their council not mine. 
It was set up for them." According to Shelly there were one or two people setting the 
tone for the NAC and more involvement from everyone was needed. On the June 
conference call Shelly brought her concern forward and told the members, "I am feeling a 
little frustrated. If I don't take the lead on agenda items I don't get input. This was set up 
for you guys." Travis, the chair, immediately stepped in and took accountability (TG, 
9/23). This attitude, revealed by Shelly, that the board was "theirs" promoted a 
partnership and supporters club frame. Shelly was viewing the board in terms of what 
they could bring to the organization, such as legitimacy, influence and expertise to further 
the aims of the organization. 
Euro Salon 
What I think of you. The phrase "we peacefully co-exist" was how the 
franchisee president of Euro Salon's F AB, Adam, described the relationship with the 
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franchisor representatives on the board. He went on to say, "my main job as president of 
FAB is keeping Steve [the corporate CEO] at arm's length." According to Adam, the 
franchisor wanted to obtain control of the advertising funds. This has meant that 
corporate has taken a more active role in F AB and it is one of the reasons Steve ran for 
President of the FAB during the last election (AG, 8/22). Theresa, the FAB administrator, 
echoed this position, and franchisee David B. was even blunter, with his statement, "The 
corporate people are looking for every way they can to put their hands in the franchisees 
pockets." He went on to say: 
From what I hear from the guys who have come in and out of FAB a time or two 
before, there has never been an issue to the same degree that there has been with 
the current CEO ... while the thing has changed hands several times, it has 
never been so negative with this corporate versus franchisee mentality. (DB, 
10/21). 
Based on my observations of the verbal exchanges between Rita, the corporate 
marketing director, and Theresa, F AB 's administrator, the two women's relationship 
appeared strained. On those occasions, when Rita was ready to present to FAB, she 
would ask Theresa if she had forwarded the information to the group. In each instance 
the data had not been sent. In one situation Theresa said to Rita "I thought you sent it 
out." In the other situations, Theresa indicated to Rita that she was busy working and had 
not seen the email. I believe the implication was being made that the materials had 
arrived too close to the time of the conference call (Observation, 10/26). Also, when 
Theresa discussed some adjustments to the in-person meeting agenda for the June FAB 
session, Rita voiced her displeasure over time changes for the meeting agenda, 
complaining twice in loud clipped tones "I already booked my flight" (Observation, 
5/25). 
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A negative relationship defined the corporate versus franchisee board members. 
In contrast, Theresa, the FAB franchisee members, and the advertising agency 
representative (Sean), all reported a solid and well respected relationship between top-tier 
and second-tier franchisees on the board. The election of John, a second-tier franchisee, 
lent credence to this level of respect. In addition, as noted earlier, John was appointed to 
lead the new subcommittee on marketing. 
Steve, the CEO of the corporation, offered a different perspective. He stated that 
he believed the relationship between the franchisees and corporate F AB members was 
above average and greatly improved from the recent past. Steve also commented that the 
"franchisee council members" don't always agree with one another (SC, 9129). This 
statement contrasted with every other interview, which suggested there was little to no 
debate between the franchisees on FAB. Based on personal observation from five 
conference calls, I have not witnessed any disagreements between any of the franchisee 
board members with one another (Observations, 5125; 7127; 8/31; 9/28; 10126). On the 
other hand, I have experienced political tension between the franchisees and corporate. 
Board assessment. Although the adjectives differed, the viewpoints expressed 
by Euro Salon's F AB members, Theresa and Sean, all shared a common theme, 
conservatism. The franchisee board members used words such as, cautious, deliberate, 
fair and honest to describe the board. Meanwhile, Theresa offered the word "consistent" 
and Sean said the board was "professional, collaborative and at times combative." Steve, 
the franchisor, said that FAB was serious, not every creative and prefers to do things the 
way they have always done them in the past. 
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The franchisee members of the board consistently graded F AB 's performance as 
an A or B. David gave the board an A- or B+, but this was only because of the litigation 
the board experienced with a model from an ad campaign. Had it not been for that issue, 
the board would have scored a "solid A" by David (DB, 10/21). Meanwhile, Theresa, the 
FAB administrator, thought the board deserved an A because of how they handled the 
legal dispute (TN, 10/7). Nelson offered up an A, while John rated the board's 
performance a B. John commented, "we have done some good things, but the one thing 
we have struggled with is timelines" (DN, 9/30; JR, 10/3). John went on to elaborate, 
"too often we are getting materials too close to the promotion and this means the 
franchisees can't plan properly" (JR, 10/3). Meanwhile, the advertising agency 
representative, Sean 0., laughingly said, "that's a hard question to answer right now 
because there is threatened litigation between the two of us that clouds my judgment. 
Putting this aside, however, I would say a B" (SO, 10/17). 
In stark contrast, the corporate CEO, Steve, indicated he would evaluate F AB' s 
performance as a C. Steve commented that if the advertising F AB was "approving" had 
been working, the organization would not have experienced such a high number of 
closures over the past year. He went on to say that he blamed the agency, which has been 
in place for 25 years. Steve noted, "I've advocated agency reviews for years, but when it 
happens it is a whitewash. We need fresh blood, Sean is good, but not that good." In 
continuing his assessment, Steve also commented that the governance of the F AB resists 
change and that the committees get in the way (SC, 9/29). 
Benefits of membership. Obligation was the sentiment that several Euro Salon 
franchisee board members used to describe why they serve on FAB. Nelson laughingly 
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responded to the question about benefits of membership, with the comment, "there are 
none." He went on to say "I felt like it was my tum ... everyone needs to participate and 
be involved" (DN, 9/30). John echoed this viewpoint by commenting that, "It's a duty 
thing, FAB is there to protect franchisees and their money, so there is an obligation to 
serve" (JR, 10/3). David added that being on the FAB requires a major donation of time, 
but that the "benefit is that we have a strong national fund that is administered fairly, and 
it is totally outside of corporate control" (DB, 10/21). 
Steve, the franchisor CEO, shared the franchisees assessment regarding the 
benefit of serving on FAB when he commented, "There are no benefits. It's ajob you 
have to do for everyone else ... You are serving your system with your sweat, equity and 
time." Steve noted that while travel is reimbursed, the two meetings F AB has are tacked 
on to other meetings that the F AB members would need to attend anyway (SC, 9/29). 
The two external members of FAB shared a similar philosophy on the benefits. Theresa 
commented that the board members have a "deciding role in how the advertising is 
handled, produced and the direction it is going and this carries a lot of weight." 
Likewise Sean 0., pointed the FAB members playa deciding role on the advertising and 
they also know what's coming down the pike (TN, 1017; SO, 10/17). 
Atmosphere. When asked to describe the climate, the franchisee board members 
of Euro Salon pointed out that much of the time it can be congenial, casual, and even 
melancholy. They were, however, quick to point out that tempers can flair and the 
atmosphere can become heated. David B., one of the top-tier franchisees noted that 
everyone is "quick to take a position." He commented that one of the other members, 
Terry B., was a "fighter and will put the gloves on and start boxing with corporate." 
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Interesting to note, Terry B. has been absent from four of the last five conference calls 
(DB, 10/21). John indicated that the people on the board have known one another for a 
long time, and because they are comfortable with each other it helps the dynamics. He 
added, however, that tension existed and it was mainly between the franchisees and the 
home office (JR, 10/3). Nelson, meanwhile, was reluctant to answer the question. After 
laughing and taking a long pause. he said, "I don't know if I want to comment 
specifically, but there is some friction between corporate and the board" (DN, 9/30). 
Steve C, the franchisor, commented that it depended on the topic, but "at times the 
atmosphere is cordial and we get a lot done, but sometimes it can become very negative" 
(SC,9/29). 
Theresa, the F AB administrator, said that in comparison to past boards, the 
current board was reasonable. She attributed this to Adam's leadership and ability to 
mediate with the franchisor. Theresa commented that she thinks the current franchisor 
views the FAB as a "necessary evil." When I asked her to explain, Theresa said that if 
corporate tries to eliminate the FAB, they know that the franchisees would "rebel and file 
a lawsuit." She went on to say that the tension between corporate and the franchisees 
has al ways been there, because "corporate would like to use F AB 's money to do things 
their way" (TN, 1017). The atmosphere of the board has underlying tension based on 
lack of trust and respect between the franchisees and franchisor. The relationship 
functions, however, due to a strong leader who navigates the political environment. 
Cross Case Comparison 
What I think of you. Zen Masters had a positive relationship between the 
franchisees and the franchisor. Franchisees, for the most part, indicated confidence in the 
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franchisor and a high level of trust that issues brought forward, would be resolved. Only 
one franchisee expressed some mild reservation. Jay D. offered the thought that what 
happens in the coming months would be critical. Shelly, the franchisor, also indicated 
optimism about the NAC and confidence that the chair was going to take a more active 
role in the future. The high level of support and positive reinforcement between 
franchisor and franchisees was evident from interviews, convention speeches, and 
observed behaviors. Franchisee board member also appeared to be forging relationships 
with one another. Along with the partnership demonstrated, there appeared to be 
willingness among the NAC members to carry the torch for the franchisor. I believe the 
high level of partnership, coupled with a supporters club mindset, suggested that the Zen 
Masters NAC stakeholder relationship was one of allies. 
Similar to Zen Masters, Portini's FAC, shared a partnership frame of reference. 
Based on the intense level of input the franchisees provided to the corporation, it 
appeared that they were working towards the same brand-building goal. I excluded the 
one franchisee, Mitchell G., who had his hand slapped by the FAC at the last meeting. I 
believe this event was isolated and his comments tainted by his personal feelings of being 
scolded. The evening of the board award dinner, I noted three board members chatting 
with Mitchell G., and personally heard Karen giving him a pep talk. 
The Portini's franchisor took the time to build a social aspect into the relationship. 
The NAC board met for dinner prior to the in-person meetings. I attended two of these 
dinners and noted a friendly atmosphere in my journal entries (Journal, 3129; 9125). The 
first event was held at the president's house after the board meeting. Because the 
franchisees did not have spouses in attendance (excluding Betty and Gordon) the group 
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was small and we all sat together. Talk centered on families, sporting events, and 
upcoming vacations (Observation, 3/29). The second dinner, held the night before the 
NAC meeting, and just prior to the start of convention was at a restaurant with a private 
dining room. The room contained two large tables because spouses were included. In 
addition to the president attending, the original owner, Joe also came to the dinner with 
his date. I found the choice of seats taken by the group interesting. At one table it was 
primarily the corporate people with only two franchisees. The other table was exclusively 
franchisees, their spouses and I. Candidly, I was surprised the president and owner didn't 
split up between tables (Observation, 9/25). This, however, further supported the 
underlying knowledge that franchisees and franchisors have differences. 
My interviews, along with my observations, suggested that this board had a 
partnering attitude. The group was cognizant, however, that the franchisor-franchisee 
relationship won't always be aligned, as evidenced by the "royalty" humor. In the case 
of Portini's board, since the franchisor does not vote, the franchisee board members have 
an active role in helping ensure compliance to the rules. This was evident in the board 
members reaction to Mitchell G. not following NAC protocol when he tested a new 
product. One franchisee, Gordon, told Mitchell, "I think it sounds like a good sandwich, 
but we [the FAC] should be the ones to agree on it first." I believe the board, serving to 
monitor the franchisees, as well as the franchisor, indicated this stakeholder relationship 
was one of activists. 
Euro Salon shared a monitoring frame with Portini's, but instead of partnership, 
power and politics dominated. Based on interviews and observations during conference 
calls, this board had an "us versus them" attitude. The franchisees and the F AB 
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administrator were, for the most part, outspoken in their criticism of Steve, the current 
CEO. Theresa commented that the franchisor ignored the franchisees until they were 
"pushed to the wall" (TN, 10/7). Two of the franchisees shared with me the "thorny 
issue" that was causing some of the friction. The franchisor was apparently buying back 
regions from distressed franchisees. As they did so, the franchisee F AB board members 
wanted corporate to abide by the rules for payment into the FAB fund. The franchisor had 
chosen to interpret the rules differently. Because there was a significant amount of 
money involved the issue had escalated. The board members I spoke with said they had 
almost settled the issue after a face-to-face meeting in Chicago with Steve, the franchisor. 
However, Steve involved the corporate attorney at the last minute, and as one franchisee 
phrased it "The lawyer goobered it up" and the deal fell through (DB, 10/21; AG, 8/22). 
The issue remained unresolved and continued to cause tension between the franchisee 
board members and the corporate board members of F AB. The F AB functioned in the 
antagonistic stakeholder relationship, caught between the monitoring and political 
frames. 
Board assessment. In two cases, the franchisors graded the performance of the 
boards more stringently than did thee franchisee board members. In the case of Portini's 
and Euro Salon, the franchisees tended to assess their board's performance in the A 
range. The respective franchisors, however, gave the boards lower scores. While the 
Portini's franchisor offered a B, the franchisor of Euro Salon judged the board a C. Zen 
Masters franchisees and franchisor were more aligned. This was not surprising, since the 
Zen Masters board was relatively young and experiencing growing pains. 
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Benefits of membership. The franchisees in the three cases shared little in 
common with regard to the perceived benefits of being a board member. Euro Salon 
franchisees served out of duty. Portini's franchisees viewed being on the board as an 
opportunity to have input in the direction of the company. Zen Master's franchisees, on 
the other hand, considered board membership as a means to obtain information first, and 
to be perceived as leaders in the franchise community. 
Atmosphere. All three boards functioned in a cordial manner. In my six months 
of observing the behaviors of meetings and conference calls, there were debates on 
topics, but no shouting matches erupted. All of the meetings were relatively well 
organized and individuals respected one another in pUblic. In describing the climate, the 
majority of interviewees described boards that were respectful and professional. While 
the overt atmosphere was similar, however, the boards had underlying differences in their 
relationships. The most obvious climate difference occurred with Euro Salon. In this 
case, the franchisees, the F AB administrator, the advertising agency representative and 
even the franchisor, discussed a strained relationship between corporate and the 
franchisees. Completely counter to Euro Salon's antagonistic relationship, between 
franchisees and the franchisor, was the Zen Masters NAC. The Zen Masers NAC 
franchisee board members indicated a high level of respect and liking for Shelly, the 
franchisor. The Portini' s F AC franchisee board members, for the most part, also had 
high regard for the current corporate president, Matt. These board members, however, 
had prior history with the franchisor. In the past the franchisee board members had 
experienced a more top down approach with prior leadership, therefore they were aware 
of inherent differences that could occur between the franchisees and franchisor. 
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Chapter Summary 
Three case studies were examined to determine why franchise advisory boards 
form, what roles these boards play in the eyes of the franchisees and franchisors, what 
governance processes operated, and what type of stakeholder relationships existed. To 
gather this data, I conducted 25 interviews, observed four in-person board meetings, 
attended 14 conference calls, and three board dinners. I also examined meeting agendas, 
meeting minutes, and bylaws for these boards. 
Sharing information and pooling resources appeared to be the primary motivator 
for the emergence of the three boards examined. There was also evidence that when 
"signals" of stress arose they encouraged the franchisor to move more quickly in forming 
the board. The three boards studied also shared certain roles in common. All functioned 
as sounding boards and allowed franchisee voices to be heard by corporate. Two of the 
boards, Portini's and Euro Salon had extensive bylaws and used formal voting 
procedures. On these boards the franchisees played a key role in decision-making. These 
two boards also stressed the monitoring aspect of board governance. 
Zen Masters focused on the supporters club model. Both franchisee board 
members and the franchisor board member signaled to external audiences that the board 
was unified. While all three boards characterized their relationships as collaborative and 
collegial, the relationships between franchisee and franchisor board members differed. In 
the case of Euro Salon, there was a high level of distrust between the franchisee board 
members and the corporate board members. This was not evident in the other two 
cases. On the contrary, the attitudes between Portini's and Zen Masters franchisees and 
franchisors showed respect, trust, and caring. Based on the relationships described by 
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interviewees and my observations, each board would be classified in a different space in 
my proposed conceptual framework. See Figure 8 for how the three cases would be 






Figure 8. Stakeholder classification for cases . 
Supporters 
Club Frame 
In chapter 6, I compare the findings from Phase 1 and Phase 2. I then present the study's 
conclusions, outline implications for the franchising sector, and provide 
recommendations for future research. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCULSIONS; IMPLICATIONS; FUTURE RESEARCH 
Introduction 
The high-performance board, like the high-performance team, is competent, 
coordinated, collegial, and focused on an unambiguous goal. Such entities do not 
simply evolve; they must be constructed to an exacting blueprint. David Nadler, 
Harvard Business Review, 2004 
Due to the continual growth of the franchising sector, mechanisms to enhance the 
franchisee-franchisor stakeholder relationship will continue to be needed. Strong and 
effective franchise advisory boards offer one such networking channel. Without a board 
building process in place, however, Nadler's reflection in the opening quote is unlikely to 
occur routinely in the franchising community. Similar to many corporate and nonprofit 
boards that operate without regular evaluations (Huse, 1998; Nadler, 1998; Conger & 
Finegold, 1998, Drucker, 1990), franchise advisory councils rarely partake in any formal 
assessment to understand whether they are operating effectively. 
As a former franchising executive, I participated in many board meetings. 
Intuitively, I believe there is value to the overall organization when there is a strong 
working relationship between franchisees and franchisor board members. Because little 
literature existed on the social dynamics of franchise board interactions, I chose this as 
my avenue of research for my dissertation. My purpose was to examine why franchise 
boards form, what roles they play, how they are governed, and the type of stakeholder 
relationships that occur. My ultimate goal was to provide organization development 
scholars and franchise organizations with an empirically-tested, practitioner-friendly map 
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that could be used to distinguish between different types of stakeholder relationships. 
Applying this typology, franchise advisory boards could then determine where they 
currently reside, as well as where they would like to be, on this stakeholder relationship 
grid. I hope that this tool can be used in OD assessments to provide a meaningful 
starting point for helping franchise advisory boards to develop strategies that reinforce 
positive, or change negative, franchisee-franchisor relationships. 
I conducted my research in two phases. In phase 1, I interviewed 22 franchisee 
and franchisor members of advisory boards or councils. Multiple industries and multiple 
sized organizations were included. In phase 2, I used what Stake (2000) would refer to as 
instrumental cases to offer insights into franchise board dynamics. I spent nine months 
exploring board interactions through participant observation, reviewed multiple 
documents, and secured 25 additional interviews from members, or attendees, of three 
unique franchise advisory boards. 
The contributions of the research are four-fold. First, my study contributes 
empirical data to support practitioner theory on why these franchise advisory boards 
form. Secondly, the findings shed important light on the roles these boards playas 
perceived by franchisee and franchisor members. Thirdly, the findings provide 
information on how the governance processes, as well as internal and external conditions 
influence the franchisee-franchisor board relationship. Finally, this study provides a 
conceptual map for categorizing the types of stakeholder relationships operating in 
franchising board environments. These findings are more fully explained below; 
however, it should be recognized that they are inter-related. Why boards form, the roles 
they play, and their governance processes will contribute to the relationship dynamics. 
In this final chapter, I discuss the analytic framework for the study. Next, I 
review key findings from Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the study. Following this, I address the 
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studies limitations. Then, I share implications of the findings for franchising and 
organization development practitioners, including recommendations for practice. Finally, 
I conclude with avenues for further research on this subject. 
Analytic Framework 
Stakeholder theorists (Evan & Freeman, 1988; Phillips, 1997; Van Buren, 2010) 
argue that stakeholders co-create value for an organization. Furthermore, these theorists 
maintain that organizations that do not create value for their stakeholders will eventually 
collapse. It is logical to assume that franchisees co-create financial value for franchisors 
in that they serve to help these organizations expand geographically into new markets. 
Hence, it is not surprising that many franchise systems recognize the importance of 
franchisees as important stakeholders by creating franchise advisory councils. 
Franchisees, on the other hand, may also take it upon themselves to create independent 
association boards to assert their stakeholder status. 
My aim was to observe board behavior in a natural setting to learn what 
conditions contribute to the stakeholder dynamics. Having established the stakeholder 
lens as my telescope, my next step was to search the literature for analytical tools to help 
identify the socio-political aspects of board behavior. Although, stakeholder theory has 
given rise to multiple typologies for categorizing various stakeholders for firms (Mitchell, 
Agle, & Wood, 1997; Frooman, 1999; Ford, Peeper, & Gresock, 2009), none of these 
typologies specifically addressed the stakeholder interactions between franchisee-
franchisor board members. I used Cornforth and Edwards' (1999) four governance 
models to help me chart these unique relationships. 
Cornforth and Edwards (1999) described four frameworks of governance 
concerning the role of boards, and each has a different theoretical assumption. Agency 
theory, for example, focuses on the monitoring role. Alternatively, a resourced 
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dependency view implies power is continually negotiated between the groups. A 
networking or managerial perspective emphasizes how members partner to add value to 
the organization. Finally, institutional theory suggests boards serve to legitimize 
decisions. Using these four governance dimensions, I created a conceptual grid that 
assumes franchise advisory boards that favor political behavior are less likely to favor 
partnership. These two dimensions comprise the vertical axis. Likewise, I proposed that 
boards focused on monitoring are less likely to be characterized in a supporters club 
frame. These two dimensions became my horizontal axis. Inside of the four quadrants 
the specific stakeholder relationships are distinguished by the following names: allies, 








Figure 9. Conceptual framework illustrating four governance processes and 
stakeholder relationships by quadrant. 
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Guiding my interviewing strategy was the research conducted on corporate 
governance by Huse (1998). He used case methodology to study three corporate 
boardrooms. Huse (1998) found that the relationships between the board members, their 
behavior towards one another and the corporation, as well as how meetings were 
conducted, when and where meetings occurred, and what was accomplished in those 
meetings, all served as factors that influenced the stakeholder relationships. I postulated 
that these factors would also impact the franchisee-franchisor dynamics operating in 
franchise advisory board meetings. 
Conclusions 
The first significant finding was that franchise advisory boards form out of stress 
on the system and to share communication, as well as to pool resources. These data were 
consistent with the practitioner reports from consultants and franchising attorneys 
(Barkoff, 2007; Luxenberg, 1986; Sniegowski, 2010; Wulff, 2005) on why boards form. 
Phase 1 of the study, in which I interviewed 22 board members, suggested that 
environmental "stress" was the number one catalyst for board formation. The second 
most mentioned motive was to share information and pool resources. The three cases 
studied in Phase 2 revealed similar findings, but the order was reversed. Portini's FAC, 
Zen Master's NAC, and Euro Salon's FAB were all initiated to leverage information; in 
the case of the FAB, the board was also formed to pool marketing dollars. Both the Zen 
Master's franchisor and two franchisees acknowledged that a controversy in the system 
provided an additional impetus for creating the NAC. Although Euro Salon's FAB was 
not created out of stress, this organization's independent franchise association (InFA) 
arose when the organization was facing bankruptcy. 
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A study by Meek (2010) found that high levels of communication in a franchise 
system increased emotional connections and that franchisees were less likely to leave 
these relationships. Franchise advisory boards are a formal method franchisors can use to 
stay connected. Franchising executives, in both Phase 1 and Phase 2, confirmed that 
advisory councils served as a conduit for communication in that they provide for both 
information exchange and knowledge sharing. Given these results, OD practitioners and 
consultants may want to recommend to franchisors that they create franchise advisory 
councils early in the relationship to facilitate communication before a crisis or 
controversy erupts. I would argue that creating a franchise advisory board to build an 
engaged franchise system, with constructive communication between the franchisor and 
franchisees, is not the same motive as initiating a franchise council to avoid the 
franchisees from launching an independent franchise association. 
A second finding revealed that the roles of franchise advisory boards were 
generally consistent with past research on nonprofit boards. Studies on nonprofit boards 
discussed in Chapter 2 indicated that board functions could be categorized into five 
groups. These main tasks included providing voice, stewardship, legitimacy, 
representation, and strategic direction. Findings from Phase 1 and Phase 2 suggested that 
franchise advisory boards serve as a sounding board, provide representation, legitimize 
decisions, monitor actions, and aid in decision-making. Interesting to note, however, 
franchisees and franchisors emphasized different roles. 
Divergent views about board roles should not be surprising. Studies about 
employees' participation on boards suggested workers and owners also stressed different 
functions (Hammer, Curral, & Stem, 1991). Management and owners were more apt to 
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give lower ratings on the boards' role of influence. However, employees in these studies 
gave higher ratings to this role. Adding support to these findings, in Phase 1 of my study, 
the franchisees focused on the board's role of influencing decisions, while franchisors 
emphasized the board as a mechanism to provide credibility for decisions. One possible 
reason franchisees and franchisors had divergent views on the role of advisory boards, 
however, may be the fact that those interviewed were from different franchise systems. 
In Phase 2 interviews, the franchisors and franchisees were aligned on their views 
regarding their boards' roles. Interestingly, however, each of the three boards 
emphasized different roles from one another. The Portini's franchisees board members, 
and the franchisor, all focused more heavily on influencing decisions and protecting the 
brand. Zen Masters franchisee board members, along with the franchisor, emphasized 
communication and providing confidence to the external audience of franchisees. Even 
in the most tension-filled board, Euro Salon, the franchisor, similar to the franchisee 
board members, acknowledged that the role of the FAB was to guide marketing decisions 
and to protect franchisees' advertising contributions. I might add, however, that Steve C., 
the franchisor, indicated that this watchdog mentality was based on an "urban legend" 
regarding the original owner's attempt to gain control of the advertising funds. It is 
possible that the franchisor was "educated" by the board members that the purpose of the 
FAB was to protect franchisees' marketing investments. 
A third finding focused on the impact of governance structures, leadership styles, 
and decision-making norms that served to facilitate, or to hinder, the dynamics of the 
relationship. These dimensions were visible in the Phase 1 and Phase 2 interviews. 
With respect to governance, the boards had clear accountable processes and held regular 
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conference calls and/or meetings. In all three cases studied, the boards operated 
according to bylaws. Two of the boards had extensive bylaws, while the most junior 
board, Zen Masters, operated with a three-page set of rules. This board was also still 
struggling to define its scope. The leadership styles of the franchisors and the chairs of 
the boards also influenced the stakeholder relationships. 
The attitudes of board members towards one another impacted the relationships as 
well. Trust, transparency, and openness were attributes that many franchisees and 
franchisors mentioned as highly-desirable for effective advisory boards. Unfortunately, 
in Phase 1, ten of those interviewed indicated that their boards lacked these qualities. In 
Phase 2, there was one case in which distrust between the franchisees and franchisor was 
evident. 
The fourth finding confirmed that the conceptual framework of a stakeholder 
relationship typology provided a reasonable method for categorization. While Phase 1 
findings supported the overarching grid classification, my observations of the inner-
workings of specific boards offer ancillary evidence. The answers to the interview 
questions helped identify characteristics that were likely to be evident in each stakeholder 
type. My findings from Phase 1 and Phase 2 are portrayed in Table 9. Each of the three 
cases from Phase 2 provides an example of one of the four stakeholder relationships. 
With respect to the fourth, the "agent relationship," I relied on Phase 1 data. Three 
interviewees in Phase 1 focused on the importance of the board conferring legitimacy to 
decisions, indicated the prevalence of trading favors and discussed a strained relationship. 
Table 9 outlines what conditions and characteristics are more likely to appear in 
each of the four typologies. In the discussion below, I offer a more in-depth review of 
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each stakeholder classification. While no board will perfectly match the criteria on every 
metric, a board will have more in common with one stakeholder classification than 
another. 
Allies 
These allied stakeholder relationships may appear during the initial formation 
phase of franchise advisory boards that are initiated by the franchisor. The primary 
reason to form is likely based on the franchisor's need to facilitate communication as the 
system grows in size. The Zen Masters NAC offers evidence of how a franchisor became 
proactive in establishing an advisory council when communication became challenging 
due to rapid expansion. Interviewees from Phase 1 who indicated their franchisors 
initiated the advisory council as a forum to share information included Kevin S., Tom C., 
Ron B., David B., Sam P., and Franklin C. 
Enhancing communication, however, is only one motive in an allied relationship. 
Franchisors also use the council to demonstrate that they are listening to franchisee 
voices and staying connected to those in the field. This supports Meyer and Rowan's 
(1977) argument that powerful organizations attempt to design formal structures to 
demonstrate they are acting in a proper manner and to protect the organization from 
having its conduct questioned. Meanwhile, franchisees in these allied relationships may 
use their positions on the board to become part of the inner circle and gain leadership 
stature in the broader franchise community. 
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Table 9 
Stakeholder Classification Matrix 
Franchise 





Legitimize decisions Protect franchisees 
Formation making 
Shares knowledge and 
Endorses franchisor 
Foremost a communication 
acts on input from 
decisions to reassure 
Monitors the interests 





sounding board. Secondarily 
ensures franchisor and the 
community. Secondarily 
Secondarily has 
lends credibility to decisions 
rest of the system are 
serves to alert franchisor 





Likely to have formal 
Formal or Informal. Likely 
Likely to have formal Formal process in place bylaws. May have an 
to at least use agendas. Less 
bylaws; voting process for with visibility to broader independent franchise 
likely to use formal voting 
decisions outlined; clear franchisee community. association in place. A 
Governance process for decision-making. 
method to capture broader Likely to use a voting voting process for 
Structure May use elections, or 
franchisees input. process for decisions. decision-making is apt 
franchisor may appoint the 
Election process with May use elections, or to be in place. 
franchisee council members 
members voted on by franchisor may appoint Members of board will 
franchisees the franchisee council be elected by broader 
franchise community 
Leadership of Consultative Collaborative Coalition Forming Controlling 
Board 
Decision- Discussion and 
Making Discussion Constructive conflict Trading favors debates with "majority 
Norms rules" mandate 
Attitudes Characterized by trust. 
Characterized by trust, but 
Healthy amount of 
Suspicion and distrust 
Toward Desire to help the franchisor 
with the recognition each 
suspicion 
of franchisors 
Franchisor side has different interests intentions 
Calm, cordial, with humor 
Underlying tension 
Atmosphere Professional and agreeable used to build rapport 
despite outward Tension-filled 
appearance of calm 
Agreement on Likely that franchisor and Likely that franchisor and Likely that franchisor 
Unlikely that 
franchisor and 
Board franchisees will be closely franchisees will be closely and franchisees will be franchisees will be 
Performance aligned aligned closely aligned closely aligned 
Social 
Elements (e.g. Yes Yes Yes No 
Dinners) 
Meetings 
Without No No Yes Yes 
Franchisors 
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These allied boards mayor may not have formal governance processes. Members 
may be elected or appointed by the franchisor. The franchisor is apt to focus on the board 
as a consultant that serves as a sounding board. Decisions will be made by consensus, 
and there will be little or no use of formal voting procedures. Franchisors are likely to 
discourage any type of "voting." 
In this allied stakeholder relationship, the trust between franchisees and franchisor 
will be high. The atmosphere will be professional and cordial. Board members will 
respect the franchisor and one another. It is also likely that the franchisor will create 
mechanisms to promote social exchanges, such as dinners that create cohesion. The 
franchisor will promote the board to the full franchise system to indicate unity. In the 
allied stakeholder situation, the franchisee board members are less likely to have private 
one-off meetings without the franchisor. 
Activists 
An activist stakeholder board may originate as a means for the franchisor to 
capture the ideas and expertise from franchisees in the field. These stakeholder 
relationships are built on collaboration. Despite the partnering attitude, however, both 
sides recognize that the board has a monitoring role to uphold. In the case ofPortini's, 
the monitoring was two-fold. First, the franchisee board members kept the franchisor 
from becoming myopic. Secondly, these same board members monitored franchisees in 
the system to uphold procedures and policies. This monitoring of the rank and file 
constituents was noted by the Portini's founder, but was also evident from the franchisee 
board members' reactions to a wayward franchisee who had chosen to test a new product 
without the board's approval. 
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In an activist relationship, the franchisee board members will influence decisions 
either formally, through voting mechanisms, or informally, by offering input. Decision-
making will be characterized by debates. These debates, however, are typically conducted 
with a sense of mutual respect between members. It is also likely that humor will be used 
as a social lubricant. A high level of trust operates among members. 
Franchisors in an activist relationship are likely to favor a post-bureaucratic 
leadership style that emphasizes inclusion and participative management practices (Ford, 
2005). This leadership style, for example, was favored by the president of Portini' s, who 
took accountability for the meeting processes, content and execution of meetings, but 
continually engaged the franchisees in the dialogue. In Portini's case, it was ultimately 
the franchisees who approved, modified, or voted down ideas. 
Relationship dynamics in an activist board will be built through social networking 
that occurs outside the boardroom. There will be strong communication with the broader 
franchise community to provide a high level of transparency on decision-making. It is 
unlikely that franchisee board members will engage in ancillary meetings without the 
franchisor. 
Agents 
Agent stakeholder relationships may occur when franchisors have ulterior motives 
for forming the board. The board may, for example, be created for cooptation purposes 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). A cooptation strategy operates when the controlling 
organization invites others, who may be potentially hostile, to participate on a board as a 
method to socialize them and thus ties them to the firm's objectives. As noted in Phase 1 
interviews, a number of franchisors spoke about the importance of the board's 
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endorsement of decisions to reassure or convince the broader franchise community about 
the wisdom of the franchisor's initiatives. 
These agent boards may start out as a communication conduit, but some 
controversy in the system changes the focus of the board. New franchisors may opt to 
shift from using the board to share ideas and gain input to controlling the board's agenda 
and coopting the members for political benefit. In Phase 1, Jason T. discussed how his 
board changed direction with new owners who wanted to "ram things" through using the 
board members as shills. He also spoke about the plum board meeting locations being 
referred to by members as "golf tours" (JT, 3/1). 
Phase 1 interviewees were quick to point out that these boards often ended up 
becoming "rubber stamps" for the corporation and were held in low regard by the broader 
community. Even franchisors were concerned when franchisee board members "went 
native" and became "de facto" corporate employees (SP, 2/8). These franchisee board 
members ultimately have less credibility with the broader franchisee community. 
In agent relationships, the franchisor focuses on informing and educating 
franchisees during meetings to promote their agendas. The goal of the board is to be 
unified to convince the broader system of the value of the franchisor's ideas. Because 
franchisors want "endorsement," they may use formal voting mechanisms. The element 
of horse-trading becomes apparent in these relationships. Franchisees on these boards 
recognize the power they hold and use it in bargaining with the franchisors for self-
serving benefits. There is suspicion on the part of each party that the other side "wants 
something." This suspicion, however, may be masked by collegiality in meetings. 
Franchisee board members may become disenchanted and thus begin holding separate 
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meetings without the franchisor. This became evident in Kevin S.'s situation in which 
the board realized they were shills and then held a separate meeting, without the 
franchisor present, to listen to franchisee concerns. 
Antagonists 
The formation of a board due to a crisis or controversy could indicate that the 
board's stakeholder relationship is antagonistic. Boards in antagonistic relationships may 
also form with the idea of sharing information and pooling resources. Through 
ownership changes, however, the board's relationship with the franchisor deteriorates. 
Such was the case with Euro Salon. The interviewees acknowledged that the board was 
initiated to pool resources. However, it ultimately came to serve as a watchdog, and it 
kept corporate marketing people from being able to make unilateral decisions. This was 
also reported by multiple franchisees and franchisors in my Phase 1 interviews. 
At least three possibilities exist when the stakeholder board relationship becomes 
adversarial. First, if the board has some contractual or legal power over certain financial 
elements, then the franchisor may have to then participate on the board, or allow the 
board to function without their input. This occurred with Euro Salon's FAB, which 
legally controlled the marketing funds. This was also the case with Jerry M. and Tim T., 
both of whom were interviewed in Phase 1. The franchisors and franchisees were forced 
to work together on their respective boards; both Jerry, a franchisor, and Tim, a 
franchisee, candidly admitted that their boards were dysfunctional. 
Secondly, in some adversarial relationships, the franchisees operate their own 
independent franchise associations. Franchisors vary widely in how they respond to 
franchise independent associations that assume an adversarial stance. In the case of Euro 
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Salon's InFA, the franchisor had to recognize this entity because of multiple lawsuits. 
Some franchisors, however, may attempt to ignore these groups, as indicated by Diane P. 
Meanwhile, other franchisors offer financial support, or meet with these independent 
groups out of courtesy. 
In the third situation, boards in an adversarial relationship that do not have legal 
rights and were initiated by the franchisor, may either dissolve or transition to an 
independent association. In Phase 1 interviews, we heard Kevin S. discuss how the 
franchisee board members recognized their own impotence and therefore, opted to 
disband. Likewise, we heard from Dave H., whose organization disbanded the board 
after a meeting in which the franchisees requested the brand be sold. There were also 
two interviewees who discussed how their franchisor-supported council transitioned to 
independent franchise associations. 
Not surprisingly, these antagonistic boards are likely to be hampered by distrust 
of the franchisor, and the atmosphere plagued by tension. Importantly, it is not always 
the franchisor that has the power in these board relationships. Euro Salon's FAB was 
firmly-established, and the power balance favored the franchisees. Likewise, in Jerry 
M.' s situation described in Phase 1, the franchisees in that system had more votes on the 
board than the franchisor. 
Based on evidence from Phase 1 interviews, there may also be "separate 
franchisee only" meetings" held. Such was the case described by Tim T., Dave B, and 
Dale C. from Phase 1 interviews. In an antagonistic relationship, the franchisor and 
franchisees may not even agree on the board's overall performance. Such was the case 
with Euro Salon, in which the franchisee board members graded the FAB's performance 
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in the A range, while the franchisor gave the board a C. In contrast, Jerry M. admitted 
that "folks on both sides would say ours [advisory board] is a dysfunctional mess right 
now." Jerry, however, went on to say that he believed the board could be structured to 
make it a strong relationship where there was bonding and mutual respect. Regardless of 
whether there is agreement on the board's performance, in these antagonistic 
relationships, the boards are often crippled by internal dissension and turmoil that bleeds 
out into the broader franchise community. 
Limitations 
In addition to a total of 47 interviews, my first-hand insights into board meetings 
and board conference calls allowed for observation of behaviors and attitudes occurring 
in their natural settings. I was also given access to bylaws, agendas and meeting minutes 
to further enhance the robustness of the research. These multiple data collection methods 
provide evidence of triangulation. 
This study, however, does have several limitations, many of which were 
addressed in Chapter 3. While robust in the quantity of interviews, the number of "in-
person" board meetings was restricted to four. This was based on the timing for Phase 2 
of the study being completed in eight months. Furthermore, in the case of Euro Salon's 
FAB, I was limited to observations via conference calls only. This was due to the FAB's 
one meeting being held so early on in my relationship with them, that I had not yet 
established rapport with the group to gain "in-person" access. 
I believe that the most significant limitation to this study is that I am the only 
investigator. Ideally, multiple researchers engage in observations, develop themes 
separately, code independently, and then cross-code to provide inter-rater reliability 
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confidence. Also, multiple researchers can ultimately compare findings and discuss 
alternative interpretations. An ancillary limitation is that I also risk bias in that my 
background is in franchising. I attempted to mitigate my personal bias through my 
journal entries and by continually questioning my interpretations to ensure evidence 
existed that validated my statements. 
Implications 
The conditions necessary for a healthy franchise board are similar to the 
conditions necessary for a healthy organization. According to Morse (1968) healthy 
organizations include "cooperative group relations, consensus, integration, and 
commitment to the tasks, creativity, authentic behavior, freedom from threat, full 
utilization of a person's capabilities, and flexibility." Similar language was used by 
Miles (1966) when he described a healthy organization as one that had a reasonable 
degree of cohesiveness. Likewise, Schein (2004) also focused on the need for the 
organization to have an internal climate of support. When board stakeholder 
relationships are mired in political battles, or focused on quid pro quo efforts, they are 
functioning below the horizontal axis on the stakeholder map and a strategy is needed to 
"stop the music" (Cummings & Worley, 2006) and examine the dynamics of the 
franchisee-franchisor relationship. 
Implications for OD Practitioners 
I embrace the idea that "theory informs practice," and I believe the findings from 
this study offer a variety of implications for both young and mature franchise 
organizations. This dissertation proposes a new tool, termed a stakeholder relationship 
map, which can begin to assess the dynamics of franchise advisory board relationships. 
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The idea is for franchise board members to examine their relationships and to determine 
where on the grid they currently reside. This can be a starting point for strengthening 
franchisee-franchisor board partnerships. 
Diagnosing where on the stakeholder grid a board operates entails three tasks: 1) 
understanding the historical context of why the board was formed, 2) defining the critical 
roles the board plays, and 3) examining the internal and external environments. These 
internal and external conditions include the governance processes, leadership styles, 
decision-making norms, and the attitudes of board members. To accomplish these tasks, a 
series of interviews would need to be conducted by an OD professional. 
Ideally, this would be just the first step a franchise advisory board could employ 
in an annual assessment. Additional steps might include: 
1. Seeking more information on the board's accomplishments and understanding 
when and how those occurred. 
2. Identifying what triggers issues in the franchise system. 
3. Interviewing or surveying franchisees in the broader system to understand 
their perceptions of the franchise advisory board's role and effectiveness. 
Implications for Franchise Advisory Boards 
Effective boards work together as teams, and there is mutual trust and respect that 
allows for constructive conflict to take place (Dulewicz et al. 1995). From my research, 
it is apparent that more attention needs to be paid to developing allied and activist 
stakeholder relationships on franchise advisory boards to build cohesive franchise 
organizations. In allied and activist environments, there is an open communication 
exchange and individuals share views without fear of reprisal. These types of stakeholder 
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board relationships strengthen the decision-making process of the boards. Furthermore, 
these relationships foster communication with the broader franchise system that is more 
likely to be well-received and well-respected. 
Ongoing effort is needed for boards to operate above the horizontal axis and 
maintain an activist or allied relationship. The insights that I offer below for advisory 
boards are based on my research findings, and from franchising practitioner literature: 
1. An advisory board should be initiated early in the life cycle of a franchise 
organization and be sponsored by the franchisor (Dwyer, 2008; Ingage, nd; Wulff, 
2005). The franchisor should handle the meeting logistics and costs associated 
with the meetings (Ingage Consulting, nd). 
2. The board should have a clear purpose and the roles of the board members should 
be clear to all (Dwyer, 2008; Jngage Consulting, nd; Wulff, 2005). 
3. Detailed bylaws should be created by the franchisor (Wulff, 2005) in conjunction 
with several well-respected franchisees in the system. A lawyer should be 
involved to ensure that no anti-trust laws are broken (Dwyer, 2008). 
4. Franchisee board members should be elected by the franchise community based 
on some system, this may be geographic, or by some other criteria appropriate for 
the organization. The chair of the board should be elected and should not be the 
franchisor. 
5. The board should have decision-making authority on an agreed upon span of 
issues and there should be a formal voting procedure. Issues not in the boards 
span may be discussed for input only. 
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6. The chair of the board and new board members receive training in listening skills, 
engaging in constructive conflict, and communicating with those they represent. 
7. Regular communication must occur both horizontally, among board members, 
and vertically, between the board and the broader franchise community (Dwyer, 
2008; Ingage Consulting, nd). Communication from the board to the franchisees 
at large should be a joint effort between the franchisees and the franchisor. 
8. Processes are built into the board to hold franchisee members accountable for 
meeting with their constituents. 
9. Social capital is developed with board members by having at least two in-person 
meetings a year, including board dinners prior to, or after, the meetings. These 
dinners and trips are communicated to the broader franchise community to ensure 
trans parency. 
10. Annual board evaluations are conducted by an independent consultant. The report 
is then issued to the board and to the broader franchise community in the spirit of 
openness. 
11. Successful franchise organizations with advisory boards are benchmarked to gain 
insights on their governance processes. The board is willing to adopt new 
processes to continually improve. 
12. Given the possibility for ownership change, advisory boards need some built in 
mechanism to ensure survival. 
Future Research 
The stakeholder map that emerged from this study could provide franchise 
organizations with a simplified way to diagnose their board's relationship. This research 
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supports corporate and nonprofit board literature (Brown, 2007; Curran & Totten, 2010; 
Dulewicz et aI., 1995; Van Buren, 2010) that recommends that boards clarify their roles, 
assess their relationships, and, if necessary, introduce OD interventions to help improve 
effectiveness. My research was exploratory in nature, using interviews and case studies 
to assess the fruitfulness of the proposed stakeholder map. Future research could 
quantitatively test the framework with the creation of a survey tool. A survey would 
offer a more rapid way to distinguish the type of stakeholder relationships operating. 
While I discussed several factors that can facilitate or hinder board relationships (e.g., 
governance processes, leadership, board member attitudes), other variables may also have 
impact. Additional research could extend the list of variables that influence the board 
relationship dynamics. Past research on corporate boards has shown that mature boards, 
as opposed to newly formed boards, have unique conditions impacting the relationship 
(Huse, 1998). An examination of franchise boards in different life stages could shed light 
on that subject. 
Many interviewees in this research study noted that, while it didn't always exist in 
their situations, trust in the franchisor-franchisee relationship was an essential ingredient 
for board effectiveness. This data supports prior research that showed trust and 
commitment were variables that impacted relationships (Dickey, McKnight, & George, 
2007; Morgan & Hunt, 1994). How to build trust could be further explored in the context 
of franchise advisory boards. Such data could help OD interventions that focus on 
building collaboration. 
Future research might also focus on what type of stakeholder relationship occurs 
when boards are led from the "front," where the corporation proposes the strategies and 
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leads the conversation, versus boards that are led from "behind," where the firm takes a 
backseat and allows other members to trigger the discussions (Parker, 2007). Leadership 
theories could be explored (e.g. Fiedler, 1967; Ginnett, 2005; Hackman, 1990) to 
determine whether the chair's leadership style has an impact on the type of stakeholder 
relationship that operates within a franchise board. 
An assumption, implicit in this research, was that boards would benefit from 
evaluations that distinguish the type of stakeholder relationship operating. In addition, I 
suggested that annual franchise advisory board evaluations could help identify whether 
OD change efforts were needed. Prior studies of nonprofit boards (Brudney & Murray, 
1998; Holland & Jackson, 1998) have shown that intentional efforts to improve board 
performance have enhanced the effectiveness of boards. Moving stakeholder 
relationships, however, proves both challenging and time consuming (Polonsky, 
Schuppisser, & Beldona, 2002). Future action research efforts could help ferret out 
whether a change to franchise advisory board conditions results in moving the 
stakeholder relationship, and helps achieve more synergistic board behavior. 
Ultimately, however, I believe my research achieved the purpose of illuminating 
how stakeholder relationships on franchise boards could be categorized. By considering 
the reasons why boards form, the roles that franchisors and franchisees ascribe to their 
boards, the governance patterns used in action and the attitudes of board members 
towards one another, one can help identify what type of relationships operate. I recall, 
from my Phase 1 interviews, Jerry M'.s plea for a better way to "hardwire a franchise 
board." Jerry wanted something a board could "plumb into their system to help create 
transparency." He added that finding this would be "nirvana" (JM, 5/16). Jerry, it is my 
190 
sincere hope that this study will offer a start in assisting the franchise community build 
better advisory boards, and will spur additional research to help discover "nirvana." 
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Ask for background of interviewee. 
• What type of board, council, or association does your system have in place? 
• Why did this board form? 
• What roles does this board play? 
• How would you classify these roles in terms of priority? 
• How would you describe the structure of the board? Probes on: 
How are the board members determined? 
What "rules" govern this board? 
How often does the board meet? 
Who participates on the board? 
How do franchisees communicate with their constituents? 
What areas does the board spend most of its time on? 
How does the franchisor seek input on programs and polices? 
• How are problems identified that come to the board? 
• How does the relationship between board members and franchisors impact the 
rank and file franchisees 
• How do franchisees on the board deal with conflicts of interest that can place 
them between the franchisor and those franchisees they represent? 
• What norms are used to generate agreement on the board? 
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• How do you think the "x" feels about the board? 
• What types of tension exist on the board? 
• How would you evaluate the franchisors' responsiveness to board members issues 
or concerns? 
• What attributes are needed to have a successful board relationship? 
Final broad question: What research would you like to have done that would help 





Franchisee Board Franchisor Board 
Number of Times RQ Member Member 
Not Not 
Observed Observed Observed Observed 
Questions asked by franchisees 4 
Questions asked by franchisors 4 
Humor is used 4 
Laughter occurs 4 
V oices are raised 4 
Caustic remarks occur 4 
Sidebar conversations occur 4 
Decisions agreed upon 2 
Items tabled 3 
V oting occurs 3 
Breaks occur 3 
Re_C}uests for assistance occur 2 
Reference to rank & file 
2 
franchisees 
New ideas are proposed 2 




Contact Summary Form: Franchise Advisory Board Study 
Title: 
Franchisee: Franchisor: Both: Other: 
Date of Interview: Today's Date: 
In-Person: Site: Length: 
Phone: Length: 
Background of Interviewee: 
Company Info: 
What were the main issues that struck you in this contact: 
Summarize the info you got or failed to get for each question? 
Anything that struck you as salient, interesting, or important with this contact? 
Who did they refer you to for further exploration? 





































Emailed agenda received on 5/23111 
Emailed agenda received on 7125111 
Emailed agenda received on 8129111 
Emailed agenda received on 9/26111 
Emailed agenda received on 10/25/11 
My meeting notes from 5/25 conference call 
My meeting notes from 7/27 conference call 
My meeting notes from 8/31 conference call 
My meeting notes from 9/28 conference call 
My meeting notes from 10126 conference call 
Official meeting minutes 
Bylaws dated November 7, 1997 
Policy Statement 
Interview Adam G. 
Interview Steve C. 
Interview John R. 
Interview Nelson N. 
Interview Theresa N. 
Interview Sean O. 
Interview David B. 
Observations from 5125 conference call 
Observations from 7127 conference call 
Observations from 8/31 conference call 
Observations from 9/28 conference call 
Observations from 10/26 conference call 
Agenda received on 3128111 for board meeting 
Emailed agenda received on 5/6 for 5/19 conference call 











































MP, 3/21; MP, 10/3 
Emailed Agenda received on 7/16111 for 7/28 conference call 
Agenda received on 9/2611lfor board meeting 
Bylaws dated October 14, 2011 
Official meeting minutes from March 28th board meeting 
Official meeting minutes from May 19th conference call 
Official meeting minutes from June 23rd conference call 
Official meeting minutes from July 28th conference call 
My meeting notes from March 28th board meeting 
My meeting notes from May 19th conference call 
My meeting notes from June 23rd conference call 
My meeting notes from July 28th conference call 
My meeting notes from Sept 25th board meeting 
Interview Matt P. 
KM, 4/28; KM 9126 Interview Ken M. 
JL, 9/26 Interview Joe L. 
MG, 9/25; MG, 9/26 Interview Mitchell G. 
BH, 8/2; BH, 9/26 Interview Betty H. 
GH, 8/2; GH, 9126 Interview Gordon H. 
MA, 4/11; MA 9/26 Interview Marty A. 





















Interview Karen F. 
Interview Bruce M. 
Interview Dee B. 
Interview Danny S. 
Interview Beverly P. 
Observations from March 29th board meeting 
Observations from March 29th board dinner 
Observations from May 19th conference call 
Observations from June 23rd conference call 
Observations from July 28th conference call 
Observations from 9124/11 board dinner 
Observations from Sept 25th board meeting 
Agenda emailed for 3/9/11 conference call 
Agenda emailed for 3/30111 conference call 
Agenda emailed for 4127111 conference call 
Agenda for board 'meeting provided on 5/20 
Agenda emailed for 6/21111 conference call 
Agenda emailed for 8/31 conference call 
Agenda em ailed for 9118 conference call 









































Z_MN_03_9 My meeting notes form 3/9/11 conference call 3/9/11 
Z_MN_3_31 My meeting notes from 3/31/11 conference call 3/31/111 
Z_MN_4_27 My meeting notes from 4127/11 conference call 4/27/11 
Z_MN_5_20 My meeting notes from 5/20 board meeting 5120/11 
Z_MN_6_21 My meeting notes from 6121111 conference call 6/21111 
Z_MN_8_31 My meeting notes from 8/31 conference call 8/31111 
Z_MN_9_18 My meeting notes from 9/18 board meeting 9/18/11 
Z_MN_I0_19 My meeting notes from 10/19 conference call 10119/11 
SE, 4/19; SE, 10/3 Shelly E. interview 4/19111; 10/3/2011 
TG, 8114; TG, 9/23 Travis G. Interview 8/14; 9123 
TD,10/4 Dusty D. interview 3/16/11; 10/4/11 
TC,9/29 Tori C interview 9/29/11 
PE,9129 Pete E. interview 9/29111 
JD,9119 Jay D. interview 9/19/11 
Observation, 3/9 Observations from March 9th conference call 3/9/11 
Observation, 3/31 Observations from March 31 st conference call 3/31111 
Observation, 4/27 Observations from April 27th conference call 4/27/11 
Observation, 5119 Observations from May 19th board dinner 5/19/11 
Observation, 5/20 Observations from 20th board meeting 5/20/11 
Observation, 6/21 Observations from June 21st conference call 6121111 
Observation, 8/31 Observations from August 31 st conference call 8/31111 
Observation, 9/18 Observations from Sept 18th board meeting 9/18/11 
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